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PREFACE

Benin, Ecuador, Peru or India are tropical countries,
impoverished for many reasons: for their colonial past, the plundering
of natural resources, the loss of forests and biodiversity, the ruling
neoliberal model, because peasants no longer have access to their land
and seeds, due to the weight of external debt, and the severity with
which climate change has hit these countries. In Africa, Asia and Latin
America we see the same occurring: inequality, corruption, poverty and
death.
Our continents have been plundered with intensity and have
lived through conditions of violence, massive forced migrations, coups
d’etat, civil wars, the scourge of AIDS, famine, genocide and droughts
or floods, as a consequence to climate change.
During these last years, oil and gas extraction, mining activities
and the wood industry, have played an ominous role in the
development of peoples, as apart from provoking environmental
impacts they have also caused enormous and irreversible social and
economic impacts on countries. The history of these activities has also
been linked to violence, dictatorships, to massacres. Examples such as
those of oil in Nigeria, Sudan or Colombia, mining in Peru or
Philippines, are known by us all; they are cases in which the presence of
oil, gas or mineral has been a cause for armed conflicts, and poverty.
Also biopiracy, a common practice among European colonists in
America (the Spanish, English, Dutch and Portuguese from this
colonial period were biopirates), is today presented under a new guise,
and comes in the form of a new scourge. With it, pharmaceutical and
seed companies have made themselves rich at the cost of the loss of
agriculture and wild biodiversity in our countries, as well as the
7

collective rights of indigenous and peasant populations where such
resources are extracted.
On the other hand, all Third World countries live under political
and economic pressure owing to our external debt, contracted basically
to establish a development model based on intensive extraction of
these same natural resources.
Ecological debt is a new concept explaining an old practice – the
real flow of capital, natural resources and human beings – and explains
the destiny and effects of external monetary debt. Moreover, it
proposes to identify debtors and creditors of the debt in this unfair
world, made up of an enriched North that keeps its high level of
consumption thanks to resources extracted in the South.
In the centre of this model of global and local overconsumption, over-exploitation, inequality and debt, we find fossil
fuels, whose exploitation, extraction, transport, refining and
consumption provoke serious environmental, social and cultural
impacts, on both a local and global scale (such as climate change),
thereby constituting a great part of the ecological debt.
This chain, which goes from the extraction to the consumption
of resources, presents various reasons that result in an ecological debt.
-

The eradication of cultures and sacrificing of the health of the
people.

-

The loss of wild and agricultural biodiversity owing to pollution
generated by this activity.

-

The destruction of eco-systems (seas, coasts, forests, etc.)

-

The cancellation of other sources of clean, renewable and lowimpact energy resources, due to disloyal competition from
differing subsidies in the hydrocarbon industry.
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-

The production of tons of carbon that inevitably reach the
atmosphere and exceed the planet’s capacity for absorption, thus
provoking the increase of greenhouse effect and climatic chaos.

-

The imposition of increasing export of hydrocarbons to pay off
growing external debt.

-

The appropriation and control of public goods.

-

The hoarding and monopoly control of a strategic resource,
through which the basis of the industrial society’s production
system is controlled.

-

Social and environmental, local and global costs not included in
the value of oil and gas exports.

We are in an opportune moment to exchange strategies in the
face of globalisation. Every day spaces are created for developing
perspectives and common perceptions about ecological debt, and this
allows us to share experiences and case studies in order to learn more
about concrete possibilities to make our demands.
The Southern Peoples’ Ecological Debt Creditors Alliance, a
platform that facilitates and brings together some of these initiatives,
wishes to present this publication as part of the journey towards
confronting local and global impacts and bringing an end to conditions
of violence and destruction.
This book draws on presentations made in three seminars on
ecological debt, climate change, biopiracy and mining held
consecutively in Benin, Ecuador and Peru over the last year. We hope
that this publication, now launched in Mumbai, helps us build the way
to creating new societies and weaving new networks of solidarity
between the people of Africa, Asia, Latin America and other friendly
nations.
Ivonne Yánez
Lima, August 2003
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We are not Debtors,
we are Creditor
Aurora Donoso Game
SOUTHERN PEOPLES ECOLOGICAL DEBT
CREDITORS ALLIANCE (SPEDCA)
Acción Ecológica - Ecuador

The genocidal attack by the USA and its European allies on Irak
is a form of action, based on arrogance, ambition and cruelty, by which
the world’s largest powers ensure for themselves the flow of strategic
natural resources that sustain their economy. This has been a
permanent practice throughout history.
In Asia, Africa and Latin America we have been submitted to a
long history of plundering and destruction which began at the time of
European colonization: mercury poisoning in silver amalgam in Potosí,
Bolivia; exploitation of gold in Minas Gerais in Brasil; the rubber of the
Amazon; guano from Peru; the quebracho in Argentina; the bark of the
quinine tree (cinchona) from the Andes; contamination from copper
dioxide in Chile, and many other similar cases in Asia and Africa. If we
look at the size of Latin America, Asia and Africa in relation to the size
of Europe we can understand the volume of wealth that was transferred
from these colonies to the North.
The industrialized countries of the North were formed thanks to
the slave work of Southern peoples, violently subjected to the
continual exploitation of our natural wealth during the colonial
period.
Colonization also started permanent processes of exploitation
and impoverishment in the countries and peoples of the South, that
11

continue to this day. From then on, the industrialized countries of the
North became accustomed to a way life based on the exploitation of the
South. And all this debt has remained in impunity!
These days we live through silent wars of looting and systematic
destruction of our lands, peoples and cultures, by the Northern
industrialized countries, their governments, corporations and financial
institutions, in complicity with some Southern governments and elites,
to favor the accumulation of world wealth in their hands. This
accumulation has reached such an extent that of the 100 largest
economies of the world, 52 are global corporations and 48 are
countries. 90% of these corporations are found in industrialized
countries, they are responsible for 70% of world trade and possess 90%
of all patented technology and products. (Ecumenical Agency for
Development Aid).
Owing to innovations in production technology,
communication and transportation, there is currently a permanent
increase in: the rhythm of intensive extraction of non-renewable
resources such as oil, gas and minerals; the substitution of native forest
by wood plantations and other monoculture for exportation; the
destruction of coastal ecosystems for shrimp aquaculture and over
fishing; the biopiracy.
The case of oil exploitation provides us with a clear example as
industrialized countries in the North depend principally on oil to
sustain their industries and trade. This is where oil company violence
comes from such as Shell, Chevron-Texaco, Exxon Mobil, Total-FinaElf, AGIP, British Petroleum, Unocal, Occidental and others that are
operating in Africa, Asia and Latin America, in countries such as
Burma, Thailand, Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Colombia, Ecuador and
others. These companies have destroyed and contaminated nature and
affected indigenous, black peoples, peasant and fishermen. Peoples
such as the Cofán, Secoya, Huaorani, Quichua, Shuar and Achuar in
Ecuador, Mapuche in Chile, Guahibos and Araucas in Colombia,
Achua, Urarina, Yora in Peru, Sakai and Aceh in Indonesia, Karen in
12

Burma, Ogoni in Nigeria, Bakola in Cameroon, peasant villages in
Chad, ethnic minorities in Sudan, and all the peoples of the Niger Delta
and many others.
These companies are those mainly responsible for the social and
environmental destruction of the affected communities by oil
expansion, as well as the impact due to climate change from carbon
emissions into the atmosphere from oil burning.
Examples such as these can be found throughout activities of
intensive exploitation of natural resource, in exportation monoculture,
in mega projects such as hydro electrics, motorways, hydroways, dams,
and many others promoted in the South by the IMF, the Multilateral
Development Bank, transnational corporations and Northern
governments.
All these elements add up to form the North’s immense
ecological debt with the South.

What is Ecological Debt?
Ecological debt is accumulated, historical and current debt,
which industrialised Northern countries, their institutions and
corporations owe to the peoples and countries of the South for having
plundered and used of their natural resources, exploited and
impoverished their peoples, and systematically destroyed, devastated
and contaminated their natural heritage and sources of sustenance.
Industrialised countries are also responsible for the gradual
destruction of the planet as a result of their patterns of production and
consumption, and environmental pollution that generates the
greenhouse effect.
In specific terms, ecological debt includes:
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Historical debt for the plundering, destruction, devastation,
slave labour and cultural annihilation in the South that Northern
countries generated during the colonial era.
Debt from the social, environmental, economic and cultural
impact of the extraction of natural resources, such as oil, gas, minerals,
marine and forest life.
Debt from the intellectual appropriation and use of ancestral
knowledge relating to seeds, the use of medicinal plants and other
knowledge on which biotechnology and modern agro-business
depends, for which royalties must be paid.
Debt from the impact of imposing Green Revolution
technological packages that include “improved” seeds and agro-toxics,
and from the genetically modified seeds of the Biotechnological
Revolution.
Debt from the use and degradation of the best land, water, air,
and human energy to establish export monoculture, putting the food
and cultural sovereignty of communities at risk.
Debt from the pollution of the atmosphere with carbon by
industrialised countries through their disproportionate gas emissions,
which are the principal cause of climate change and ozone layer
damage. Debt from the appropriation of the atmosphere and the
carbon absorption capacity of oceans, vegetation and forests.
Debt for the damage caused by chemical, nuclear and biological
arms production, and also toxic substances and residues that are
deposited in Southern countries.
To talk of ecological debt is to demand environmental, social and
economic justice; it is to understand the whys and wherefores of wealth
and poverty; to identify those responsible for social, cultural and
environmental damage both locally and globally; to fight against
impunity: it is the opportunity to stop the destruction of the lives and
peoples of the South.
14

Mechanisms of plunder
It would seem that the current form of plundering uses more
subtle methods than those applied during the conquest, but
nevertheless hiding behind them we find economic and warlike threats
like those we have lived under in recent times.
There is more and more confirmed evidence suggesting that
decisions on global running economics and the control of natural
resources, are taken by parallel and supranational organizations that
keep themselves hidden from the public eye.
Council on Foreign Relationships (CFR) is an entity that brings
together the most powerful individuals, institutions and corporations
of Northern countries, among them media owners, IMF directors, the
main directors of multilateral Bank, the most powerful transnational
corporations, politicians, main representatives of governments,
universities, investigators and armed forces, espionage and security
bodies. They meet periodically to take decisions and define strategies
on economic and military policy on a global level.1 This is the only way
that we can explain the coherence in the objectives that these actors
share – control of military geopolitics, of the planet’s economies and
natural resources.
Among the mechanisms used are the impositions of the
neoliberal model, external debt and free trade agreements. These
mechanisms are promoted by international organizations in which
Northern government are hegemonic: the IMF, the World Bank, the
regional development bank, the WTO and others.

The Business of external Debt
The external debt crisis of the 1980s was the ideal pretext for
powerful groups in the North who, through their international
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financial institutions, conditioned Southern countries in order to
maintain control over their economies and sustain the flow of raw
material, cheap labour and financial resources.
Structural Adjustment Programs, “Poverty Relief ” Programs and
Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) imposed by the IMF, the World
Bank and the multilateral regional Bank, are ways of imposing the
neoliberal model, which includes: privatization of strategic sectors,
opening up to foreign investment, labour and environmental flexibility,
fiscal adjustment, economic and environmental deregulation.
The cynically named “Aid for Development” are credits oriented
to the needs of these powerful groups. Credits to finance structural
adjustment programs. Credits with variable interest rates, which
turned into usurer interest rates. Credits to buy technology and pay for
advice. Credits to buy military equipment and consultancies. Credits
for building infrastructure that facilitated over-exploitation of natural
resources. Credits to pay interest on external debt. Credits to change
national legislation and allow legalization of the illegitimate, as is the
case of laws that promote mining which eliminate environmental
protection laws.
With co-financing from the Swedish and British governments,
the World Bank lent $24 million to Ecuador, to promote industrial
mining through a new Mining Law that would give enormous
guarantees to foreign investment, financing the country’s mining land
register, and creating an authority that cynically claimed to seek mining
development and environmental protection. Nevertheless, it is well
known that the World Bank also represents important mining interests,
and the $643 million given to mining projects in 1996 were not
donated in vain.2
According to the report “Perverse Harvest”3 in the 20 years
between 1983 and 2002, the multilateral bank lent Ecuador
approximately $1.425 billion for projects relating to the agricultural
sector. $600 million were destined directly to this sector and the rest
16

went to other projects that had a significant agricultural component, or
that influenced policy in the same sector.
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and World Bank
credits were directed to changing agricultural policy, to growth the use
of the “green package” and all agro-industrial technology, as well as to
promote agro-exports in Ecuador, in order to generate currency to
service external debt. These were credits based on the precepts of the
Washington Consensus, and benefited transnational corporations that
produce and sell pesticide, seeds, fertilizers and equipments, as well as
those that promoted the spread of artificial irrigation systems and
controlled technology etc.
An article published by the Washington Post points out that the
webpage of USAID proclaims that: “the principal beneficiary of the US
foreign aid program has always been the United States itself ” and that
almost 80% of USAID contracts go “directly to US companies”. It also
states that in 2000, USAID programmes, which cost $7.5 billion, helped
to create new markets for US goods and “hundreds of thousands of
jobs” for US citizens. (Michael Dobbs, Aid abroad is business back home,
Washington Post, 25 January, 2001).
All such activities financed by usurer credits have benefited
principally the “donors” and have generated serious social, cultural,
economic and environmental impacts in Southern countries: displaced
communities, impoverishment, migration, deforestation, loss of
agricultural and wild biodiversity, soil erosion and water
contamination.
External debt generates ecological debt both through directing
these credits towards activities that produce social and environmental
impacts and through the application of pressure to generate currency
for the payment of interest on the debt.
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Free Trade Increases Ecological Debt
According to the report “Blockade By the South?”4 free trade was
imposed through structural adjustment programs during the 1970s
and 1980s, and in more recent years has come under the name of
“poverty relief ”. However it is now clear that it is the negotiation of free
trade treaties, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico and the USA, or
bilateral treaties, that are the most powerful tools employed by
corporate interests to control the world economy. These treaties aspire
to the unconditional opening-up of markets, ensuring intellectual
property rights, giving complete freedom to investments and
guaranteeing the provision of strategic natural resources (oil, gas,
minerals, freshwater and biodiversity).
Monopoly control of basic global food is aspired to by
corporations who wish to consolidate it through free trade agreements,
using as bait the promise that Southern farmers, particularly small- and
medium-scale ones, will have access to Northern markets, historically
closed under protectionist policy.
Nevertheless, what we are seeing is that in the run-up to 2005,
the year in which the FTAA enters into effect, and a time with
substantial advances in negotiations with the WTO, there is a massive
amount of agricultural products coming into our countries, controlled
in the large part by transnational companies evidently seeking to make
national producers bankrupt. The pricing policy of transnationals in
these cases does not only reflect the exaggerated subsidies that
accompany agricultural production in the North, but also the strategic
need to eliminate those who compete with them, that is, millions of
rural peasants who still produce corn, rice, potatoes, wheat, coffee,
milk, meat and other products that form part of the basic diet across
the world. Only in this way will they be able to obtain a monopoly.
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To increase production and sale so as to flood the global market
necessarily implies the construction of better infrastructure, greater
energy supply (oil, gas, hydroelectric) and the exploitation of more
natural resources (minerals, wood, biodiversity, water). It also means
greater external indebtedness, as it aims at putting into practice the
IDB project named Regional Infrastructure Integration in South
America, a project similar to the Puebla Panama Plan in Central
America, which comprises the construction of megaprojects within
multi-modal strategies that include transport, energy and
communications. The IDB, the World Bank, CAF and Fonplata will
provide the credit. The exploitation of natural resources and the
infrastructure building will in most cases be carried out by
transnational companies: this is a good deal.
According to the Network of Resistance to Oil Activities in
Tropical Countries – OILWATCH, despite the international recognition
that the burning of fossil fuels is the principal cause of climate change,
investment in fossil energy over the last years has been 100 times
greater than in other energy sources. It is calculated that Multilateral
Credit Agencies have invested nearly $50 billion in fossil fuels.
To sustain the globalization process, the petrol frontier has
expanded over the last ten years, with 100 new countries incorporated
into exploration activities and exploration and exploitation agreements
drawn up in heartlands.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration,
world demand for oil will increase by 56% (that is, 43 million barrels
per day) in the coming two decades. The Energy Department’s
Statistical Agency foresees that world demand will increase from 77
million barrels per day, the current consumption, to 119.6 million
barrels per day in 2020.
To ensure control over the resources, transnationals require geopolitical control supported by military plans. It is not in vain that, for
example, the US has set up military bases in Ecuador (Manta),
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Colombia (Tres Esquinas and Leticia), Peru (Iquitos), Aruba (Reina
Beatriz), Curacao (Hato), Cuba (Guantanamo) and Honduras (Soto de
Cano). They plan to build military bases in El Salvador and Argentina
(Tierra de Fuego), and control the Alcántara base in Brazil. The USA
also finances the military component of Plan Colombia. With the
declaration of the war on terrorism after 11 September 2001, the US
has given itself a green light to install itself in any corner of the world.
All of these plans increase the social and ecological debt that the
North has with the South. For this reason it is important to hinder the
carrying out of such plans and to demand the debt that is owed. We
must strengthen our sovereignty, our defence of collective and
environmental rights, and the sustainability of our peoples and
countries.

We, the People of the South, are creditors
On the slave route in Benin, Africa, one of the rites imposed by
colonists was to turn around on one of the sections of the route, so as
to forget history. This very same idea is what is intended by the
neoliberal system; that we forget our history, its deep roots in our land
which sustains and feeds us and strengthens our resistance.
It is time to stop the looting and destruction, the accumulation
of wealth and the systems that promote it. Our history shows us that we
are CREDITORS OF ECOLOGICAL DEBT.
By constituting ourselves as CREDITORS we change the power
relationship. From the position of creditors we can prevent ecological
debt from increasing, demand the sanctioning of those responsible for
environmental and social damage, and the restoration of affected
ecosystems.
As CREDITORS of ecological debt, we must demand the
cancellation of external debt, which apart from being paid financially
already, is illegitimate as it increases ecological debt.
20

To be CREDITORS implies a call to peoples to re-appropriate
nature, to manage their resources and life sources in a sustainable
manner.
It thus becomes indispensable to form alliances among Southern
peoples who are all creditors of ecological debt, as a space that allows
us to unify and strengthen our demands and positions.
Thankfully, it does exist movements opposed to the neoliberal
system, that struggle to avoid the control of transnational corporations,
to seek structural solutions to the problem of external debt. Likewise,
indigenous peoples and peasants have suffered the impact of this
model and are resisting privatizations, exploitation of their natural
resources and imposition of free trade agreements.

Notes
1
2
3

4

The World’s Brain. Finance and external debt as tools for domination. Adrian
Salbuchi, Córdova y Buenos Aires, 2001, 2002.
Socavando los Bosques. World Rainforest Movement. January 2000.
Perverse Harvest. International Institutions and Ecological Debt of Agroindustries in
Ecuator. Instituto de Estudios Ecologistas del Tercer Mundo. Acción Ecológica.
Gerard Coffey 2004.
Blockade by the South?. Southern Peoples Ecological Debt Creditors Alliance –
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SPACES FOR DEBATE AND ACTION
FACING ECOLOGICAL DEBT

In the face of the problem of ecological debt, several spaces with
complementary objectives have been formed: the Southern
Peoples’ Ecological Debt Creditors Alliance (SPEDCA), the
European Network for the Recognition of Ecological Debt
(ENRED), the Debate Group on Environmental Justice, Ecological
Debt and Sustainability (JADES), as well as other organizations and
networks that have incorporated ecological debt as a priority
within their objectives.
THE SOUTHERN PEOPLES’ ECOLOGICAL DEBT
CREDITORS ALLIANCE - SPEDCA
This is an initiative launched in Prague in 2000 for the Campaign
for the Recognition and Demand of Ecological Debt. The Alliance
is a space to bring together organisations, networks and social
movements from the South to identify ecological debt from North
to South, to look for mechanisms that make demands viable, to
demand sanctions, compensation to those affected, and
environmental restoration. It seeks to strengthen the joint positions
of creditors to achieve recognition of ecological debt, repairing the
damages caused and prevention of potential impacts.
THE EUROPEAN NETWORK FOR THE RECOGNITION
OF ECOLOGICAL DEBT - ENRED
Set up in Paris in 2003 and promoted through the Debt
Observatory, the objective of ENRED is to drive forward and
coordinate efforts that seek the recognition of ecological debt
contracted by European countries with Southern countries, as well
as to contribute to the reduction/elimination of ecological debt in
the future. For this purpose they will contribute to, strengthen and
propose campaigns in place to this effect on a European level.
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DEBATE GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE,
ECOLOGICAL DEBT AND SUSTAINABILITY - JADES
Started in Paris in 2003 as a proposal by the ecological debt
campaign’s promoter, José Augusto Padua, this proposal is
supported by Alianza 21. The group is made up of activists and
academics from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe who have
worked on the topic for several years. The objective of the group
is to gain recognition, restoration and prevent future accumulation
of ecological debt, through research, debate, communication and
lobbying as a contribution to environmental justice and
sustainability.
OTHER ORGANISATIONS AND NETWORKS THAT HAVE
INCORPORATED ECOLOGICAL DEBT INTO THEIR WORK
Other networks and organisations that have incorporated
ecological debt within their priorities do exist, among them:
Jubilee South, Oilwatch, World Council of Churches (WCC),
Kairos, Vodo, the Committee for the Cancellation of External Debt
in the Third World (CADTM), and Friends of the Earth
International. All of them have organised events to spread
arguments based on ecological debt and look for joint strategies
that consider the problem of both external debt and ecological
debt.
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The ecological debt
in the context of sustainability*
Karin Nansen
REDES – Friends of the Earth - Uruguay

The industrialized countries of the North have generated an
ecological debt with the countries of the South since the times of the
conquest. This debt has increased throughout history, first through the
direct appropriation of natural goods and resources by the colonial
powers, and later by the imposition of a predatory development model,
unequal and inequitable terms of trade, the unjust and
disproportionate appropriation of ecological space and the
privatisation of nature and services by transnational companies
(TNCs).

Introduction
The current development model fostered by the neo-liberal
economic system is based on a “grow or die” doctrine that seeks
continuous economic growth and the maximization of profits in the
shortest term possible. The very essence of this doctrine is questioned
as it generates destruction and degradation of the ecosystems on which
life and cultures depend, deterioration of the quality of life of the
majority of the population, and major social, economic and political

*

Article presented during the “Globalization, Ecological Debt, Climate Change and
Sustainability: A South-South Conference”, held in Benin, in November 2001,
organised by Acción Ecológica from Ecuador, FoE Benin and FoE International.
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exclusion. This model is responsible for increasing an ecological debt
that has been the result of the colonial world order and the subsequent
models imposed on southern communities.
Neo-liberal economic globalisation, which is really about the
expansion of TNC power throughout the planet, comes alongside the
authoritarian imposition of a homogeneous model that threatens
biological diversity, cultural identities and results in the concentration
of power and resources.
Natural resources and the services they offer to humanity are
commodified and put at the service of the “God market” - which has
the capacity of transforming everything into money- instead of at the
service of human welfare. The supposedly “invisible hand” of the
market is presented as the only way of guaranteeing an efficient use of
natural resources and managing supply and demand in a rational
manner. The current system aims at giving up the planet, its people, its
ecosystems and its life to that invisible hand which in reality is an
appendage of TNCs.
In order to confront an authoritarian, destructive and
marginalizing model, diverse social movements all around the world
are becoming organized to resist this paradigm based on destruction
and the incremental accumulation of an ecological debt. They are also
forging sustainable, just and participatory alternatives based on an
integrated vision of sustainability, involving four dynamic dimensions
that interact among each other: ecological, social, economic and
political dimensions.
Ecological dimension: related to the enhancement of diversity,
the profound knowledge about nature’s cycles and fostering
productivity of ecosystems. This ecological dimension calls for the
resistance to homogenisation and for the defence of the public
character of natural goods against commodification and privatisation.
Social dimension: related to collective rights and social justice.
Calls for respect and recognition of cultural diversity as well as gender
26

equity are to be key components of sustainability, demanding new
relationships among human beings.
The economic and political dimension: Demands a redefinition
of economy to serve human needs in an integrated manner, according
to nature’s potential and human cultures. The economy must be
embedded in and controlled by society, and the market should mainly
be a means to exchange products. This dimension should be associated
to the diversification and decentralization of the economy.

Neoliberal Globalisation and Ecological Debt
The globalisation of exclusion,
homogenisation and degradation
The so-called economic globalisation is nothing other than the
expansion of the power of trans-national companies, favoured by
economic, financial and trade policies imposed by the World Bank
(WB)-International Monetary Fund (IMF)-World Trade Organization
(WTO) trident. Although these institutions declare in unison that their
objectives are to promote economic growth to guarantee development
and expand and liberalize international trade, their real objective,
which becomes more evident day to day, is to favour the accumulation
of power and resources under the control of few. This means
maintaining and increasing the benefits enjoyed by global corporate
actors.
The other face of the transnational financial capital expansion
process and the so-called integration of international markets, is the
increasing marginalisation and exclusion of the vast majority of the
world population and a major degradation and destruction of
ecosystems at the very base of life.
For global corporate stakeholders, the planet is in fact a
homogeneous globe that does not contain diverse peoples, cultures,
territories or histories. Thus, the same technological, economic (trade,
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finance and investment), educational and other policies will be suitable
throughout the planet to guarantee the development that comes from
economic growth.
But insofar as these policies have generated deep inequalities
(contrary to the trickle-down theory), have violated diversity (by only
adapting themselves to the interests and visions of the world held by
the corporate shareholders) and have had to be imposed in an
authoritarian manner (as they do not coincide with many
communities’ visions of the world), the model itself is characterized by
the strong social, economic, political and ecological exclusion it
generates, and by the continuous accumulation of an ecological debt.

Free trade doctrine vs. sustainability
The control of the economy by the market system, according to
Polanyi (1975) “means no less than the running of society as an adjunct
to the market: instead of economy being embedded by social relations
(as in the past), social relations are now embedded in the economic
system”.
The market should be an instrument of economy, whereby the
various economic stakeholders freely exchange products, in a
relationship of complementarity and equity. Nothing could be more
distant from this than the current market situation.
Instead of economics being conceived as the organization of
production and distribution for the satisfaction of human needs,
human needs are now determined by the market system, and the whole
production process is organized to produce pseudo satisfactors or
inhibitors.
Human beings and natural resources have been turned into
objects within the market sphere, while the anonymous market has
invaded the social and ecological spheres, aiming to replace the
relationships among human beings and between them and their
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environments.
Although the WTO has laid the foundations for the free
movement of products, services, investment and finance throughout
the “globe”, this same institution, similarly to other free trade
agreements, establishes new regulations aiming at protecting corporate
rights (for example, intellectual property rights and the right to equal
or better treatment for foreign investment). It goes so far as to allow
transnational companies to take governments to court over policies
that could affect the companies’ profits, as in the case of NAFTA, and
potentially in the FTAA).
In this respect, it may be said that free trade agreements and
their sacrosanct institutions, are substituting the regulations that
formerly protected the widest interests of a diversity of stakeholders,
through regulations aimed at favouring the interests of transnational
corporations.
As Sachs (2001) points out, both strategies - deregulation as well
as re-regulation - were pursued in the name of free trade. The
contradiction disappears as soon as one realizes that the aim in both
cases was to create a uniform legal foundation for a global economic
space.
In the name of the de-monopolization of economic activities,
new corporate monopolies have been set up, in a race of growth or
death, establishing new rules of the game for our societies and taking
control over decision-making in various walks of life.
Societies can no longer establish the rules of the game that
control the impacts of economic stakeholders. Today it is the major
private economic stakeholders who, through international financial
and trade institutions, establish these rules, achieving control over our
societies and over nature.
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The unsustainability of the economic theory of free trade
The economic theory of free trade is based on the idea of
comparative advantages and the consequent desirability of
specialization of labour, arguing for efficiency and output
maximization. Each country has a comparative advantage in producing
and exporting the resource or commodity for which it is most suited,
in terms of the availability of production factors; thus, trade benefits
all, as every country will specialize in producing the goods and
resources according to its comparative advantage.
But free trade is highly inefficient as products are transported
great distances instead of being produced locally or regionally. One of
the key characteristics of free trade is to increase the distance between
consumers and producers to allow for greater profits for corporate
actors, instead of promoting sustainable and diverse production
systems at local and regional levels.
Free trade also destroys cultural diversity and prevents citizens
from having diverse occupational choices, as its mandate is to specialize
only in some areas in which a country is most effective.
To add to the above arguments against the theory of comparative
advantages as an organizing principle, we must be aware that the reality
today is that production is no longer dependent on the availability of
resources in a country. As Sachs points out, companies are now in a
position to split up their value-creation process and locate individual
parts in areas of the world with the most advantageous wage, skill or
market environment. There is the shifting distribution of the valuecreation chain across far-flung regions of the world, which enables
companies, in their choice of the best location for each stage of
production, to enjoy the full rationalization of benefits.
This process does not involve countries producing goods
according to their comparative advantages, but corporate chains with
branches and subsidiaries in many countries (and free trade zones),
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developing resource-, market-, efficiency- and asset-seeking strategies.
The “grow or die” doctrine encourages the existence of fewer and fewer
stakeholders (on the basis of acquisitions, mergers and vertical
integration) and therefore, resources and power become ever more
concentrated.
In the case of MERCOSUR, corporate strategies have been
redefined on the basis of market opening and the changes generated by
this process. The initial reaction has been to seek the streamlining of
administrative structures and the reduction of employment, in
addition to the adoption of new trade and distribution strategies. The
major private firms, and in particular TNC branches, were those in the
best position to carry out these actions. (Kosacoff & Bezchinsky &
Bonvecchi quoted by Regis Bonelli, 2000)
FDI in the region was mainly aimed at fusion and acquisition
(F&A) and not at the installation of new branches or the construction
of new plants. The new flow of FDI in the region has mainly been
channelled to the service sector. Of the U$7.67 billion for the year 1996,
no less than 75% was aimed at this sector. In 1997, of a total of US$
15.3 billion from FDI, almost 83.7% was allocated to services. In both
cases, the main sub-sector was that of services provided to companies.
In second place come the electricity, water and gas services (ECLAC
1998), where FDI had been virtually nil until 1995. This increase is
related to privatisation. (Bonelli, 2000).

The blindness of unlimited growth
Access to natural goods should be equitable, respecting the
diversity of nature and its productive potential, as well as the cultures
that have interacted with and promoted biological diversity.
Production and consumption models imposed subsequently to
neo-liberal economic globalisation are those of the industrialized
countries in the North, based on an intensive use of natural resources,
contravening the presumed implementation of a process of
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dematerialization of economy. As Sachs points out, even in those cases
in which more efficient productive practices from the standpoint of
energy consumption have been implemented, or in which eco-efficient
technologies have been applied, the growth of global economic
activities involves an increase in the consumption of natural resources.
In some cases this does not happen according to service unit, but in
terms of the totality of the extraction, production, marketing and
consumption processes, and the continued accumulation of ecological
debt.
The exploitation of nature to serve over consumption in the
North and the greed of the TNCs is harming the balance of many of the
world’s ecosystems, and therefore the services that they provide to
humanity. Nature is not a stock of natural resources that can be
considered in an isolated manner, but a network of diverse ecosystems
interacting in a dynamic way; this complexity is not considered by
economic stakeholders, on the contrary, any attempt at preserving its
wealth and diversity may be tried in courts specially set up to settle
trade controversies.
There is no doubt that the problems generated by the free trade
doctrine are not only theoretical, but they have various very real
negative impacts on the daily life and environment of millions of
people throughout the world. Protests against the World Trade
Organization in Seattle in 1999 were a demonstration of the resistance
to a system that generates increasing exclusion and to attempts to
commodify all spheres of life and the environment. In order to check
this fragmentation process – in which few win and the majority loose
– it is imperative to recognize that the present model of continuous
economic growth at any price, has led to an excessive consumption of
resources by a minority, to degradation and destruction of nature’s
goods, violating the communities’ present and future possibilities of
satisfying their needs, and to greater and continued accumulation of
the ecological debt the North has incurred with the South.
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The debt trap
The free trade doctrine imposed by the WTO is the same as that
which sustained and sustains the structural adjustment programmes
promoted by the International Monetary Fund and the multilateral
development banks, demanding that the countries of the third world
open up their markets and financial systems and reduce their social
expenditure. The changes necessary to bring to an end the fallacies
imposed on our societies, imply profound changes in the architecture
of the international financial system, as has been suggested at various
fora for several years now: “50 years are enough.”
The peoples of the South supporting the heavy load of external
debt, very often do not have access to the resources essential to satisfy
their needs, because these resources are aimed at production for
export, in order to generate currency.
The programmes of the Bretton Woods institutions (the World
Bank and IMF) promote exports on the basis of a short-term vision,
encourage the excessive supply of raw material on the world markets
(that accumulate ecological debt) and therefore a drop in the
international prices of such products, seriously affecting the NorthSouth terms of trade and thus further increasing the ecological debt.
The countries of the South have increased their exports at enormous
and unaccounted social and environmental cost, while at the same time
poverty and unemployment are growing.
The IMF Structural Adjustment programmes also favour the
reduction of public expenditure addressing social issues, which in turn
affects the quality of life of the majority of the population in the South.
These same institutions also promote policies aimed at a greater
commercialisation of natural goods and the privatisation of public
services, imposing a model that socializes costs and privatises profit,
perpetuating the unfair distribution of resources and encouraging a
few to consume more, while fewer and fewer possibilities of access to
resources are available for the vast majority.
33

In order to bring back the balance of trade in favour of
sustainability and promote trade and the satisfaction of needs on a
local level, an end should be put to export-led development. The
Structural Adjustment Programmes should be buried, so that the
people can define their future, regaining control over their national
budgets and their development plans.
The illegitimate external debts, already paid, should be annulled
and the North should recognize its ecological debt with the South as a
basic requisite for any sustainability proposal. It is along these lines that
the initiative of the Creditors of the Ecological Debt Alliance was
launched in Prague in September 2000.

Unequal Ecological Exchange
It is important to be aware that on the one hand, in global terms,
the North is responsible for over-consumption and on the other, that
the vast majority in the South suffer because they are not allowed
access to resources necessary for life.
WTO rules and those of the Bretton Woods institutions
mutually strengthen and complement each other, imposing the
unchecked exploitation of natural goods for export and promoting the
extraction of natural resources, vital for the South, from the biological,
economic and cultural point of view.
What in market terms are known as commodities, in Third
World communities are vital goods from nature for daily subsistence
and to maintain ecosystem balance and their productivity.
Furthermore, these goods have a deep meaning from the cultural
standpoint.
Unequal ecological exchange is a result of the imposition of a
model centred on exports aimed at generating currency to comply with
the obligations generated by external debt, and of an economic system
(trade, investment and finance) that increases the ecological debt
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through the transfer of natural goods – be they soil, water, wood,
minerals, etc. – from South to North, resulting in the continued
devastation of ecosystems and cultures.
As Martinez Alier points out, the North consumes two thirds of
the primary commodities being exported, while these same
commodities account for the largest share of developing countries’
export earnings and 45% of developing countries have primary
products as their main source of export earnings (IMF, 1998, quoted by
Martinez Alier)
To face the challenge of building up sustainable societies, it is
absolutely essential to reverse this process and redistribute wealth and
access to resources in an equitable manner and to allow communities
to manage and control their natural resources.

Principles for Sustainable Societies
Defending already-existing and new sustainable societies implies
a two-pronged strategy; the first is to resist the imposition of this
authoritarian and destructive model called neoliberal economic
globalisation and the second to fight for the adoption of a set of
principles by our societies that reverse current dominant trends and
put us on the road to sustainability.
Here we will present some of the principles we propose should
be at the very foundation of both strategies.
To allow for societies to organize themselves around these
sustainability principles the historical ecological debt must be
recognized and those responsible for its generation must compensate
communities for the damage and restore their environments, and the
ongoing process of continuous generation of ecological debt must
come to a definitive end.
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Societies in the South have the capacity and cultural wealth to
define their present and future around principles that are the opposite
to those being imposed by corporate actors and the institutions serving
their interests.

Self reliance and participation
Self-reliance refers to the autonomy and the power to control the
course of events that most influence a community’s future. People, and
therefore communities, nations and regions, should not be subjected to
impositions by other people or institutions that impair their ability to
live their lives according to their own legitimate priorities and
preferences.
Self-reliance means accountability to the community and thus
responsibility. Among the characteristics of the so-called free market
we can name anonymity and distancing; both of these promote the
externalisation of costs (environmental and social), which affect
communities, thus increasing the ecological debt.
Self-reliance implies using local resources as much as possible to
fuel diverse economic activities to meet people’s needs in an integrated
way, while respecting ecosystem characteristics and dynamics and
cultural diversity.
Self-reliance means economical and political self-determination
and the possibilities of influencing life conditions on a local level
correlated to higher degrees of economic decentralization and relative
degrees of self-sufficiency.

Territorial management by communities
As Leff (1994) points out, the management of natural resources
remains subject to private property principles and to the jurisdiction of
nation states, and not to the rights of communities and society in
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general. Legal norms sanction individual behaviour that generates
harmful effects on the environment, instead of reorienting the
rationality of resource use, while at the same time empowering
communities.
A sustainability approach requires the mobilization of social
groups calling for the legitimisation of communal control and
management of resources. Territorial management based on social
control and cultural valorisation of community resources cannot be
planned under the criteria of economical calculations that have
sustained and legitimised centralized development models.
Economic decentralization implies social participation in
determining the theoretical principles, operative instruments and
social values that norm the decision-making criteria for productive
activities and the ways of using such resources.
Communities must have the right not to authorize exploitation
of their environments, to say no to those activities that will impact their
present and future, both in physical and cultural terms.

Recognition of the public nature of natural goods
and communities’ rights
As world citizens we must stop the privatisation of natural assets
- be they water, agro-diversity or the atmosphere - and we must fight
for the recognition of their public nature if we are to build sustainable
societies in the near future.
Communities must have control over resources, to allow for a
harmonious interaction between human beings and the environment
and to guarantee the protection and enhancement of ecosystems as
integrated units.
Communities must be compensated for the damage done to
them and those responsible for the harm must restore the
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environments (part of the recognition of ecological debt) to allow the
satisfaction of their needs.
From the market rationale, nature is seen as a source of resources
that exist to be exploited to fuel unlimited economic growth. In the
name of use rationalization and efficient management, natural goods
are being privatised to ensure the constant flow of resources into the
global market economy.

The dignity line: responsible and sustainable
use of natural resources
The dignity line appears as a new conceptual framework in the
North-South debate on sustainability. On the one hand we must
eradicate over consumption and the excessive use of resources and, on
the other, we must eradicate poverty, guaranteeing access to goods that
are necessary for the majority of the population. The existing
environmental space between the ceiling imposed by natural limits and
the floor, which would be the minimum consumption necessary to
sustain a decent life, can be defined as the dignity line, that is the mean
strip space where we should all converge to live a decent life, without
deteriorating or depleting the goods that other people need or will
need: a new, just and sustainable approach to the management of our
economies.
Greater commodification of nature and the increasing opening
up of markets are directly linked to the control of goods essential to
life. Sustainable production and consumption should be the centre of
the new economic models. Communities should have the right to
refuse to have their resources commodified, in order to guarantee that
these will continue to be social goods aimed at the satisfaction of needs
and to avoid them from becoming private resources, aimed at
promoting over-consumption by the elites.
The dignity line is the mean strip between the ceiling and the
floor of the environmental space concept.
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A new approach to economic welfare: economic diversity
The doctrine of comparative advantages has led to a
homogenizing of productive specialization and an international
division of labour, where Third World countries produce raw materials
at low prices, involving enormous ecological and social costs, and
where industrialized countries produce technologies at a high price,
feeding enormously unfair terms of trade and ecological exchange.
Economic homogenisation in the countries of the South is related to
the payment of debt services and to structural adjustment
programmes, violating sustainable and diverse production and
consumption systems.
“Exports of goods and services in the developing world are
usually below 30% of the GDP, which does not necessarily imply low
environmental pressure from the exporting sector. Development
strategies aimed at attracting international capital to the exportoriented primary sector (Bolivia, Peru, Chile and Venezuela) may lead
to increasing income distribution asymmetries and illusory growth in
the short term” (Martinez Alier 2000)
We must introduce a new concept: economic diversity.
Economic diversity implies the diversity of economic strategies (that is
to say, the end of the absolute priority of production geared towards
exports), diverse economies (that is to say, a wide spectrum of sectors
and activities instead of an economy depending on one or two
commodities), and diversity within each of the sectors (equivalent to
the exclusion of monopolies).
Countries and communities must have the opportunity to select,
according to their own criteria, those economic mechanisms that are
best adjusted to their environment and their needs at a given time.
These decisions should be taken, considering the need to optimise
economic activity and preserve some degree of self-sufficiency in order
to encourage the development of strong and diverse economies, able to
withstand external impacts and adapt themselves when necessary.
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A new approach in economic decision making:
participation and social control
Insofar as the economy is controlled by the “invisible hand of the
market”, and vital resources are increasingly being commodified,
people do not have the possibility to decide on how and on what
resources available in their surroundings should be used. Unlimited
economic growth and liberalization of international trade, investment
and finances are the main organizers of society on a global level today.
This violates the free will of peoples, ecological and cultural diversity,
community welfare, generating increasing exclusion and degradation
of ecosystems fundamental for life.
The communities must decide locally what their needs are and
to what extent they need international trade. Local economies should
mainly be based on their own productive systems and on the reduction
of distances between production and consumption.

Food Sovereignty
Communities and countries must have the right to decide their
own agricultural policies and to control their food systems in order to
feed their population with sufficient, safe, sustainably produced, locally
grown and locally processed food products.
Food sovereignty relies on small-scale indigenous and family
farming, and on equitable access to land, water, forests, and other
resources such as seeds and plant genetic resources. It also relies on the
resource conservation afforded by organic/ecological farming
practices.

Biological and Cultural Diversity
Neoliberal globalisation stands for homogenisation, same
institutional frameworks, same policies, same technologies, and same
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seeds everywhere without considering ecological and cultural diversity.
Corporate actors aim to adapt societies to their interests and world
visions, negating the richness of and the need for diversity if we are to
sustain our societies and protect and enhance our environments.
As biological and cultural diversity are strongly linked and are
the very foundation of life, we must organize ourselves to resist the
imposition of a homogenous model and to defend diversity as an
organizing principle in our societies.

Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle must be a guiding factor in policy
design and decision making, so that societies can choose whether they
are willing to run certain risks or not.
It is important to take into account that the decisions we take
regarding resource use will always have an effect on future options, and
for this reason strategic, participatory planning is essential, based on a
vision of sustainability.
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Environmental justice, ecological
debt and sustainability*
José Augusto Pádua**
Environment and Justice

Over the last few years, two fundamental concepts environmental justice and ecological debt - have renewed the debate
about the global transition toward sustainability, creating a stronger
link between the movements for social change and environmental care.
Even though these concepts did not originate in academic circles,
intellectuals and researchers alike have also begun to incorporate and
develop these principles.
The concept of environmental justice emerged from the Black
Movement in the United States. Informed by their experiences in the
civil rights battles of the 60s, organized defense groups of colored
people began to notice - at first intuitively and later more
systematically - that the most polluting and environmentally damaging
economic activities were deliberated distributed, being predominantly
concentrated in the neighborhood of Black, Native American and
Latino communities. Such “environmental racism” illustrated the
correlation between social and environmental inequality, causing the
most marginalized sectors of society to receive a disproportionate share
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of the environmental impact created by the socio-economic system.
Although the dominant classes were largely responsible for this impact,
through their unsustainable consumption and production patterns,
they were protected from the degradation by intentionally targeting its
effects to the public space and to the areas occupied by the non
European-American sectors of society.
The conceptual innovation consisted in framing the
environmental debate in terms of rights and justice and not solely in
terms of conservation and survival. The central premise was that all
people are equally entitled to a healthy environment, and that any
structure or process that in practice targeted the most economically
disadvantaged populations for environmental risk and degradation
was unfair. Such degradation, where unavoidable, should be
distributed equally through all sectors of society. In this way, the
movement against environmental destruction and degradation began
to be considered as an arena for the struggle for true democracy and
the affirming of human rights.
Although the concept of environmental justice originated in the
United States, it has been appropriated and redefined by social
movements all around the planet. It has an extraordinary potential for
a political renewing of environmentalism and for making it more
relevant to the struggle for social transformation. For example, in Latin
America, despite the pronounced evidence of environmental racism
(especially in the form of ecological discrimination against indigenous
and Afro-descendant communities), the issue has centered on the
defense of impoverished populations against systemic environmental
inequities. The fight for environmental justice, on the other hand, has
transcended efforts for mere defense, and acquired a much more proactive character. It is clear that the poor majority of the population
must be protected against the selective advance of environmental
degradation. But also, on a positive way, the poor have the right to
enjoy equal access to the common environment and its natural
resources via an equitable and democratic distribution of clean water,
arable land, pure air etc. In this sense, the struggles for agrarian and
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urban reform gain a much more explicit and coherent environmental
dimension. The same can be said about the fights to defend the
collective space against the encroachment of privatization context. On
the other side, the defense of the environment has acquired much
stronger social implications. Indeed, the transition to sustainability
must include as a basic principle the people’s right to live beyond a
“dignity line”, which implies, for example, a basic basket of water,
energy and green spaces. The concept of environmental rights must
overcome the indulgent and technocratic visions that are used as a
framework to the “poverty line” policies.

Environmental Justice: A Condition for Global Sustainability
The concept of ecological debt was launched by Latin American
ecologists during the 1980s, as a way of challenging the economicist
and deceptive nature of the discussion about the “financial debt”. The
basic argument was that the growing degradation of the Earth’s
ecological systems is closely linked to the ecological inequalities
inherent in and developed by the world economic system of the last five
centuries. Indeed, the modern world-system produced a huge
ecological segregation, with a minority of 20% of the human
population, living mainly in the OECD countries, consuming over 80%
of the Planet’s resources and consequently producing 80% of the global
environmental impact. The historical outcome of this segregation is
that this minority of high level consumers are ecological debtors in
relation to the majority of the world’s population. Even if,
paradoxically, they live in countries whose financial institutions are the
main global “financial debt” creditors.
The rationality of this argument has two components. Firstly,
this great inequity is the historical result of colonialism and
imperialism, which generated a complex legacy of disproportionate
consumption of the Earth’s human and natural resources in favor of
certain regions and at the detriment of others. This liability already
constitutes a political and moral debt, even though its details are not
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easily mathematically demonstrated. Secondly, the disparity of
economic patterns in the current context results in a small part of the
human population occupying a disproportional amount of the planet’s
environmental space. For example, the global warming produced by
the production and consumption patterns of a planetary elite threatens
the life conditions of the whole of the human population, especially the
poorest sectors who are most dependent on direct access to the
ecosystems (and thus very vulnerable to climatic instabilities). The
ecological debt, in this sense, is not only a legacy from the past, but a
concrete reality that expands daily.
It is not difficult to perceive the political promise of the link
between both concepts. Actually, the ecological debt is created by the
effects of preserving a strongly unfair global environmental order,
where a minority of rich people is confiscating the Earth’s resources for
its own sake, at the same time as exports the consequences of planetary
degradation to the poor majority of humankind.
The situations of environmental injustice at the global and
national levels generate internal and international ecological debts that
must be paid politically. To put it in another way: the concept of
environmental injustice critically diagnoses the roots of contemporary
environmental unsustainability at its various levels and ties it to the
over-consumption caused by the unfair and disproportionate
appropriation of the basic materials for survival. On the other hand,
the concept of ecological debt postulates the ethical imperative that
these injustices must be faced and overcomed, given that only the
payment of these debts will make possible the building of just,
balanced, beneficial and sustainable human development models in the
different regions of the planet.
Global unsustainability is thus confronted by promoting the
concept of environmental justice and the political (rather than
monetary) repayment of the ecological debts. It is only by equitably
redistributing the planet’s resources that it will be possible to avoid the
over-consumption of a minority, which is the greatest factor of global
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degradation. It is essential to identify patterns of consumption and
production that are environmentally sustainable and appropriate to the
balanced and equitable development of humanity as a whole. This
ethical guideline could work as a great incentive to promote sustainable
technologies and practices, given that the disproportional
consumption by the elite has been the great stimulus for promotion of
destructive and irresponsible economic and technological patterns. As
Gandhi said, “The Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s need,
but not every man’s greed”.
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ECOLOGICAL DEBT
CASES
Fossil fuels
and ecological debt

Ecological debt and Transnational
Corporations in Africa*
By Dr. Festus Iyayi,
Department of Business Administration,
University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria

1. Introduction
It is now no longer necessary to argue about whether the
penetration of African societies by capitalist relations of production
from around 1400 onwards and the formal process of incorporating
Africa into the capitalist world economy from around 1850 onwards
have done more harm than good to Africa and its people. Mounting
evidence available indicates clearly that Walter Rodney was right and
his critics were wrong.
The following facts from the latest World Development Report
are as revealing as they are disturbing: the Human Poverty Index is
highest in Africa than in any other part of the world; by the same token,
African countries are at the bottom of the Human Development Index.
Nigeria, potentially the richest country in Africa, is number 151 out of
the 174 countries listed on the Human Development Index. Countries
such as Ghana do a little better but overall, African countries are
among the poorest of the poor countries on the earth today.
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This discussion looks at the role of transnational corporations in
the process of Africa’s impoverishment in general, and more
specifically, their role in creating a new ecological deficit in Africa. In
the process, we deal with the concept of ecological debt and how it may
be defined in order to establish appropriate debt levels and
responsibilities for payments.

2. Forces involved in Africa’s Incorporation
into the Capitalist World Economy
Offiong (1980:76) has noted that, ‘the international system upon
which Africa depends implies a structure, that is, a structure of
institutions, classes, and power arrangements. The dynamic process
that takes place within that structure known as “imperialism” is thus an
institutionalised system of control that systematically shapes the
institutions and structures of dependent dominated countries and
limits their freedom of action, if they are to avoid the system’s
sanctions, to system-defined alternatives”. The notion of a system
implies a centre of some remote control and of parts that are so
arranged that they function automatically and naturally. It is true that
there is an international capitalist system but the key question is what
are the driving forces of this system?
Even in closed systems, the first cause principle still exists. All
human systems are brought into being by human agency. In the
capitalist system, human agency and thus driving forces are individual
capitalists who erect and maintain institutions that foster and protect
their role and control over other classes in society.
In the early days of capitalist accumulation and penetration of
other modes of production, the driving forces were individual
merchant capitalists supported by state power. For example, the
triangular trade in slaves in which underdeveloped Africa and
developed Europe and the United States of America and Canada was
driven by private companies and individuals such as the East India
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Company, Baker and Dawson, Richard and John Barclay, Azurara and
several others. During the colonial period, these driving forces had
expanded considerably to include the large number of joint stock
companies that were established during the emergence of industrial
capitalism. In Nigeria and in many English speaking African colonies,
the Royal Niger Company and later the United African Company
played a leading role in the expansion of capitalist relations of
production. In French speaking African colonies, Societe Generale
enjoyed the privilege of leading the capitalist penetration campaign.
In the neo-colonial period, and especially in the period now
regarded as that of globalisation, “the dominant forces are the TNCs
(Transnational Companies or Corporations), the characteristic
institutional form of transnational practices, the transnational
capitalist class in the political sphere and in the culture-ideology
sphere, the culture ideology of consumerism” (Sklair, 2001:4).
These forces are often supported by the state structures of
advanced capitalist countries and those of the underdeveloped world,
exploited for profit. These state structures are, nevertheless, creations of
the capitalist class with the purpose of serving class interests. It is thus
that capitalist state structures are manned by professional politicians
and bureaucrats who are themselves capitalists in terms of their
worldviews, orientations, attitudes, preferences and practices.

3. Transnational and Multinational Corporations
Many writers have noted problems of definition involved in
distinguishing transnational corporation from other types of global
corporations such as the multinational business enterprise (Sklair
2001; Jenkins 1987). Sklair (2001:2) has suggested that, “transnational
refers to forces, processes, and institutions that cross borders but do not
derive their power and authority from the state.” The transnational
corporation is nevertheless one of the most important of these forces.
The UN Economic and Social Council refers to the transnational
corporation as, “all enterprises that control assets - factories, mines,
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sales offices and the like – in two or more countries” (UNCTC,
1978:158). Jenkins (1987:1-2) believes that it is best to adopt a broad
definition, which sees TNCs as “firms that control production in at
least one foreign country”.
The problem with this definition is that it excludes global
financial institutions from the spectrum of TNCs. Yet, it is clearly
established that both finance and production capital work hand in
hand to support and enlarge the global capitalist system. In essence
therefore, TNCs are corporations that engage in economic activities
across national boundaries and which often have huge assets and
resources at their disposal.
The distinction between TNCs and multinational corporations
(MNCs) has usually been in terms of the membership of the
organizations. MNCs were viewed as those TNCs that had employees
drawn from different countries. Moreover, MNCs usually establish sites
in most countries and operate these sites largely as autonomous units.
However, recent developments among TNCs in the areas of mergers
and acquisitions have increasingly blurred the distinction between
MNCs and TNCs. Now it is clear that in both cases, share holdings may
be geographically dispersed and that organizational membership will
cut across national boundaries. What is, however, not at issue is that,
with respect to third world countries at least, the location of control in
both TNCs and MNCs tends to be in some foreign advanced capitalist
country, usually the USA, Canada, Japan or Europe. These
developments indicate the need to use both MNCs and TNCs
interchangeably: they spring from the same interests, operate on the
same terms and produce the same consequences.

4. Profiling TNCs
TNCs vary in terms of size, national coverage, origin and area of
concentration. The last of these criteria is perhaps the most important
in terms of the consequences or effects of TNCs on different pacts of
the world. However, the origins of TNCs are also of significance. In
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terms of origin, the largest number of TNCs is located in the USA,
which accounts for 151 (30.0%) of the Fortune Global 500 (1996). The
USA is closely followed by Japan, which accounts for 141 (28%) of
Fortune Global 500 (1996). Between developing and underdeveloped
countries, only India (1) Mexico (1) and Venezuela (1) have three
TNCs between them (Table 1) These TNCs are however state
sponsored enterprises.
In terms of areas of concentration, the consumer goods and
services sector accounted for 153 (30.6 %) of the 500 Global
corporations; financial services accounted for 132 (26.4 %) of the
TNCs; heavy industry posted 84 TNCs (16.8%) of the total while
infrastructure and electronics respectively accounted for 88 or 17.6%
and 43 (8.6%) of Fortune Global 500 (1996). (Table 2)
Table 1
Areas of Concentration of Fortune’s Global 500 (1996)*
No

Area of Concentration

Number
of TNCS

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Consumer goods and services
Financial Services
Heavy industry
Infrastructure
Electronic
Total

%

Reveries
US $ Trillion

153
132
84
88
43

30.6
26.4
16.8
17.6
8.6

4.3
2.6
1.7
1.6
1.2

500

100%

11.4

Complied from Sklair (2001: 38)

The heavy industrial sector is dominated by extractive global
companies (petroleum refining 29, chemicals 18, metals 15, crude oil
production 3, and mining 3). The refining petroleum companies are
dominated by the ‘Seven Sisters’ - five US based corporations plus Shell
and BP” (Sklair, 2001: 44)
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5. The Ideology of TNCs
Understanding the ideology or the particular beliefs of the
owners of TNCs is crucial to an explanation of the activities of TNCs
in the world in general and in the underdeveloped parts of the world in
particular. Ideologies help rationalise actions that border on the
criminal or, that are in fact, criminal. They suggest strategies, justify
means, define options and even the choice of particular ends. The slave
trade was rationalized, for example, on the ideology of racial
superiority, the needs of capitalist commerce and development. Today,
the ideology of the TNCs has changed little.
Korten (1996:131, 70-71) has identified several key elements of
this ideology, including the beliefs that:
•

The world’s money, technology, and markets should be
controlled and managed by gigantic global corporations;

•

Corporations should be free to act solely on the basis of
profitability without regard to national or local consequences;

•

There should be no loyalties to place or community;

•

People are motivated primarily by ambition;

•

The uncontrolled pursuit of ambition and acquisition leads to
socially optimal outcomes.

It has also been pointed out that the willingness with which
multinational oil companies tend to exploit the undemocratic and
corrupt processes of most third world countries arises from an
entrenched oil industry culture that defines the relationship of Western
oil companies with third world countries. According to Ashton – Jones,
(1998:130) this oil industry culture is founded on five assumptions:
•

That profit maximization is the only basis upon which a
company can operate, so that any expenditure beyond what is
required to get out the oil is resisted;
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•

That deals can only be made with governments, regardless of the
government’s legality or morality;

•

That the “market”, (that is, the industrialized world) has a right
to have the resources it wants, at the lowest price, and regardless
of the costs to local people who are obliged to play host to
mining companies; and

•

That “we”, the mining companies, know best and act responsibly.
Continuing, Ashton – Jones, (1998:31) says:
“Generally, neither the companies nor the governments with whom
they associate, (from both first and third worlds) are willing to accept
any divergence from this culture which is reinforced with a mixture of
cynical public relations and intimidation. It is fair to say that the
adverse impacts of mining upon the lives of host communities (and,
for that matter, the extravagant use of mineral resources by the
industrialized world) arise more from this immoral culture (this
wickedness) than from anything else.”

These assumptions drive the operation of the TNCs operating in
the third world. They serve to justify and legitimise the attitudes of the
multinational (oil) companies towards such environment degrading
activities as oil spills, gas flaring, shoddy and unsafe constructions of oil
facilities, supply of guns and weapons for the massacre of indigenous
peoples, bribery of top officials of the state and their direct
participation in human rights abuses.

6. TNCs In Africa
Seen against the above background, it is easy to understand the
activities of TNCs in Africa. During the colonial period, almost all TNC
activities were concentrated in the primary sector. These included “tea
estates and coffee plantations in Kenya, rubber plantations in Liberia,
copper mines in Zambia, precious metals in South Africa” (Jenkins,
1987: 6) and cotton, groundnuts and coca in Nigeria. Although the
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Table 2
World Wide Sales of Leading TNCs compared to GDP
of selected Third World Countries
No.

Company

Nationality

Industry

1.
2.
3.

Exxon
RoyalDutch/Shell
General Motors

USA
Netherlands/UK
USA

4.
5.
6.

BP
Mobil
Ford

UK
USA
USA

7.
8.

Texaco
IBM

USA
USA

9.

Du Pont

USA

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

General Electric
Chevron
Amoco
Atlantic Richfield
Toyota

USA
USA
USA
USA
Japan

15.

EN 1

Italy

16.
17.

Unilever
Chrysler

UK/Netherlands
USA

18.
19.
20.

Elf
BAT Industries
Hitachi

France
UK
Japan

Oil
Oil
Motor
Vehicles
Oil
Oil
Motor
Vehicles
Oil
Office
Equipment
Chemicals/
Energy
Electrical
Oil
Oil
Oil
Motor
Vehicle
Energy and
Chemicals
Food
Motor
Vehicles
Oil
Tobacco
Electrical

Sales
($bn)

GDP
($bn)

Country

73.6
72.6

83.2
80.6

South Korea
Indonesia

64.4
44.1
43.0

76.2
73.5
50.7

Argentina
Nigeria
Algeria

40.2
36.3

47.5
47.5

Venezuela
Turkey

35.2

42.0

Thailand

27.6
21.4
21.4
20.7
18.9

34.4
32.8
30.6
30.6
30.1

Colombia
Philippines
Hong Kong
Libya
Egypt

18.2

29.3

Malaysia

17.9
16.2

27.7
19.8

Pakistan
Chile

15.0
14.7
14.4
13.4

18.8
18.2
15.5
13.3

Peru
Singapore
Syria
Morocco

Taken from Jenkins (1987:9)

TNCs moved into the manufacturing sector during the colonial period,
they continued to expand and dominate economic activities in the
primary sector of African economies. There was, however, now a shift
from agricultural products to the extractive (including timber)
industries. In addition, they tended to dominate those sectors of
manufacturing industry in which they began to participate. The data
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on the worldwide sales of leading TNCs compared to GDP of selected
Third World Countries in 1984 is indicative of the first trend (Table 3)
while the data on the share of manufacturing industry controlled by
foreign firms in selected African countries for the same period is
indicative of the second trend (Table 4). Over the years, these trends
have deepened, rather than receded.
Table 3
Share of manufacturing industry controlled by foreign
firms in selected African Countries*
Country

Year

Foreign %

Basis of Calculation

Ghana
Kenya
Nigeria
Zaire

1974
1976
1968
1974

50
30 – 35
70
30 - 35

Sales
Employment
Assets
Equipment

Taken from Jenkins (1987:9)

7. TNCs Impact on Africa
The impact of TNCs on the world economy in general and on
Africa in particular has been a matter of controversy. On the one hand,
there are those, including the TNCs themselves who have argued that
TNCs have been the engines of economic growth and development in
the world and Africa.
On the other hand, there are those who have argued that while
the TNCs have indeed been the engines of growth in the wealth of a
small portion of the earth’s population, they have nevertheless been the
engines of poverty and underdevelopment for the vast majority of the
world’s people. This second view is obviously the correct one. It is
supported by the historical experience of the peoples of the third world
and Africa in their relationships with TNCs, by the determinants and
hence role of power in economic relationships and by the specific
practices of TNCs in Africa.
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Although there are several areas of African experience that are
directly relevant in this regard (Africa’s debt crisis, underdevelopment,
poverty, political instability, cultural crisis, etc) we shall focus
particular attention on Africa’s growing environmental and hence
ecological crisis. The analysis shall be in terms of the role played by
TNCs in the creation and substance of this crisis in Africa. Africa’s
ecological crisis is substantively different form the ecological crisis in
the advanced parts of the world. It arises largely form the activities of
global multinational companies in the extractive industries: mining,
petroleum extraction, exploitation of forest resources, including
genetic reserves and the introduction of large mono product farms.
While we can cite several examples in Africa where the activities of
TNCs and their local collaborators have produced ecological crises,
(Ghana – where there has been excessive water pollution especially in
the mining areas, and depletion of forests for surface mining; Zaire –
where foreign interests in the mining industry and the consequent
export of all outputs to the advanced capitalist countries have
produced environmental degradation, mass poverty, unemployment
and economic growth without development; Cameroon - where the
activities of logging companies have dramatically altered the
ecosystem) two particular instances of the activities of TNCs will be
highlighted to illustrate the general situation. These are the cases of
Papua New Guinea and Nigeria.

Broken Hill Proprietary in Papua New Guinea
Sklair (2001:241) has documented that Broken Hill Proprietary
(BHP) “was a major actor in the mining industry in Papua New
Guinea. The OK Tedi copper mine, in which BHP had a controlling
stake, had been both a source of large profits and a running sore for the
company since its opening in the 1980s. Shortly after the Australian
government granted independence to Papua New Guinea in 1975, OK
Tedi Mining Limited was established. The promise of revenues and jobs
persuaded the PNG government to exempt the company from most of
the country’s environmental laws. Unsurprisingly, the mine has
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become an environmental hazard. According to the Australian
Conservation Foundation, in 1991, the head of the OK Tedi River
System was almost “biologically dead” after years of exposure to
crushed rock, cyanide and heavy metal wastes from the mine. The
livelihood of about 30,000 landowners had been seriously impaired
and in 1994 they filed a suit in Australia against BHP. The company,
which accounted for about 30 percent of Papua New Guinea’s federal
revenues, was later found guilty by the Victoria Supreme Court (BHP
was headquartered in Melbourne) for its involvement in legislation
that was drafted for the PNG parliament making it a criminal offence
to sue BHP! For this behaviour, BHP was included in Multinational
Monitor’s list of the ten worst corporations in 1995”.

The Nigerian Case
The role of TNCs and the Nigerian government in the brutal
exploitation and creation of an ecological disaster in Nigeria’s Niger
Delta has been well documented (Olorode, 1989; Ashton – Jones, 1998;
ERA/FoEN, 1999: Human Rights Watch: The Price of Oil, 1998; Iyayi,
1999; Okonta, 1998).
It is instructive that Ashton – Jones’ ‘The Human Eco-systems of
the Niger Delta’ is dedicated to:
“NNAH UABARI,
who was shot dead on 25th October 1993
near Shell Flow Station No, 5 Ilorokoro, Ogoni, Rivers State Nigeria.”

The repression of the peoples of the Niger Delta has gone hand
in hand with the crude exploitation of the oil resources of the area. In
this repression, the oil companies led by Shell have played a significant
role, providing Nigerian police with guns and information with which
to suppress local revolt against its profit maximization activities. As
Olorode (1998: 15) has noted, the oil industry in Nigeria has inflicted
unprecedented agony on the indigenous communities of the Niger
Delta by completely disrupting the waterways, by destroying soil, water,
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air, animal and plant life and indeed cutting off all the means of
livelihood of the communities. Olorode (1998) has equally
documented how other branches of the extractive industry in Nigeria
(tin mining in the Jos Plateau area, lignite and coal mining in the
Enugu and Niger Basin area, exploitation of forest products and plant
genetic resources) have adversely affected the local and hence national
ecosystems.
The extractive industries in Nigeria, as in other parts of Africa
and the third world, are completely dominated by TNCs. The TNCs
not only operate with the full backing of their home governments over
which they have considerable control but also exercise complete
control over the governments of Africa and third world countries. The
role and impact of TNCs in these contexts confirm the view that they:
“have emerged as the dominant governance institutions on the planet,
with the largest among them reaching into virtually every country of
the world and exceeding most governments in size and power.
Increasingly, it is the interests of TNCs more than the human interest
that defines the policy agendas of states and international bodies,
although this reality and its implications have gone largely unnoticed
and unaddressed” (Korten, 2001:54).
From this brief analysis of the profile and activities of TNCs
some general points can be made about the reasons for environmental
degradation in Africa and elsewhere. The first point is that in any given
situation, environmental and ecological problems often arise from
unequal power relations between the user non-owner and the owner
non-user of natural resources. This holds true not only in TNC nonowner and indigenous peoples owner-non–user relationships in Africa
and other parts of the Third World but also for the same types of
relationships in advanced countries. It is for this reason that the
activities of extractive companies produced quite different results for
both Canadian and American Indians than they did for Canada’s
Atlantic Provinces and US West Texas farmers. For the Indians on both
sides, the activities of extractive companies caused social dislocation,
environmental degradation and despair. For the West Texan farmers
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and Canada’s Atlantic Provinces, “local community businesses became
more prosperous and larger … the new oil field and gas money
broadened and deepened the distribution of wealth and power in the
community” (Copy, 1984). Whereas in the one case the extractive
companies and the US and Canadian governments entered into
agreements with local communities that guaranteed that they could
exercise the right to refuse, delay or permit any activity in their
communities, in the case of the Canadian Indians, the culprits, the
Reed Paper Company and the Canadian government both “disclaimed
all legal, social and moral responsibility for the pollution. Neither the
Federal government, the state government nor the politicians could, or
would help the Indian people” (Ikein; 1988: 118). Unlike the Texan
farmers, the Indians were, of course poor, unorganised but most
importantly, indigenous and powerless.
The second fact is that environmental degradation is the result
of the pursuit and application of the TNC ideology, which is also the
ideology of the capitalist class in the advanced capitalist countries.
Thus ideas about sustainable development and corporate
environmentalism cannot succeed in a world where profit making,
mass consumption and acquisition and greed inform or provide the
fundamental basis for economic, political and social relationships. The
third point is that those who exercise dominant power in the user – non
– owner and owner-non-user relationship are not only largely
responsible for producing environmental degradation; they are also
responsible for producing poverty in these contexts. This point is
amply supported by specifically American experience, by the American
and Canadian data that we have just reviewed and by thousands of case
examples from various parts of other third world countries. In this
regard, the following are illustrative: the Japanese controlled Philippine
Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation, PASAR and its record
of shame in the Philippines; the experience of the indigenous Igorot
people of Benguet Province, Philippines in the hands of the US (rich
Philippine investors owned Benguet Corporation); the careless
dumping of waste and severe pollution in Venezuela, Curacao, Peru
and Ecuador by oil companies notably, Shell (Bassey, 1997; the
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environmental tragedy in Indonesia (Ikein; 1990); etcetera, etcetera,
etcetera. The fourth and certainly the most alarming and disturbing
point is that the TNCs that degrade the environment of the Third
World do so deliberately and consciously, rather than out of ignorance,
necessity, lack of resources or accident. Whether it is in Papua New
Guinea or Nigeria, the Philippines or Ecuador, the TNCs backed by
their home governments take part in drafting legislation to cover their
tracks or to escape responsibility, they actively take part in human
rights abuses, they mount advertising campaigns that cost billions of
dollars to polish their image and distort the facts, they tell lies. They do
all these and more knowingly, deliberately with the backing of carefully
crafted strategies. It is within the context of these four observations and
particularly, the last one that I believe the concept of ecological debt
needs to be phrased, given meaning and developed.

8. The Concept of Ecological Debt
Debts imply some mandatory obligations based upon some
precedent. The obligations may be moral or legal but they do require to
be redeemed. Moreover, that requirement, or the foundation that
provides validity for the obligation is the precedent and therefore the
nature of the debt, whether moral or legal can only be inferred from the
nature of the precedent. In the normal debtor – creditor relationship,
the precedent is provided by a request from the debtor to the creditor
for some facility. The relationship between the debtor and the creditor
is formalized in an agreement which becomes binding on both parties:
the creditor is obliged to provide the promised facility while the debtor
is obliged to replace the facility upon terms and conditions specified in
the agreement. Even in cases where the obligation is moral, for
example, where A feels indebted to B for some acts performed by B that
A values, the obligation arises out of an understanding between A and
B, that an obligation exists on the part of A to redeem the debt at some
future date. No formal agreement may be executed but the obligation
to redeem the debt will be no less binding.
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Difficulties arise in the debtor-creditor relationship where: [i] A
believes that B owes her a debt but which B does not acknowledge – or
refuses to acknowledge; and [ii] where B acknowledges the debt
claimed by A but proclaims that it is a moral rather than a legal one.
This may be so even when, indeed, A maintains that the obligation is a
legal one or both legal and moral. In this case, the parties will be
required to plead their causes in the court of precedent.
Ecological debts encounter these and other difficulties in at least
four areas. The first is one of definition; the second is that of
quantification and therefore of establishing the limits of responsibility;
the third is assigning responsibility. The fourth and by no means, the
least difficulty is ensuring that those who have responsibility actually
assume and discharge that responsibility.

Defining Ecological Debt
Some writers have made a distinction between ecology and
environment and while noting the dependence of the one upon the
other have insisted that the two terms be used differently (AshtonJones, 1998; Sklair, 2001). Indeed Sklair (2001) has argued that leading
trans-national corporations are consciously involved in promoting the
idea of an environmental rather than an ecological crisis because the
latter has greater implications for corporate behaviour. Corporate
environmentalism has costs but they are costs that can easily be
absorbed within the dominant TNC ideology. Other writers make no
distinction between ecology and environment indicating that one does
not make sense without the other (World Commission on
Environment and Development). While taking serious note of Sklair’s
observation, this discussion will use the two terms interchangeably.
Ecological, or from our point view, environmental debt, has
been defined as “the additional burden on the environment occasioned
by surpassing the limits of the resilience of the natural system” (Navia,
1994, quoted in Ojo, 2001: 28); or as surpassing “the productive
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potential of the ecosystem” (World Commission on Environment and
Development, 1987: 9). These and related definitions raise a number of
questions: what is the resilience of the natural system or the productive
potential of the ecosystem? What is the nature of the additional burden
and how does the burden arise? These questions, especially the last one,
are important because of the need to assign responsibility for debts.
Arising from our earlier observations, we see an ecological debt
as an obligation owed by economic and political actors to society or
sections of it for conscious acts on their part that lead to a damage of
the environment and impairs its ability to support life or regenerate
itself. The emphasis on actors indicates that recognizable individuals
and institutions perpetuate harmful acts to the environment whether
or not they hide under an agenda of global sustainability or
development imperatives. The idea that the acts are conscious is to
draw attention to the legal, rather than moral obligation that the
consequences of damage to the environment, impose. It is also to
separate this class of action from others such as those in previous premodern or pre-industrial societies, when food-gathering communities
engaged in relationships with the environment that ultimately led to
the true tragedy of the commons. In particular, given the acknowledged
relationship between poverty and environmental degradation, the
insistence on economic and political actors acting consciously usually
in pursuit of the profit motive suggests that responsibility for
environmental degradation cannot be shared to the poor but rather
those whose actions cause poverty. Finally, being conscious acts, they
are different from acts of ignorance or accident. They can and need to
be placed within the representative class of actions that we categorize
as “crimes against humanity”. For example, we are aware that soldiers
kill each other and even members of the civilian population in times of
war. These killings are not regarded as criminal acts: they are
understandable within the rules of war. But then some soldiers do get
tried for war crimes. An ongoing and classic case is that of Milosevic,
former President of Yugoslavia who has been arrested and is now being
tried at the Hague for “crimes against humanity”. The trial is based
upon the notion of decent and indecent or normal and abnormal acts
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in war. While different kinds of action can lead to ecological damage,
not all such actions need to be classified as ecological debts. We suggest
that the notion of ecological debt be reserved for damage to the
ecosystem that results from the conscious acts of economic and
political agents and that the concept of ecological losses be reserved for
damage to the environment that result from the unintentional actions
of economic agents and actors. The one is a crime of the head, the other
an offence of the heart. Both require redemption but of qualitatively
different kinds. TNCs commit ecological crimes in the third world for
which they must pay but payment cannot be in the form of sustainable
development, nor corporate environmentalism; it must be in the form
of appropriate and adequate restitution. The question that arises
however is, how are the adequacy and appropriateness of such
payments are to be determined?

Establishing Costs
Many commentators on the ecological crisis are agreed that is
difficult if not impossible to quantity and allocate the costs of
ecological damage (Kapp, 1970; Martinez –Alier, 1990). Indeed, Kapp
(1970: 44) has argued that:
…the fact of the matter is that both disruption and improvement of
our environment involve us in decisions that have the most
heterogeneous long-term effects, and which moreover, are decisions
made by one generation with consequences to be borne by the next. To
place a monetary value on and apply a discount rate to future utilities
or disabilities in order to express their present capitalized value may
give us a precise monetary calculation but it does not get out of the
dilemma of a choice and the fact that we take a risk with human health
and survival. For this reason, I am inclined to consider the attempt at
measuring social costs and social benefits in terms of monetary or
market values as doomed to failure … (Quoted in Martinez-Alier
Ecological Economics: Energy, Environment and Society. Basil
Blackwell, Oxford 1990: xx)
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Martinez-Alier (1990) has suggested that one way to resolve the
problem is to politicise the economy by assigning values to alternative
results and costs since neither economic rationality nor ecological
rationality can be relied upon to solve the problem of
incommensurability in evaluation. The problem with such a solution
however, as Martinez-Alier recognizes, is that the politicisation of the
economy will mean leaving decision making in the very hands of those
who create the negative externalities. Thus the interests of “the three or
four billion of the earth’s poorest members” who suffer the effects of
environmental degradation will not be taken into account. We believe
that the problem of measurement can be solved if we reserve the
process for ecological debts as opposed to ecological losses. Indeed, we
believe that the difficulties that Kapp observed apply largely to damages
to nature that we have classified as ecological losses.
Indeed, Pearce and Turner, 1990; Power, (1996) have
demonstrated that it is possible to measure environmental damage,
especially those that involve environmental debts. Devlin and Grafton
(1998) have advanced the notion of property rights as basis for
conducting such valuation. “Property rights are defined in terms of
owner(s) and their relationship with others regarding the asset. A
property right provides a stream of benefits to the owner (or user) and
requires that others respect the property right. Who owns the property
right and how this right is specified affects its use”. (Devlin and
Grafton, 1998: 38)
Once property rights are established over resources, it becomes
possible to make people pay attention to the external costs that are
generated in the course of using those resources and therefore of
ensuring that payments will be made for any negative externalities
thereby created. An important point about property rights is that they
can be exercised at local, national and international levels. At the local
level, the problem is easy to identify, property rights can easily be
established and the costs of negative externalities quantified; moreover,
the major contributors to the problems can be identified easily. The
idea of local property rights and how trading schemes can be
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established at this level indicates how the process may also be
established at the national and international levels.
At the national level, ecological debts can be computed as an
aggregate of the debts at the local level; in the same way, the debts at the
international level can be established as the sum total of the debts at the
national level. The idea then is that rather than think of ecological
debts in global terms, and therefore be confronted with the problems
of incommensurability, assigning responsibility and exact
measurement; it is better and more realistic to begin with an agenda of
local ecological debts which are arrived at on the basis of local property
rights. Such rights would include tradeable permits and responsibility
on the part of the users whenever and wherever negative externalities
are produced. The methods of enforcing these rights, including the role
of regulatory agencies, would also be provided for and addressed when
drawing up the tradeable permits.
In proposing this approach towards the establishment of the
ecological or environmental debt, we wish to acknowledge that a
number of preconditions must exist for success. The first precondition
is that property rights must be vested in the real rather than surrogate
owners of resources. The real owners of the resources are those who
have a historical claim to the resources and who also will be most
affected by negative developments with respect to the use of the
resources. In developing countries, the major problem is how property
rights are established: this explains the struggles of the peoples of
Nigeria’s Niger Delta for control over the oil and gas deposits on their
land. It also explains the refusal of the Nigerian state to concede such
rights to the people of the Niger Delta. In essence, here, as in several
parts of Africa, property rights are vested in the state, which however,
goes into collaboration or collusion with transnational corporations to
exploit those rights without regard for the interests of the owner nonusers or host communities.
The second precondition that needs to exist is that the property
rights must be adequately protected by appropriate legislation. In the
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name of the need for revenues and development, the governments of
several third world countries often fail to enact legislation that protect
the property rights of their people. Indeed, legislation is enacted that
frees the TNC user-non-owners of those rights from several
obligations. It must be noted however that within the context of the
ecological debt as have conceptualised it here, the lacuna in the laws
does not free the users of the rights from being liable for abuse of those
rights; if anything, it simply postpones the day of reckoning for them.
The third precondition is that the owners of property rights
must be empowered to protect their rights. Where the owners of the
property rights are weak relative to the users of those rights, ecological
abuse will certainly occur.
In summary then, ecological debts need to be calculated on the
basis of specific local instances. The localization of quantification
means that every possible detail will be captured: the actual degree of
abuse, opportunity costs and so on. It will not matter that the origins
of a particular pollutant are several thousands of kilometres away, nor
that the effect become recognizable after so many years. These will be
matters of tracing responsibility. What will be critical from the point of
view of establishing the size of the debt will be compiling all the data
that relate to actual costs in each local situation. From such local costs,
national and international costs can then be established.

9. Conclusions: Ecological Debt, reparation
ans debt Cancellation
A reappraisal of the past and ongoing relationships between the
third world peoples and leading centres of the advanced capitalist
world has led in recent times to demands by peoples of the underdeveloped world for various forms of compensation and restitution
from the leading centres of the advanced capitalist world. One of these
demands, reparation, is specifically African and is anchored on the
inhumanity of the forced trade in slaves from around 1400 to 1850
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during which over 20 million Africans were uprooted from the African
continent and sold into plantation labour in the Americas and
elsewhere. Walter Rodney (1972: 106) has shown, for example, that
whereas in 1650, Africa’s population stood at 100 million, by 1900,
three hundred and fifty years later, the population had increased to just
120 million. Europe and Asia, which respectively had 103 million and
257 million people in 1650, had increased their populations to 423
million and 857 million people by 1900. The trade in slaves pushed
Africa outside of the orbit and hence natural trajectory of its
development as a push by a big planet on a small planet alters the
trajectory of the small planet forever. The slave trade altered Africa’s
natural trajectory of development forever. The demand for reparation
thus seeks redress for a small part of the incalculable and
unindemnifiable damage done to Africa by European and American
slave traders.
The second demand, shared by all third world peoples is that of
debt cancellation. This demand is based upon the realization of debtor
countries that the huge debts, which they are being called upon to pay,
represents a fraction of the surplus expropriated from their own
countries by agents and representatives of global capital. More
importantly, it is based upon the realization that the debts arose as a
result of unjust economic, trading and political relations that were
consciously foisted by the advanced capitalist countries on the poor
countries. It has been estimated for example that in 1996 alone, the net
outflow of funds from the third world to the advanced world was in
excess of US$50.0 billion. This net outflow was calculated by
subtracting the total outflow of foreign investments form the advanced
countries to the third world from loan repayments by third world
countries. What the data shows is a scandal: in effect, third world
countries are financing the development of advanced countries and
having to be reminded that they are poor by the same advanced
countries.
The third demand, the idea of an ecological debt owed by rich
countries to the world in general and to third world countries in
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particular links the current world wide ecological crises and specific
regional environmental disasters to the conscious activities of a
globalising capitalism. For third world and African countries, the
ecological debt has a close relationship with debtor status and therefore
the demand for debt cancellation and for the sources of the loans that
finance the debts of third world countries are extracted from the soils
of third world peoples – extractions that produce environmental
disasters and crises in the third world. That this relationship is indeed
recognized by international financiers can be seen in the attempt some
years ago to write off US$4.0 billion of Brazil’s foreign debt as the value
of the ecological damage to the Amazonian rain forest in Brazil.
In general, however, what needs to be understood is that the
demands for reparation, debt cancellation and payment of ecological
debt are related. They are demands that arise from the exploitative
nature of the relationships between third world and first world
capitalist countries. Indeed, they arise from the relationships between
poor and rich countries, where the rich have become so by fraudulently
taking what belongs to the poor. In a fundamental sense therefore, all
the demands arise from a class of actions on the part of the advanced
capitalist countries that need to be recognized and as treated as crimes
against humanity. This needs to be the slogan for the various demands.
The slogan may not win any specific concessions now because of the
existing power relationships between third world and the advanced
capitalist countries but it will certainly serve a note of warning to them
that we understand the history and nature of our relationships and that
a day of reckoning is coming.
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OIL and GAS in Africa:
ecological debt Huge as the sky*
Nnimmo Bassey
EARTH RIGHTS ACTION

Introducción
The story of oil and gas in Africa is the story of rogue
exploitation, despoliation and bizarre brigandage. It is a story of
pollution, displacement and pillage. It is a montage of burnt rivers,
burnt forests and maimed lives. An oil well is a death sentence if it is
located in your backyard.
I was waiting for immigration checks at the Johannesburg
International airport in late August 2001 when suddenly I found that I
was standing behind two US oil industry workers based in Nigeria.
They were quite loquacious. Two lines in their excited talk caught my
attention.

*

•

“Just imagine,” one said, “how crude oil is always found in
Godforsaken places.”

•

“No,” the partner replied, “it is crude oil exploitation that makes
those places Godforsaken.”

Article presented during the “Globalization, Ecological Debt, Climate Change and
Sustainability: A South-South Conference”, held in Benin, in November 2001,
organised by Acción Ecológica from Ecuador, FoE Benin and FoE International.
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This brief interaction sets clearly the basic pillar of ecological
debt. Every destructive action attracts a debt. It is an ethical issue; it is
a moral issue; it has cultural connotations; it is economic, political and
even criminal.

Revenue: on what Avenue
If Africa were to be devoid of mountains, rivers and other
natural features, oil and gas fields would nevertheless have provided
sufficient dots on the map to arrest your attention. Each dot on the
map representing oil or gas fields has a long story to tell. Their histories
are deeply linked to the histories of the geographical boundaries within
which they are found. These dots look so abstract and commonplace
on maps, but they did not just appear there; they are the footprints of
oil transnational corporations (TNCs) whose umbilical cords are fed
by colonial blood.
The revenue accruing from oil and gas exploitation is certainly
huge. The problem is that it does not translate to positive change in the
nations of Africa. The huge revenues are neither adequately nor
transparently accounted for by the governments or by the TNCs. Thus,
the same deprived people are made to bear the heavy load of unpayable
debts allegedly owed to the World Bank and other creditor institutions
of the North.
The extractive industry generally holds a record in conflict
generation, gross human rights abuses and sustenance of undemocratic
or at least unstable regimes. It does not matter where in the South these
companies operate or whether we are considering crude oil or
diamonds1. When one reflects on the situation in Sierra Leone, one
cannot but think that wearing a diamond these days could mean the
same as wearing a child’s limb on one’s finger.2
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Let’s go Offshore
Offshore oil and gas exploitation has predictably generated
conflicts due to the brazen disregard of social and environmental
concerns and today the TNCs are literally heading into the deep waters
as they head offshore. Off shore is attractive for many reasons:
•

Onshore reserves are drying up after about five decades of
ceaseless exploitation.

•

There are huge finds now found offshore that are open to
exploitation at monster profits.

•

TNCs activities are removed from the immediate view of local
communities

•

Toxic wastes can be dumped into deep waters with less resistance
or need for environmental accountability.

•

Impacts are more insidious but less readily noticed.

•

Less needs to be spent on requirements of good neighbourliness.
Once out in the seas, TNCs claim they have no neighbours.

The problem with this is that the destructive effects of these
activities are not wholly kept offshore. Mankind is yet to produce
effective legislation or even physical boundaries to block off offshore
pollutants that tend to wash onshore and even across national
boundaries.
Another threat from these offshore adventures is that the TNCs
are digging in for a long stay. This means the extension of present
conflicts, exploitation, destruction, degradation and environmental
and human rights abuse.
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Nigeria
The oil industry in Nigeria is emblematic of oil activities in other
Sub-Saharan countries in Africa. Cases of degradation and human
rights violations are well documented and known. Let us mention a few
examples.
On 14 October 2000, ten youths of the Olugbobiri community,
Bayelsa State, were murdered by military guards near an oil facility
belonging to AGIP in an unprovoked attack. After this massacre AGIP
commissioned a study into the alternatives to using military personnel
on oil facilities.
The incident at Olugbobiri came about as youths from the
community sought to clarify the status of the specifications for a
proposed road project in the area. It was alleged that the oil company
had altered the agreed specifications without proper procedures and
without any discussion with the local people.
On 28 May 1998, Ilaje youths were shot, killed and wounded on
Chevron’s Parabe platform where they had gone to arrange for
dialogue on the impact of oil extraction on their communities and
livelihoods.
Cases abound where rivers are not only polluted but are also set
on fire in a bid to conceal evidence of crude oil spillage. When you see
a fire in the Niger Delta you do well not to jump into any river. It may
just be the river itself that is on fire.
Oil and gas business is a business carried out on an uneven
ground. Trade with the North has been decidedly unfair. The incident
involving the Royal Niger Company (RNC) - the 1895 sacking of
Akassa - should underscore this position. The Akassa people (of now
Bayelsa State) were a great people with thriving agriculture and
commerce. Indeed they were in trading contacts with merchants in
areas as far off as Liverpool. To ensure that they had a complete
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monopoly of trade in Akassa, the RNC ensured, by force of arms, that
the people were cut off from what they knew best to do. The result was
massive starvation, disease and death.3 The trade then was about palm
oil. Today there is still resource conflict in the region and it is still about
oil, only this time it is not palm oil but crude oil.
Oil TNCs use judicial processes to present themselves as law
abiding corporate citizens while ensuring that they do not accept
judicial decisions that are against them.4

Exploration/prospecting
This phase of oil business is marked by seismic activities that
involve the use of dynamites and other explosives. These are either
detonated in the bowels of the earth through water bodies or dry land.
These explosives have direct impact on the aquatic stocks in the area as
well as the fauna. Aftershocks are known to sometimes cover as much
as a radius of 10 kilometres. The blasts have been known to have
impact on the auditory systems of sea birds and mammals finally
affecting their ability to community and procreate. Other side effects
are noted in diminished food supplies, increased cases of hypertension
and endocrine imbalance5. The ultimate impact is on the fish supply
on which the economy of the local people hangs.

Exploitation & Transportation
Oil spills, pipeline explosions and resultant conflicts mark the
exploitation and transportation stages. Pipelines are routinely left to
rust and rupture before efforts are made to replace them.
Oil spills are never adequately cleaned up. Cases in point here
can be found in Nigeria’s Ogoniland. The Ogoni people expelled Shell
from their communities in 1993, but spills that occurred long before
then already dotted the landscape and are testimonies to the
destruction wreaked on their land by Shell.
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The cleaning up of the Ogoni environment has been one of the
demands of the Ogoni people. A recent testing of the underground
water at Botem Tai in Ogoni by ERA showed serious contamination by
hydrocarbons, heavy metals and sundry toxic substances.
Natural remediation may take generations to return the
environment to its natural state. In many cases spills are “cleaned”
using contractors who have no skills for such technical actions. It is not
surprising that they often set whole forests on fire in a bid to wipe out
the evidence of the spills. Examples abound in AGIP and SPDC areas
of operations.
The Aleibiri forest was set on fire to hide SPDC’s spill after crude
efforts to clean the spill proved ineffective. AGIP’s spill at Etiema, a
community close to Ogbolomabiri (headquarters of Nembe West LGA
of Bayelsa State) was traced to her pipelines that were constructed in
1972 and have not since been upgraded or replaced. The people have
seen many spills but nothing like that of 13 May 2000.6 By the end of
the day the crude oil had spread to communities such as IgbetaEwoama, Iwokiri, Agbakabiriyo, Sabatoro, Kemenini, etc. AGIP hired
some youths to clean up the spill using faulty mechanical pumps. The
faulty pump generated a spark that ignited the crude oil and killed at
least six youths.

Angola
Angola is a prime example of a richly endowed nation that has
found her riches a curse rather than a blessing. The nation has some of
the richest mineral resources in Africa. Oil activities commenced in the
1960s here. Over the years, civil wars have torn this nation apart and
this has put virtually every national endeavour in reverse gear. It is
remarkable to note that because crude oil here is produced offshore
(mostly from the fields off Cabinda), the production pace has
remained high.
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The war in Angola, as in many other countries in Africa, is a war
of resource control. Going offshore has meant a negation of corporate
responsibility to the real owners of the resources and assurance of
unchecked gains.
Fuels accounted for 94.8% of national exports by value in 1991.
The total annual output of crude petroleum in 1998 was 268 million
barrels per year. The offshore fields have up to one billion barrels
reserve. The TNCs at work here include ELF, ExxonMobil, BP, etc.

Sudan
Sudan has a shorter history of oil extraction but because of the
massive war in the oil areas it can be compared to the Niger delta.
“Southern Sudan – where most of the oil is – has long been a zone of
extraction rather than of development. In fact, since the resurgence of
civil war in the last two decades it has gone backwards in terms of
development and social provision.”7. The method favoured by the
Sudanese government to keep the oil fields and pipelines quiet is that
of “expelling civilians from the areas of Talisman’s operation to create
a no-man’s land around the wells...if it were not for oil development,
the army would not be displacing civilians from these areas”8.
Displacement is effected by bombings and burnings of
communities. This displacement, coupled with other violent situations,
gives Sudan the honour of contributing one out of every eight refugees
and displaced persons in the world. Moreover, many places suffer
extreme hunger and villages devastated by militia raids are said to now
be off the map. There are reports of instances where relief materials
were being dropped and quickly followed by bombs.
More than 40 years of war in Sudan may appear to have
nothing to do with oil since Sudanese oil only got pumped into the
market in 1999 but long before the first well was drilled, deals were
being made and speculators were already trooping to the banks with
‘oil’ money.
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Cameroon
Cameroon has a wide range of natural resources including
bauxite, tin ore and limestone. Natural gas is found near Douala, and
offshore oil deposits are being exploited. However, what placed
Cameroon on the oil resistance map of the world is not oil found in this
nation but crude oil from the oil fields of neighbouring Chad. The 1000
km pipeline is running from Southern Chad to the Cameroonian
Atlantic coast.
The pipeline is running through lowlands, forests and some of
the rivers used by the local communities. Studies have shown that the
consortium handling this pipeline may escape liability for
environmental damage because of weak legislation in both Chad and
Cameroon9. This situation has made many analysts believe that the
presence of the World Bank is critical for the observance of basic
environmental and human rights.

Congo (Brazzaville)
Offshore petroleum reserves have been exploited since 197510.
The Congolese offshore has interesting petrochemical infrastructure
made of concrete. The N’Kossa concrete barge for liquefied natural gas
(LNG) has held the record of being the largest concrete barge ever
built.11 This barge measures 200 metres by 36 metres and is 16 metres
deep. This concrete monster weighs 110,000 tons.
This is ELF territory, following on the heels of French colonial
“conquest”. Elf is working with BP, Shell and Statoil in developing new
fields as deep as 2 kilometres. Design focus has been on multifunctional
concrete barges that drill and produce simultaneously.
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Equatorial Guinea
Mobil was the first oil TNC to obtain a license to prospect here.
Until the discovery of crude oil, agriculture was by far the main source
of livelihood in Equatorial Guinea. The rural economy has deteriorated
under successive brutal regimes, with the potential for agriculture-led
growth reduced as a result12.

South Africa
The most worrisome problems here relate to highly polluting
refineries. The health issues related to these refineries are constant
challenges. More recently SAPREF’s petrol pipelines in South Durban
have been springing leaks of alarming proportions. In a recent leak, up
to 71,000 litres of petrol was recovered from groundwater after the
spill.13

As more finds are made, the areas of concern expand14
1. Tanzania - The Zanzibar government has authorised a Canadian
company, Antrim Resources, to prospect for oil off Pemba and
Zanzibar islands. License given since 1997.
2. Mozambique – A gas pipeline is planned to link Mozambique
with South Africa.
3. Uganda – Prospecting still on. The Australian firm, Hardman, is
the key player here.
4. Mauritania – with Hardman as the major TNC also.
5. Democratic Republic of Congo – is a new oil goal
6. Malawi – with activities in the lake
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Livelihood Challenges
Time is long past when oil communities rejoiced at the
announcement of crude oil finds in their territories. Today they receive
such announcements with trepidation. From experience it has heralded
environmental and human rights abuse of monumental proportions.
In Nigeria there is more attention to environmental impact
assessments (EIA) and their scrutiny. Case in point is the reaction of
the local community to ELF’s presentation of an EIA on its recent oil
field (Amenam Ikpono FDP, OML 99) in Nigeria. The areas of worry
were telling15:
1. Lack of fisheries study. The people see fisheries as a strategic
resource of livelihood of the inhabitants of the coastal areas of
the project.
2. Non-reference to the naturally rich shrimp and sediment in the
microbiological study.
3. Unacceptable low level of attention paid to the coastal vegetation
and soils that they see as ultimate points of impact when spills
occur.
4. Inadequate baseline studies as well as inadequate level of
participatory research/dialogue with stakeholders.

Offshore Oil: Offshore Contracts
The media frequently reports on communal conflicts over lack
of basic social services in communities where crude oil is exploited.
However, there are other levels of conflicts that are just as prominent
and equally fundamental. This has to do with who wins the contracts
in the oil fields.
Shell’s 1000 metres deep Bonga oilfield lying 120 kilometres off
the Nigerian coast was discovered in 1995 with investment decisions
84

reached in 2000. The field is set to begin production in 2003. The
oilfield has a recoverable oil deposit of 600 million barrels.
Federal legislators are unhappy that the contracts for works on
the oilfield were all given to foreign companies.16 A Shell spokesman
said recently that the company is “not concerned about federal
legislators threatening to bring a halt to the work on the Bonga Main
find over the award of five major contracts to foreign firms… We’ve
engaged some group of senators and House of Representatives
members in a debate and they are looking into the details. I don’t think
they will take a decision that will not be in the interest of Nigeria.”17
The controversy over these contracts eventually led the national
assembly to set up a body to investigate the award of contracts in the
Nigerian oil industry.18 Shell’s current position is that Nigerian firms
will have a share of contracts during the production stages.

Burning Gas
The people in most oil communities in Nigeria live with gas
stacks that flare gas 24 hours a day at temperatures of 13-14,000
degrees Celsius. These gas flares produce 35 million tons of CO2 and 12
million tons of methane, more than the rest of the world. This makes
the oil industry in Nigeria the single biggest source of global warming
in the world).19
Indiscriminate gas flaring has been the lot of the people of the
Niger Delta for about 40 years now. In 1989 alone Nigeria flared a
reported 617 billion cubic feet of associated gas, releasing 30 million
tons of carbon dioxide in the process20.
The effect of gas flaring has been dramatic: continual noise, acid
and retarded crop yield, corroded roofs and lung diseases.
Nigerians have been told that the various facilities and projects such as
the proposed West African Gas project would greatly reduce gas flaring.
The way this would be achieved has not been transparently presented

rain21
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to the people. What is obvious is that the gas being flared is associated
gas whereas much of what the new gas projects plan to utilise are from
new gas fields and are not associated with crude oil production.22
The spectre of rising sea levels due to global warming is more
ominous for the Niger Delta that is a naturally subsidence-prone
territory. Although scientists generally dispute the warning that sea
levels will rise by 2 metres by the year 2100, it is strongly believed that
at the rate of subsidence of the Niger delta, that net rise in sea level will
be exceeded. Measurements at the site of a tank farm showed a
subsidence rate of more than 2.5 cm/year.23 A one-metre rise in sea
level could flood a land area as large as 18,000 sq. km and force millions
of people to relocate. It is estimated that up to 80% of the population
would have to relocate if/when this scenario plays itself out.24

Conclusion: Points to Ponder
Oil and gas extraction has been done with little or no
environmental mitigation provisions. These methods ensure huge
profits for TNCs and leave an equal deficit to the local communities.
The question is what will it take to return the environment to its
natural state? The environmental costs are evidently discounted from
the accounting books. These unbalanced balance sheets need to be
revisited.
Oil was first pumped in commercial quantities in West Africa
from a well in Oloibiri in 1958. Up to now, the area has no all season
roads. The well itself yielded all the crude it could and is today
garlanded by silent bushes and a plague erected there by General
Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s president. Generally, it is held that living
conditions in oil communities are worse than they were before the
onset of oil.
Today’s world is interconnected and interdependent. The
problem is that the linkage has remained a lopsided one. Conflicts in
Africa are in the main traceable to extractive activities. Diamonds in
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Sierra Leone, oil in the Niger Delta and Sudan, diverse minerals in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, etc. From the West these conflicts are
usually seen as “African problems that require African solutions”. That
must be seen as true in a certain sense. “ The history of externally
driven solutions has not delivered durable peace on the continent…25”
Tropical oil producing countries have become critical sources of
cheap energy resources. With less rigorous environmental legislation,
the TNCs derive excessive profit by plundering the land irrespective of
the safety of the people and their environment.
We can conclude that:
•

This apparently cheap resource is so because of the intrinsic
subsidy provided by the space to operate mindlessly.

•

Debts occur in every unfair relationship where one is benefiting
and the other is losing. A crude example is when a robbery
occurs. The robber owes the robbed a debt that may be paid back
in kind or through penalties secured through a judicial process.

•

In the oil and gas sector as well as in other spheres, TNCs are
expanding and merging for greater expansion and greater
influence while at the same time the World Bank, IMF and
related institutions are encouraging shrinking of public
corporations. The TNCs are swallowing up governments,
weakening them and re-colonising these nations.

•

TNCs are the warrant agents of Northern governments. They are
the hands of Esau “behind” the voice of Jacob. But the people see
that the governments are trying to protect the oil and gas
companies’ installations, “or knocking down a protest
action…”26

•

One of the problems of conceptualising ecological debt with
regard to oil and gas extraction is located in the internal political
equation of the countries involved. Because these TNCs operate
87

“better” under repressive regimes27 the entire process is nonparticipatory. And because the people at the end of the burning
sticks are so oppressed, they often question the legitimacy of the
governments under which they are forced to live.
•

There is agitation by local peoples for a say in the extraction of
resources from their communities. In Nigeria this has given rise
to a demand for Resource Control by these local peoples. The
argument is that since they (the people) live on the degraded
lands and waters, they would be in a better position to negotiate
with TNCs over the methods of resource extraction as well as
being in a better position to utilise the accruing resources for
development and meeting of real needs28.

•

Inter ethnic conflicts are deliberately generated in and between
oil and gas communities. A report on the Nigerian environment
highlighted some “key indicators” to monitor, including: “The
emergence of regional political movements or cross-ethnic
coalitions based on concerns about public health and
environmental degradation. The rise of such groups, a rarity in
Nigeria to date, could signal a move towards political instability
on a national level.29” It adds, “escalating violence could also
prompt oil companies to request US or foreign government
assistance”30.

•

The same report highlights the corrupt nature of oil TNCs when
it states, “Oil revenue is often diverted into military-controlled
accounts, and oil companies give kickbacks to secure licenses”31.

•

Analysis of environmental costs and compensations are not mere
technical exercises. They require political decisions and the will
for this is currently in short supply. According to Jose Navia32, “a
political decision is also involved is environmental impact
evaluation; and even the methodologies used in such evaluations
are not foreign to cultural and political influences.”
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•

Loss of species, destruction of habitats, environmental
dislocations, impoverishment of whole people groups, and
subjugation for profit all constitute ecological debt.

•

Mega consumption in the North, mega degradation in the south:
that is the wheel that rolls in the debt.

•

Exportation of global warming through fossil fuel consumption
adds to this debt.

•

Alternative energy sources must be developed and popularised.
The stranglehold on the alternative energy industry by oil and
gas TNCs must be broken to save our planet and reduce the everincreasing ecological debt.

•

Ecological debt is a debt long overlooked. It must now be placed
right on the table. It is time for international negotiation
processes and dialogue on this massive debt owed the South by
the North. A debt owed to humanity by the ambitious TNCs. It
is a debt owed to our collective yesterday and our collective
tomorrow.

•

There must be a moratorium for at least ten years on all new oil
exploration while a massive environmental audit is carried out in
all existing oil and gas fields. The audit will reveal what actions
need to be taken to restore our devastated environments. It will
also show components of what debt needs to be addressed.

•

We must also demand a moratorium on “debt” servicing or
repayment until the ecological audit and debt assessment. This
will clear the picture about who really is the debtor.

•

The ecological debt balance sheet is as huge as the sky!
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Texaco’s Ecological Debt*
Esperanza Martínez
Acción Ecológica and Oilwatch
Ecuador

Introduction
Texaco is probably the company that has accumulated the
greatest ecological debt with Ecuador. Its operations brought with
them destruction and pollution for wide areas of the jungle in the
Amazon region, the extermination of indigenous peoples and the
impoverishment not just of the region, but also of the country.
Life is immeasurable, thus a price cannot be put on it.
Nevertheless, it is and should be possible to establish sanctions for
those who destroy it. A price cannot be put on a dead river, but it is
possible to calculate how much it would cost to substitute the services
it provided.
In Ecuador, indigenous people and peasants are suing the
company for damage caused during its operation.
Furthermore, some social organizations affected directly or
indirectly by Texaco’s activities have announced a boycott on the
company, to make the Ecuadorian population refuse to buy any of its
products.

*

Article presented during the “Globalization, Ecological Debt, Climate Change and
Sustainability: A South-South Conference”, held in Benin, in November 2001,
organised by Acción Ecológica from Ecuador, FoE Benin and FoE International.
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We must take on the fact that Texaco affects us all, that we are all
creditors of Texaco’s ecological debt with Ecuador.
Texaco Ecological Debt File
Ecological debtor:

CHEVRON TEXACO

Creditor country:

ECUADOR
Orellana and Sucumbíos Provinces

Creditor peoples:

Cofán, Secoya, Siona, Quichua, Huaorani,
Tetete, Sansahuari (extinct) and peasants
displaced to the colonization zone. There
are approximately 30,000 people affected
directly by operations.

Affected ecosystem:

Tropical Rainforest.
Ecuadorian Amazon.
Amazon, Andean and coastal ecosystems
where the SOTE (trans-Ecuadorian oil
pipeline) crosses.

Intervention period:

28 years

Company history:

Texaco is a North American company,
created in Texas in 1926. When it opened its
offices in the Petroleum Building, Houston,
Texas, it put up a pirate’s flag on the roof.
On the fluttering flag, as black as crude oil,
was a skull and crossbones, with a pirate’s
patch over the hollow of an eye. It was as if
they were indicating what they were ready
for, their willingness to bring an end to
anything hindering them from achieving
their objectives.

Ecological extent of the Damage
Texaco was the first company to start oil activities in the
Ecuadorian Amazon, in 1967.
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Texaco extracted nearly 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil. It built 22
stations, drilled 339 wells in an area that currently covers 442,965
hectares. It spilt tons of toxic material, maintenance waste, and more
than 19 billion gallons of production water (with six times as much salt
as seawater, and with hydrocarbon and heavy metal remains) into the
environment. Its burners burnt two million cubic metres of gas daily.
There are 235 oil wells still functioning, currently operated by
Petroecuador, who inherited Texaco’s dirty technology. According to
reports, 5 million gallons of production water are spilled into the
environment daily as well as countless amounts of waste from
maintenance and other oil activities. Waste from oil is applied to roads
to control dust and “maintain them”, thus providing a permanent
source of contamination for crops sown around the roads. Every day
tens of millions of cubic feet of gas are burned as waste, thus destroying
a natural resource and polluting the air.
Production water contains a large quantity of pollutants
including hydrocarbons like benzene and other polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs) these have a direct relationship to cancer and
produce skin mutations and irritation. It also contains heavy metals
and levels of toxic salts.
Atmospheric emissions include gases that produce the
greenhouse effect, are forerunners of acid rain, and other pollutants
that in their majority contain extremely toxic dioxins.
Apart from routine and deliberate releases and emissions into
the environment, accidental spillages have been very frequent. During
the time that Texaco operated the trans-Ecuadorian oil pipeline,
approximately 16.8 million gallons of crude oil were lost through
spillages.
Texaco is responsible for impacts on peasant communities,
especially on their health, and for great economic losses due to the
death of animals and crop destruction. Direct responsibility is
attributed to them for the cancers that affect people living near
petroleum installations.
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The incidence of malnutrition in the area is among the highest
in the country, due to contamination and destruction of resources.
Cases of cancer are also among the highest and increasing, due to the
chronic pollution.

Cultural Extent to the Damage
Texaco is responsible for the acceleration of the extinction
process of peoples such as the Tetetes and the Sansahuari, who lived in
the area where Texaco set up petrol fields. It is responsible for
irreparable damage to the Siona, Secoya, Cofán, Quichua and Huaorani
indigenous peoples, who have been displaced from their ancestral
territory. Their way of life and thousand year-old culture has been
affected and countless illnesses have been caused, including: cancer,
miscarriages, intestinal, respiratory and skin infections, nervous
disorders such as loss of memory, dizziness and permanent headaches.
The Tetete culture was wiped out and other indigenous peoples
from the area have been reduced to ethnic minorities. Cultural patterns
of feeding and life have also been affected.
Apart from abruptly breaking up the way of life of the Amazon
people, Texaco has generated poverty outside the area it through its
destruction of natural resources with medicinal, nutritional, domestic
and recreational uses. When Texaco started its oil exploration the area
was a primitive rain forest. Now, in the tributaries of the rivers of an
ecosystem recognized around the world for its biological wealth, one
that contains 20-25% of the world’s freshwater reserves, many families
no longer find pure water or sufficient food.
Traditional health, decision-making and organizational systems
have been weakened.
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CAN ECOLOGICAL DEBT BE QUANTIFIED?
Life is immeasurable, thus a price cannot be put on it. Nevertheless, it is
and should be possible to establish sanctions for those who destroy it. A
price cannot be put on a dead river, but it is possible to calculate how
much it would cost to substitute the services it provided.
All the costs presented in this publication are referential in that they allow
us to measure unseen spending, things that we are not used to valuing.
Even though the calculations are incomplete, and in many cases
inaccurate, they do allow us to think about the true magnitude of damage
caused by Texaco.

Texaco’s debt with Ecuador
1. Debt for Unpaid Oil
Texaco extracted approximately 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil. It
never paid for oil resources as the payments it made were only for
extraction costs.
Oil took millions of years to be produced. In Brazil a team of
scientists calculated the value of the commodity known as petroleum,
applying a formula of working time, workforce and raw material. They
concluded that the figure that should be used to value crude oil is one
million dollars per gallon (Dos Santos L., personal communication,
1999).
To use another reference, if we had sold Coca-Cola at the current
price, the State would have obtained $107.1 billion for this same
quantity of barrels (the price of a barrel of Coca-Cola is currently
$71.4). Nobody can question the fact that charging the cost of CocaCola for oil is ridiculous, as it devalues the latter, but nevertheless, if it
had been so, Texaco would now owe us $87.6 billion.
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Ecuador received an average of $13 per barrel for the sale of oil
extracted, that is to say $19.5 billion over the 26 years of operation.
Coca Cola costs six times more than oil, despite the fact that oil
took millions of years to be made in the depths of the earth, is a nonrenewable resource and the highest valued energy source.

2. Debt caused by Spillages
During its 26 years work in the Ecuadorian Amazon, it is
calculated that Texaco leaked 30 million gallons of crude oil. Only 16.8
million gallons were registered by the General Environmental Office in
relation to the breakage of the principal oil pipeline (SOTE), and the
rest is a conservative estimate of leakages from secondary lines and the
mismanagement of wells.
To calculate the cost of cleaning up these spillages, it is worth
comparing them to others in which remediation measures have been
taken.
The largest petroleum spillage in the history of the USA
happened in the Prince William Sound, caused by the Exxon Valdez
Company in 1989. In this case 10.8 million gallons were spilled.
Cleaning up the spillage of Exxon Valdez along the Alaska
coastline cost over $7 billion. In spite of this investment, fisherman
from the same coastline and scientists claim that the work was
incomplete.
A simple mathematical calculation leads us to conclude that to
clean up the spillages caused by Texaco in the Amazon, at least $19.444
billion would be needed: this is an amount higher than the current
external debt of Ecuador. In fact it would be likely to cost much more,
as cleaning up tropical jungle and freshwater, including wetlands, is
more difficult and costly than cleaning activities in the sea. (Kimerling
J. com pers).
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3. Debt for Wetland Pollution
Behind each station there is at least one marsh covered in oil.
These can be from 1 to 15 hectares in size, but the average is 10 hectares
per station. These areas were previously tropical rainforest or tropical
wetland.
Texaco affected a minimum of 220 hectares of wetlands, if we
take into account only those in which large stations were found; of
course many smaller wetlands exist around the wells or in stations.
To recover the wetlands is impossible. Different experiences
demonstrate that the cure can be worse than the illness, and this is
confirmed by Petroecuador workers. Nevertheless, according to the
Biology Department of the Catholic University (Pallares com. pers.),
the remediation for 1 m3 of marshland would cost no less than $600.
For 220 hectares of wetland of one metre in depth, multiplied by
$600, the cost to Texaco would amount to $1.320 billion only for the
remediation, which is completely separate from restoration work.

4. Debt for gas Flaring
During its operations, Texaco burned the gas associated with
crude oil.
The gas burned contains SO2, SH2, NO2, NO, CO2, methane,
ethane, propane, butane, pentane, heptane, CO. One secondary result
of combustion is the generation of DIOXINS, which are highly toxic.
Texaco burnt a total of 248 billion cubic feet daily (Kimerling,
1993).
In order to understand the magnitude of the disaster, we can
compare it with domestic gas. Every 15 kg cylinder contains 1.03 cubic
feet of gas. If the gas burned had the same characteristics as domestic
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gas and had been used, it would have meant that Texaco had burned
240.776 billion cylinders.
According to different governments of the time, gas has been a
subsidized product. They have said officially that the real cost of each
cylinder would reach $20, meaning that Texaco burnt $5 trillion in real
terms.
At this moment in time, the subsidized price is $1.70 per
cylinder, and so the 240.776 billion cylinders burned would be
equivalent to $409.319 billion, that is to say, 30 times the external debt.

5. Debt for Deforestation and Biodiversity Loss
Texaco caused the deforestation of 1 million hectares through
seismic lines, heliports, stations, access roads, camps and as an effect of
the colonization that their operations involved.
To calculate the use of one hectare of land several studies have
been done. According to Bennet (1991), it is possible to obtain $6,520
annually from one hectare of forest. This sum is calculated from the
value of using medicinal plants and non-wood products from the
forest. According to the Yale University study in Jatun Sacha (NapoEcuador) the output of three plots per year, using non-wood products
from the forest were: first plot $3,107 per year, second plot $2,497 per
year, and in the third, $1,125.
This figure does not include the losses invoked by potential
earnings that could have been obtained, generated in the tropical
forests through medicinal plant discoveries, active principles for the
development of new medicines, cosmetics and other products.
According to RAFI in 1995, the pharmaceutical industry obtains
$47 billion a year from the biodiversity that comes from the South.
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According to the same study, if a family sells wood it could earn
an average of $164 per year. If it dedicates its labours to livestock
farming, it can earn $540 per year, or $339 through agriculture.
The use of 1 million hectares could have meant $6.520 billion
per year, which in 26 years would have been $169.520 billion.

6. Debt for Dead Fish
During the exploration phase, the use of dynamite caused the
massive death of fish. Judy Kimerling (1993) calculated that an average
of 500 fish died per explosion.
Every kilometre at least one explosion in a river was carried out.
This meant at least 30 million dead fish. The prices of Amazon fish,
according to the Arca de Noe Aquarium in Quito, vary between $0.50
and $35. An average of all the dead fish would thus be $532 million.

7. Debt for Water Used
Texaco used freshwater for its operations, in both the cooling
systems and in its camps. They never paid for the use of this resource.
In the camps an average of 200,000 litres of water were used
daily. One petroleum worker used an average of 100 litres of water per
day for his/her activities. One litre of water costs 0.20 cents, thus Texaco
used $80,000 of water per day. During the 9,490 days this would add up
to $759 million.

8. Debt for Sand Used
Texaco used sand extracted from rivers in its infrastructure,
moving hundreds and thousands of trucks. In the 339 wells with an
average surface area of one hectare, platforms of 0.50 depth were built,
101

amounting to 5,000 cubic metres. Each truck holds an average of five
cubic metres, that is to say 1000 trucks per platform. Each truckload, at
the current cost, is worth $20 to the Municipality, and for private use it
is worth $80. For each well $20,000 sand was used but not paid for,
multiplied by the 339 wells that exist we reach the total of $6.780
billion.
Sand was used for roads in the same way. According to
information from the mingas (voluntary communal labourers), one
truck “trails 3 metres”. This covers half of the road, thus to cover 1
kilometre, 666 truckloads are needed. For the 500 km of roads we reach
the figure of 333,333 truckloads, to be multiplied by $20 per load. This
is equivalent to a debt of $6.660 billion.

9. Debt for Wood Used
Thousands of planks were used to cover roads, most of them of
fine tropical wood. Along the roads 8 planks (using planks of 2.50 by
0.25 as a reference) were used for every metre. Along the 500km of road
4 million planks were used. The current price of a plank is between $36, and so the equivalent price is $24 million.
On the platforms, the planking required the use of 16,000 planks
per platform; this is equivalent to 5.424 million planks, which at the
current cost would add up to $30 million.

10. Debt for Wild Animals hunt
Each worker ate on average one whole wild animal per week.
Across the 26 years of operations, with an average of 2000 workers, and
considering the working period of 22 days on for every 8 days of rest,
the workers must have eaten 1 animal per week, which multiplied by 42
weeks of work per year, and by 2,000 workers over 26 years, gives us a
total of 2.184 million wild animals.
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One wild Amazonian animal in a zoo in the USA has a cost of
more than $1,000. To this we have to add dead animals such as snakes,
birds, monkeys and others. If we add all these figures we arrive at the
quantity of $2.184 billion.

11. Debt for River salinization
According to Petroecuador reports, 19 billion gallons of
production water were spilt into the environment during Texaco’s
operations. This put a large part of Amazonian rivers out of action. The
salt in the production waters contains heavy metals, and has a toxic
effect even in minimal concentration.
Only production water contains concentrations of sodium salts
of between 150,000 to 180,000 ppm (parts per million). That is to say
that these waters are up to five times saltier than seawater, which
contains 35,000 ppm (Ecological Action, Monitoring Manual No. 3)
These salty waters have been discharged into rivers and marshes
in the Amazon, first in perforation sites and later from separation
stations.
The current cost of desalinisation of seawater is calculated at
$0.38 per litre, according to Friends of the Earth Middle East. However
it is impossible to take out the other salts highly toxic to human health
that are present in this water.
For human consumption, bathing, food, drink and other uses, a
minimum of 7,500,000 litres of water is required for the approximately
150,000 inhabitants of those districts whose water was affected by
Texaco. This would cover the 50 litres per person per day needed to
maintain a basic standard of dignity. On the current market, 20 litres of
water cost $2. This means that in order to satisfy the water needs,
$750,000 would be needed daily. Compensation for only ten years
would thus be calculated at $5.475 billion.
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12. Health Debts
Production water has high levels of sodium salts, chloride,
sulphur, calcium, cyanide, magnesium and manganese. Depending on
the geological structure, one or another can predominate. These
contaminated waters affect the water, rendering it useless for human
consumption, and creating the ideal medium for the proliferation of
different illnesses that local inhabitants cannot cope with.
Furthermore, Texaco gave away chemical tanks to local people to
allow them to collect and store water.
The highest incidence of cancer and leukaemia in the country
has been registered in the area opened up and worked by Texaco, where
it reaches 31% as opposed to the national rate of 12.3%. The most
frequent cancers are stomach, leukaemia, liver, intestine, womb and
bone.
In a study carried out in the areas affected by oil extraction, 445
cases of cancer near installations have been identified (Maldonado,
2002). Further unreported cases could exist at greater distance from oil
wells and other infrastructure.
Cancer is an incurable disease if it is diagnosed late, and even an
early diagnosis does not ensure successful treatment. In the
Metropolitan Hospital the average cancer treatment costs $20,000; in
the USA this figure is $47,000.
To treat the 445 sick individuals, the amount required would be
$20.915 million.
In this section we have not included the compensation that
should be paid for deaths caused by cancer or other deaths from
contamination, drowning, intoxication, asphyxiation etc., which could
be calculated according to what insurance companies pay to family
members.
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13. Debt for Badly Paid Work
Texaco paid its workers in Ecuador much less than those in the
USA with the same functions.
Work in the jungle was great luxury for the North American
workers, while conditions were very hard for Ecuadorians, occupied at
the beginning in opening access roads (Cabodevilla, 1997).
Texaco did not want to have its own payroll, and so contracted
auxiliary operations out to other companies; in this way it was able to
evade all labour obligations.
The many auxiliary companies occupied more than 4,000
workers, almost all of them in the work of opening jungle access roads
(Cabodevilla, 1997). Access road workers could never make any kind of
complaint, although there are reports of accidents, over long working
days, no social security and in some cases slave labour (workers were
only paid with food).
If a complaint were to be made now, the average cost of an hour’s
work in the USA for oil fieldwork could be used as a reference, or the
Ecuadorian rate could be used. In the USA they are paid $15 per hour,
in Ecuador the OCP currently pays $0.40 per hour. This means that the
working hour in the USA is worth 37 times its value in Ecuador.
Supposing that the 2,000 field workers had received $70 a month, we
arrive at the figure of $21.842 million. If we consider that the company
should maintain the same salaries for the same work in both countries,
Texaco would be indebted to these workers to the tune of $786.312
million.

14. Debt for Genocide
Life is priceless, and even more so is the life of whole peoples.
Genocide must be sanctioned as the biggest crime against humanity.
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Indigenous peoples were decimated. Their basis for survival was
destroyed and illnesses that acted like biological extermination
weapons were introduced. Many indigenous people died of flu, an
illness against which they had no resistance. In the case of the Tetete
and Sansahuari people, there were no survivors.
The Jewish people have succeeded in sanctioning the German
state for genocide committed against them in the Second World War,
and in getting compensation recognized. They made the claim for a
fund of $1.25 billion to be created by 18 governments as compensation
to survivors. They demand $5.5 billion as payment for the unpaid work
carried out by prisoners, and also $5 billion in instalments to unpaid
and contracted insurers.
If we calculate only the $1.25 billion for seven extinct peoples or
threatened with extinction in the area under Texaco’s influence
(Tetetes, Sansahuari, Siona, Secoya, Confán, Huaorani, Quichuas), this
company would have to pay $8.750 billion.

15. Debt for Benefiting from Ecuador’s external Indebtedness
The external debt of Ecuador, according to Alberto Acosta, grew
almost 22 times in ten years: at the end of 1971 it was $260.8 million,
and by the end of 1981 it reached $5.8698 billion. These years are vital
as it was during this period that the infrastructure that would benefit
Texaco was built. By 1991, external debt had risen to $12.802 billion.
This debt represented 16% of GDP in 1971, 42% in 1981, and by
1991 it was 111% of GDP
The servicing of external debt also experienced a spectacular
rise: in 1971, $15 out of every $100 exported was committed, and ten
years later this figure rose to $71 in every $100.
It is necessary and possible to investigate how many of these $5.2
billion of external debt served Texaco and its interests (through
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building infrastructure and other related interests). It use as a reference
the minimum that Texaco could have benefited from our indebtedness,
we will take the debt of the first year only (1971-1972), that is to say $83
million.

16. Debt for Carbon Emissions
Texaco extracted 1.5 billion barrels. It is calculated that one
barrel causes 0.112 tons of carbon (Oilwatch 2000), which in turn
causes 168 million tons of CO2.
According to Joan Martínez Alier (2000) “a plausible price for
the cost of cleaning up carbon per ton is $20”. This quantity, multiplied
by the 168 million tons, means that Texaco should invest $3.360 billion.
Texaco’s parcial Ecological Debt
DEBT

AMOUNT

For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For
For

$87.6 billion
$19.444 billion
$1.320 billion
$409.319 billion
$169.520 billion
$532 million
$759 million
$6.78 million
$6.66 million
$24 million
$30 million
$2.184 billion
$5.475 billion
$20.915 million
$786.312 million
$8.750 billion
$83 million
$3.360 billion

unpaid oil
spillages
cleaning up wetlands
gas burning
deforestation and biodiversity loss
dead fish
water used
sand used in platforms
sand used in roads
wood used on roads
wood used on platforms
wild animals hunt
salinization of rivers
illnesses
badly-paid work
genocide
external indebtedness
carbon emissions

TOTAL DEBT OF TEXACO

$709.220667 billion
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The sum of all these headings establishes that Texaco’s debt
with Ecuador reaches $709.220667 billion, 51 times Ecuador’s external
debt!
This case can serve as an illustration of the scale of the damage
caused by Texaco, and at the same time, can provide a guide for other
peoples in the world to find new tools for their own struggles.
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The Moratorium: a Way of Stopping
the Growth of Ecological Debt*
Esperanza Martínez
Oilwatch

It is not easy to oppose oil activity, as it implies confronting the
whole development model in existence.
In spite of environmental, social and cultural impacts being
proven at a local as well as global level, and knowing that it is one of the
main causes of deforestation and loss of biodiversity, opposing to it in
Southern countries is a crime.
It has been proven that a relationship exists between the
dependency of a country on the exploitation of oil and its subsequent
development, which in the majority of cases is expressed in deadlock
and impoverishment. There are records of oil countries that have gone
from crisis to crisis, losing their resources and becoming ever more
dependent, decapitalized and in many cases violent.
In Southern countries opposition to oil is a crime and in the
North it is not seen as a popular proposal either; on the contrary,
efforts of all kinds are made to guarantee access to this resource.

*

Article presented during the “Globalization, Ecological Debt, Climate Change and
Sustainability: A South-South Conference”, held in Benin, in November 2001,
organised by Acción Ecológica from Ecuador, FoE Benin and FoE International.
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Fossil fuel debt
Demands are made for the ecological debt of oil, gas and coal
because of their local impact: deforestation, destruction of wildlife,
river contamination, extinction of peoples, displacement of
populations; and the global impacts such as climate change.
The petrol industry is one of the most polluting industries in
existence. Social and environmental impacts are produced from the
exploration, extraction, transportation and burning of fossil fuels.
Recently, UNICEF the WHO and UNEP published a report in which
they state that pollution kills approximately 5,500 children daily.
To put costs on destruction is practically impossible. However it
is, for example, possible to use the clean-up costs of some events as a
reference. The clean up of the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, off the coast
of Alaska, was over $7 billion, an equivalent of a dollar for each barrel
that was spilt.
The amounts requested in different lawsuits for compensation
or damages vary from case to case, but always reach millions of dollars.
This being said, those affected by the causes of pollution are never
satisfied as the damage caused to them is immeasurable.
The chemicals used in hydrocarbon activities affect the
environment, human health, wildlife, communal co-existence and
agriculture. Furthermore, residues are generated in extraction
activities. For each barrel extracted it is calculated that an equivalent of
one whole barrel of waste is created.
Apart from pollution, deforestation is caused by opening up
access paths, platforms or oil pipeline routes. It is calculated that for
each drill hole, at least two hectares of wood must be cut.
To this debt is added the lack of recognition of the real price of
a non-renewable natural resource, one that has taken millions of years
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to be created. This would include the strength of nature’s work, time,
energy, etc.
On the other hand, hydrocarbon pollution has ceased to become
a local problem and has turned into a global one.
In 1999 86.9 quadrillion cubic metres of gas and 152.2 million
barrels of oil were consumed (The Institute of Petroleum, 2001) and 6
billion tons of carbon were released.
This has led to changes in the temperature of the planet, a rise in
sea levels, melting of polar ice caps and glaciers, floods, droughts, more
serious and frequent climatic disasters, and also a rise in tropical
diseases. One of the disasters with the greatest impact is the change and
decrease in water for agriculture.
Furthermore, oil has a relation to external debt in that it acts as
a guarantee for in indebtedness, as a plaintiff in infrastructure
investments and because the largest part of income for oil exports is
destined to external debt payments.
It is not only about charging the money that they owe us, but
trying to repair what has been damaged, to reconstruct areas in a way
that allows communities to recover their self-sustaining capacity, and
above all to stop the increase in ecological debt.

A growing debt
In spite of the knowledge that the burning of fossil fuels is the
principal cause of climate change, and that its extraction requires the
massive destruction of forests, in the last five years investments in fossil
fuels have been 100 times greater than in other kinds of energy
(Oilwatch, 1997).
It is also calculated that Multilateral Credit Agencies have
investments in fossil fuels of around $50 billion.
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In the last ten years, the oil frontier has grown. 100 new
countries have been incorporated into exploration activities and
exploration and exploitation agreements have been drawn up for deepsea areas.
1999 was the greatest year for discoveries in the last decade. It
was not that drilling has increased, but that prospection techniques
have improved. In the second half of the 1990s, 4.5 million barrels were
added to the proven reserves, constituting an increase of 50% on that
obtained in the first half of the decade.
New discoveries of gas have been greater than oil. In the second
half of the 1990s, discoveries of new gas reserves were 85% higher than
oil. Oil was found in 95 countries, and 50% of the total was to be found
in ten of them
Proven reserves in different countries reach such high levels that
they will never be able to be extracted owing to the fact that countries
that have ratified the Convention on Climate Change have taken on a
series of commitments that, although postponed, will inevitably have
to be assumed. This will undoubtedly presume an obligatory transition
to renewable energy sources. It is calculated that around $4 billion tons
of carbon exist, contained in fossil fuels found still under the Earth’s
surface (UK Petroleum Institute) 1.
Nevertheless, according to the US Energy Information
Administration (EIA) it is hoped that the world demand for oil will
increase by 56% (that is, 43 million barrels a day) in the coming two
decades.
On the other hand, the US Energy Department’s Statistical
Agency, in its annual prognosis, said that the world demand for oil
would increase from its current consumption of 77 million barrels per
day, to 119.6 barrels per day in the year 2020. This agency believes that
oil will continue to be the predominant energy source, as it has been for
decades. It also considers that production of oil, in both OPEC and
non-OPEC countries, will increase thanks to new production
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technologies that allow oil companies to access new hydrocarbon
findings in distant and inaccessible places and in deep waters.

The moratorium on oil exploration
There are many ways of promoting the moratorium. One is the
proposal of countries such as Costa Rica, which has declared itself an
“Oil-Free Country”
Another is progressive application: a declaration to be free
forever of activities of intensive extraction of natural resources, in
ecologically fragile areas like in the two intangible areas declared by
Ecuador.
This is also the case of indigenous territories with autonomous
indigenous status, such as the Miskito peoples in Nicaragua, who have
declared their land free of oil exploitation.
There are also ways through reduction of exploitation quotas,
which obviously have an impact on the reduction of exploration, a
mechanism that allows crude oil prices to be increased, by reducing
supply.

Legal basis for the moratorium
•

The Precaution principle, recognized in various environmental
treaties and conventions, including the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the Framework Climate Change
Convention and the Rio Declaration.

•

The right of individuals to live in a healthy environment,
recognized by the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 1966.
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•

The recognition of collective rights enshrined in Convention 169
of the ILO, which recognizes the right of people to decide what
development model they want to follow

•

The obligation established in Article 3 of the Climate Change
Convention, which calls for measures to be taken to anticipate,
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change, as well as to
mitigate adverse effects.

•

The governing objective of the Convention on Biological
Diversity – the conservation of biodiversity.

Precedents already exist in international law of moratoria
decreed for environmental, human health or public interest reasons.
Included among them are:
•

The international convention that declared the moratorium on
the commercial exploitation of whales in 1986.

•

The environmental protection protocol of the Antarctic Treaty,
which in its Article 7 prohibits mining activities

•

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) 1973, which applies a
moratorium on the selling of species in danger of extinction.

•

The moratorium on the commercial use of rBGH, as well as
other genetically modified organisms.

•

The bilateral agreement between the USA and Russia that
proposes a moratorium on plutonium production.

•

Finally, in several countries agreements protecting fishing and
other aquatic species have been signed, either of a temporary or
permanent natures; as well as moratoria on commercial tree
cutting.
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For this reason, the moratorium can be applied
through the following mechanisms
1. WITH RESISTANCE: this is a way of executing the moratorium
unilaterally. For this organizations with capacity to convene and
mobilize are needed. Furthermore clarity and examples are
required to identify the perversity of this activity.
2. GOVERNMENTAL DECLARATIONS: it is necessary to
differentiate the conditions of each country. The situation of
countries that own great quantities is of oil is completely
different to those that hardly have resources for internal
consumption, but who nevertheless suffer from the impact of
fossil fuel consumption.
3. IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS: In international forums,
agendas and speeches gradually transform into laws and
proposals for collective action. For this reason it is important to
impregnate international forums gradually with the concept of
the moratorium.

Note
1

According to Oilwatch (2000), each barrel of oil implies an average 0.12 ton of
carbon.

115

Mining
and ecological debt

Mining in Peru: A Wealth
based on liabilities and Conflicts
Miguel Palacín Quispe
(President CONACAMI - PERU)

Peru is a country of extraordinary potential in agricultural
diversity: it produces 128 species of domesticated plants with
thousands of varieties, such as the 3,000 varieties of potato or 1,500 of
sweet potato; 50% of the mountainous areas of Peru are covered in
natural grazing land used for farming camelids (llamas, vicuñas,
alpacas and guanacos) which are of great use for communities; over 7.5
million hectares are potentially suitable for industrial forests and
forestry; the western Andean slopes have hardly yet been used for
hydro-energy; there are natural and cultural spaces for tourism and
such biodiversity that in plants alone there are 3,200 known native
plant species with 31 different uses.
All of this is the origin of a country of megadiversity, home to
19% of the world’s birds (1,073 species), 9% of its mammals (400
species), 9% of its amphibians, 175 species of reptiles and 1,200 species
of sea and freshwater fish, before even starting to count the thousands
of species of insects, molluscs and the impressive diversity of flora. The
ecological dimension of Peru is borne from its own nature and reality,
thus it constitutes an invaluable heritage, the conservation of which is
our responsibility.
To this we can add the human presence across many millennia
that has left the marks of its long existence in a setting of very peculiar
characteristics, such as in coastal strips, Andean and high Andean
zones, and in high and low jungle where ethnic groups with profound
and valuable knowledge of their natural environment, who for more
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than 5,000 years, with the cosmic vision of the Andean man (man,
nature and biodiversity) have looked after the environment.
Mining is another important resource, and is one of the activities
that from colonial times up to the present has been a priority for
government. While the State prioritized other activities such as
agriculture, fishing etc, it was mining that was questioned for the
mechanisms that it adopted, and pollution. Legislation has favoured
mining interests since the time of the Republic and has led to
establishing important mining sites in focalised zones such as: Cerro de
Pasco, Junin (Yauli), Huancavelica, Moquegua and the mountainous
area of Lima, etc; all of which are exploited by small- and mediumsized private mining companies. The State had control of the large part
of mining activities only until the 1990s, when transnationalisation of
mining turned it into a priority activity under agreements signed by
the dictatorship government with the World Bank and other world
financial organisations. State structural adjustment prioritized private
investment based on extractive industries such as mining, thus
bringing transnational mining corporations into the country alongside
a process of privatization, economic liberalization, flexibilization of
labour and tax stability. Today, 11 out of the 20 world corporations are
operating in Peru, across immense areas of land belonging to
communities and indigenous peoples. They are exploring and
exploiting mining sites principally for gold, copper and zinc, and in the
process affect natural resources, farming land and water.

The mining boom and its impact
Between December 1993 and July 2000, mining has involved
territory of 3326 of the 5680 peasant communities recognised by the
Special Programme for Land Titling (PETT). 2978 communities have
been affected by exploration activities and 348 are being exploited,
surpassing the 4 million hectares under concession to total 24 million.
The dictatorship regime passed a new Constitution in 1993,
liberalising the economy and violating the ancestral territorial rights of
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communities to make them more vulnerable. Unconstitutional laws
were passed (land law and mining rights) to strip the communities of
their land, thus violating their autonomy over land ownership. One of
many examples of violations of Convention 169 of the ILO is that no
adequate procedures are in place to implement consultations of
communities or indigenous peoples about the development of mining
activities within their land.
State monitoring and control of environmental issues is very
weak. The State, through its Ministry for Energy and Mines (MEM), is
owner the or shareholder in mining companies, the regulator of policy
for the mining sector, overseer of compliance with environmental laws,
and at the same time the promoter of investment in mining. There is
no institution that watches over the Ministry’s activities in order to
protect the rights and interests of affected communities, and for this
reason the MEM decides everything to do with land, water and mining
investment.
After the granting of mining concessions by the State, companies
carry out an Environmental Impact Study (EIA) with an
Environmental Consultant hired by the company. After a Public
Hearing is held, the study goes to the Ministry for Energy and Mines
for approval. This hearing is not a consultation but a meeting in which
changes can be suggested to help “overcome” the imperfections of the
EIA. The Ministry for Energy and Mines does not have the capacity to
inspect the truth of the data of the environmental indicators recorded
in the base line of the EIA and up to now it has not disapproved any
EIA corresponding to a medium- or large-scale project that would
imply its withdrawal. It is precisely these last conflicts, and the
mechanisms employed by the state to approve the EIAs, that lack
legitimacy and end up confronting the population, such as was the case
in Tambogrande.
Mining was made priority as it has turned into the country’s
largest exportation sector; exports reach $3.5 billion annually,
representing 47% of Peru’s total exports, but only contribute 4% of
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national GDP. Tax contributions are 5%, with the remaining 95% paid
by other sectors; furthermore the mining tax (canon minera) represents
0.7% of the value of exports, calculated at 20% of income tax. Those
who signed taxation stability and double depreciation of assets
agreements do not pay the mining tax, for which reason the amounts
received by local governments are tiny compared to levels of mining
exploitation, which is only useful in bringing fresh dollars to the
country that are used in turn to import foreign products of all types,
instead of contributing to the generation of employment, nor to the
consumption of national products.

Mining environmental liabilities
Mining activities in Peru have enormous environmental and
social liabilities, despite the existence of environmental protection laws.
There are hundreds of basins, lakes, lagoons and cities contaminated
and in permanent destruction, as well as conflicts between
communities and companies for the control of land and water
resources. A solution to all of this was attempted through the five-year
application by mining companies of Environmental Adaptation and
Management Programmes (PAMA) between 1997 and 2002,
nevertheless as yet no satisfactory public results have been obtained.
The mining sector uses 207 cubic hectometres water per day for
the 257 plants that process 120’111,959 metric tonnes per day, of which
164 are to be found on the Pacific slopes. The worst effects from tailings
discharge is found in the Mantaro, Acari, Locumba, Cañeta and Moche
river basins.
In the Mantaro, the consumption of these waters has caused the
death of thousands of animals and the loss of farming land, damaging
the precarious economy of communities. The river serves only to
collect waste water and for the 21 concentration plants that discharge
45 million cubic metres of mining tailings annually: the result is that
this river is the most polluted in the whole country.
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The pollution of the National Chinchaycocha Reserve has led to
the disappearance of flora and fauna as well as endangering the
endemic species “El Zambullidor de Junin” and others whose home is
found in the lake.

Poverty and social problems
The enormous expectations generated by the arrival of mining
in these communities’ territory is based on the improvement of the
standard of living of their inhabitants. For this reason many do not
doubt in supporting mining companies and handing over their land,
but soon after these same people show their discontent and rejection of
the damaging effects that the hoped-for activity causes them. Effects
include the contamination of their resources, the plundering of their
land and water, the lack of promised employment, not purchasing local
products, the rise in living costs and lack of contribution to the area’s
development. The mining villages and regions have in fact become
much poorer.
In her research, Annete Salis states that “in the majority of cases,
the growing and impoverished rural population over-exploits natural
resources in a short-term survival strategy. Poverty exists in more than
just environmentally critical areas, while the environmental damage of
greatest magnitude is not a product of poverty, but of a certain logic
(within the fashionable primary export model) of exploitation of an
environment considered as freely accessible property”. Suffice it to say
that before the arrival of the Yanacocha Mine in Cajamarca, the region
was fourth in the poverty ranking; after 12 years of Yanacocha the
region is the country’s second poorest, according to the State’s own
figures (FONCODES).
With reference to the social problems that mining brings, we
only need mention the bars, canteens, brothels, crime, and prostitution
that go hand in hand with mining; these have a negative impact on the
culture of these villages: a liability with no price.
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Impact on public health
In San Mateo de Huanchor (Lima), 5,000 families living in five
peasant communities (San Mateo, San Antonio, Yuracmayo, Viso and
Parac) have been victims of arsenic, lead and mercury intoxication
from the deposit of tailings from “Mayoc”, which is found a short
distance from the village. In spite of the administrative decision to
bring mining activities to a standstill, and the recommendation to take
away the tailings, thousands of tonnes of toxic material were still to be
found metres away from the village, causing pollution and damage to
the physical integrity of their inhabitants, particularly children.
According to a Ministry of Health report in 1999, the blood and urine
of children and adults contained levels of arsenic, lead and mercury
that exceeded permissible levels.
A serious accident occurred on 2 June 2000 in the villages of San
Juan, Magdalena and the Centro Poblado Menor de San Sebastián de
Choropampa, in Cajamarca, along a distance of approximately 50 km.
A spill of approximately 11 litres (equivalent to 151 kg) of native
mercury caused the massive intoxication of approximately 1,200 rural
adults and children. Owing to the peculiarity of native mercury - a
silver-coloured liquid that quickly breaks up into drops - some children
collected it in their hands and other receptacles. After seven days, the
first cases of possible mercury poisoning were reported to the
Choropampa Health Post, with the following symptoms: headaches,
discomfort, itching, reddening of skin with eruptions. Poisoning could
not be specifically determined as the respective analyses were still
lacking, until later on when, in the face of massive intoxication, the
State and Yanacocha mining company opted to give temporary medical
attention instead of following the recommendation made to
completely evacuate the population. To this very day the local
population suffers the consequences of this accident caused by the
Yanacocha mine.
Minera Yanacocha SRL, is made up of the shareholding of
Newmont Mining Corporation of Denver, Colorado, USA which owns
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51.35% through its subsidiary the Newmont Mining Capital
Corporation. Similarly, Buenaventura Mines S.A. controls 43.65%,
through its subsidiary Minera Condesa; finally the International
Financial Corporation (CFI) of the World Bank owns the remaining
5%.
The World Bank concluded after all the evaluations that there is
an OPERATIVE TECHNICAL INCAPACITY TO FULFIL ALL ITS
RESPONSIBILITIES on the part of the competent technical authorities
(Ministry for Energy and Mines, Health Ministry), and on the part of
State officials there was no willingness to put the lives of hundreds of
people before the political and economic interests that competent
authorities maintained with the hub of Fujimori’s corrupt government,
a great ally of mining companies.
The Ombudsman’s Office’s considers that the case of the
mercury spill that affected the communities of Choropampa,
Magdalena and San Juan in the Province of Cajamarca, also affected the
constitutional right of these communities to have their health
protected; the health, energy and mining sectors did not issue adequate
preventative or protective measures for the transport, handling,
labelling etc. of toxic or dangerous products or substances, such as
mercury in this case.
On the other hand, it is important to note that the quoted
constitutional norm alludes to the right to the protection of health, that
is, the guarantee of protection that consists of the right of each
individual in a State to request a medical response both in the
preventative and welfare aspects when that individual finds his/herself
in danger or affected in health. These are laws that the very State
officials violate.
Another case of the effect of mining activities can be found in
the capital, in Callao, where it is estimated that 200,000 children living
in human settlements, the poorest and most vulnerable zones of the
Callao province, are contaminated with blood lead levels higher than
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those permitted by national and international health institutions. This
situation is of public knowledge, has been taken up by the media,
municipal authorities and even State officials without the State having
taken necessary or sufficient actions to prevent, protect or repair the
damage to health, development, physical and mental integrity of the
victims. The pollution was caused by mining companies when they
installed deposits of mineral concentrates, stored in approximately
241,000 tones of lead and other metals per year. Because of this, the
fundamental rights of these children become irreparable
The public health risks caused by pollution from the La Oroya
foundry is alarming because of the contamination of metals such as
lead, as well as arsenic and sulphur dioxide and other substances. It is
known that lead principally damages the blood, central nervous
system, reproductive system and the kidneys. Lead is particularly
damaging to children, who absorb through the digestive or respiratory
system a higher percentage of lead ingested, and who are more sensitive
to its adverse effects, which present themselves through blood levels of
10_g/dl. Numerous studies demonstrate that exposure to lead, even in
low levels, can cause diminished intelligence and physical development,
as well as holding up neurological development and reducing hearing.
Chronic exposure to arsenic has been associated to several types
of cancer (including lung cancer) as well as having reproductive and
gastrointestinal effects, causing skin disease, damage to the nervous
system and others. Cadmium damages the lungs, kidneys, liver and
heart and is thought to be carcinogenic. Although the symptoms of
exposure to metals are not acute, as they are often undetected, the
damage it causes to health on a long term is severe.
Sulphur dioxide or SO2 is a polluting gas that presents a serious
threat to human health. It harms the respiratory system, worsens
existing respiratory illness (especially bronchitis) and diminishes the
capacity of the lungs to expel foreign particles such as heavy metals.
This type of pollutant also brings as a result an increase in mortality,
especially when there are high levels of particled material. The most
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susceptible to the effects of SO2 are asthmatics and people with
cardiovascular disease. In the same way as the pollutants described
above, with SO2 the damage to health increases when the exposure
period is longer, in that damage to the respiratory system is cumulative.
Furthermore, SO2 has severe environmental impacts through its
contribution to forming acid rain. The presence of SO2 and acid rain
are sources of land acidification and cause significant reduction in its
agricultural and productive quality. It also implicates a significant
impact in surface aquatic ecosystems.
The critical health situation among the child population of La
Oroya caused by lead poisoning is evident through the monitoring of
blood lead levels in 346 children in three areas of the city. According to
Dr Anna Cederstav, at the time of the monitoring, the effect of the lead
meant that “18.3% of children should be urgently admitted to hospital
for medical treatment and their habitat should be subject to
environmental follow-up. (...) two children had such high levels
(higher than 70 _g/dl) that they required chelation treatment
immediately”
These are the most emblematic cases of the effects of mining
activities on the health of individuals; the Peruvian State has been
denounced for these cases by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR).
The authority responsible for control of and compliance with
these programmes is the Ministry for Energy and Mines. This entity
has violated its own laws in demanding the fulfilment of agreements
taken on by mining companies, facilitating the execution period of the
PAMAs on the passing of a new law, the PEMA (Special Programme for
Environmental Management). Many companies that had not
complied with carrying out the PAMA can take up the PEMA and fix a
new time period to adapt their emissions to the maximum allowed in
the national mining sector for themselves.
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The Peruvian State’s Violations
of the American Convention on Human Rights
The Peruvian State has violated the American Convention on
Human Rights, in particular the articles that consecrate the human
rights of individuals belonging to peasant communities and living in
mining areas, as follows:
1. Art. 4.1. Right to life
2. Art. 5.1. Right to physical, mental and moral integrity.
3. Art.11.1 Right to have dignity recognised
4. Art.16.1 and 16.2. Freedom of association
5. Art.17.1. Rights of the family
6. Art.19. Rights of the child
7. Art. 21.1 y 22.2. Right to property
8. Art. 22.1, 22.3 y 22.4. Freedom of movement and residence.
9. Art.23. Political rights: “Every citizen shall enjoy the following
rights and opportunities: a) to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
10. Art. 24. Equality before the law and without discrimination.
11. Art. 25. Judicial protection
12. Art.26. Economic, social and cultural rights (Work, cultural
identity, development, free determination, health, adequate
environment, peace, dignified life, among others).
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The integral nature of human rights
Human rights, under the current conception, constitute a
conquest for the men, women and children belonging to globalised and
modern civilisation, having turned themselves into a constant demand
by citizens for accountability from democratic states. From this, rights
and protection mechanisms have been developed over history, as a
supposedly effective reply that stands for non-violent and democratic
co-existence in society.
The concepts that surround every human right have varied over
time, in accordance with the development of the relationship between
individuals and the State, inclining towards an interpretative expansion
rather than doctrinal limitation. Ethical and political support is given
to the idea of the dignity of the human being, his/her indemnity as
such, and the social purpose of the individual.
Currently, in academic environments as well as in national and
international spaces for the protection of human rights, there is no
concept of the separation or division of rights, instead they are
understood as integral, universal and interdependent. One human
right consecrated in a national or international instrument cannot be
treated separately or independently from other rights contemplated in
the national or international norm; in fact the first right must be seen
in an integrated manner, as a component of the rights of the subject, or
subjects of protection. As far as the character of protector is concerned,
this refers to the State. Human rights constitute a complex and varied
system of obligations that must inevitably be promoted, guaranteed,
anticipated and complied.
This integral approach has not just set out a new
conceptualization of human rights, but has also allowed individuals or
communities to access the courts and international protection
mechanisms that belong to them, independently of how rights are
positivised or divided in different treaties, pacts and conventions.
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Proposals
•

The State and mining companies must agree to eliminate
environmental and social liabilities in the development of
mining activities.

•

Passing of a law that creates “Environmental Insurance” to cover
disasters, accidents, and environmental liabilities caused by
mining companies.

•

Compliance with the PAMAs under the terms established, to
which mining companies committed themselves.

•

Public health evaluation of the populations living in areas
influenced by mining activity.

•

Implementation of immediate control and mitigation
programmes for contamination coming from metallurgic, iron
and steel mines, foundries etc. Incorporation of the right to
participate in environmental monitoring and overseeing and the
carrying out of mining activities.

•

Recognition of the Committees for Community Environment
Vigilance as a civil society monitoring mechanism for mining
activity.

•

Access to information, public participation and consultation
throughout the exploration, environmental impact study,
exploitation and closure phases.

•

Social and economic impact studies to be held for mining
projects.

•

A preventative role must be assumed in not granting concessions
in protected areas that are sensitive to the impact of mining
activities, such as in the headwaters of hydrographic basins.
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•

The Ministry for Energy and Mines must be a regulator of
mining policy and monitor compliance with environmental laws
in the development of mining activities, while communities
(civil society) must take on the role of environmental and social
vigilance of the mining sector and the State.

•

The World Bank must not finance mining projects, instead it
should finance other activities that generate employment and
diversify the economy, such as agriculture, agro-business and
ecotourism.
Lima, December 28, 2003
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Environmental liabilities:
ecological damages quantification
and responsibility*
Daniela Russi
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica

1. Introduction
The term “environmental liability” has a curious origin, and like
the concept of ecological debt, it derives from the language of
economics. In a company, the term “liability” refers to the section of the
fiscal year balance sheet where all debts and encumbrances that
diminish the assets are expressed. Used in environmental terminology,
the word refers to the entirety of environmental damages made
without compensation, and compensatory costs transferred by the
company to the community throughout history.
Often the legal context means that companies do not consider
pollution or the environmental damage produced as a cost, and thus do
not exercise any limitation on their exploitation activities other than
those strictly motivated by economics. Naturally, in most cases
companies only include costs for the effects of their activities on the
environment and communities if a law exists that forces them to pay

*

Article presented during the Seminar “Ecological debt and mining”, held in Lima Peru
in July 2003, organised by Acción Ecológica from Ecuador and CONACAMI-Peru.
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reparation or compensation for such activities. Such a condition is
often missing.
A first step to correct this imbalance would be to suggest a
legislative system that obliges companies to include in their liabilities
not only financial debt, but also environmental debts that the company
invokes with the community and the environment outside of any
contract. Thus two kinds of issues arise: legal responsibility and the
valuation of environmental liabilities.
When a company causes damage to a community the moral
responsibility is clear, but to whom does the legal responsibility belong?
Who should take responsibility for the cost of cleaning up these
contaminated places and repairing the damage, when it is possible?
And who has to pay the victims when damage is irreversible - society as
a whole or whoever caused the pollution? Are environmental liabilities
a public or private responsibility?
As far as valuation is concerned, how do you determine the
impact of a polluting activity in a complex and highly uncertain
context? And, given that in the majority of cases are about goods that
are non-exchangeable on the market, how do we value environmental
damage?
Thus the concept of environmental liabilities has social
importance in that it can gather together consensus in different fields.
Its success is being increasingly being confirmed in the context of the
struggle of indigenous peoples and peasants, communities and NGOs;
it is also becoming included in institutional and business spheres. Some
Latin American environmental consultancies are starting to offer
environmental liability estimate services. Furthermore, traditional
economists could accept the idea of environmental liabilities as a
synonym for external costs1; their internalisation in business
accounting is indispensable to achieving efficiency, the objective of
their models.
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Naturally, the influence of environmental responsibility on
company decisions depends upon the possibility of establishing an
obligation to pay for environmental liabilities. It is for this reason that
it is necessary to individualize and strengthen the legal instruments
that allow the more and more frequent vindication of the damage
victims, so that companies consider the cost and risk of their
environmental impact as something to be minimized

2. The problem of legal responsibility:
Who has to pay for environmental liabilities?
2.1. How can you force companies to take
responsibility for environmental liabilities?
The generation of environmental liabilities by companies would
be reduced if a series of laws were created to require progressive
reductions in pollution that they produce, through decontamination
technology and increased efficiency in the use of materials and energy.
Obviously, laws alone are insufficient and must be accompanied by
institutions that guarantee respect for them, and by a system of
sanctions for those who fail to respect them.
A national and international legislative system on environmental
responsibility would create a strong incentive to produce less pollution,
as it would contribute to companies’ internalisation of part of the
environmental costs and risks in their accounting. As a consequence,
natural resources will not be considered as free goods, but would have
a cost to be minimized. This system would mean that for companies it
would be more expensive to create environmental damage than to
invest in pollution reduction, and in this way they would be given the
incentive to take measures towards minimizing their environmental
impact.
Obviously the internalisation of environmental external costs as
a way of achieving sustainability has its limitations: on the one hand a
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certain degree of pollution associated with economic activity is
inevitable; on the other hand, as is explained in the third paragraph, a
significant part of environmental damage is irreversible and very
difficult to evaluate in financial terms.
However, it is the political factor that must be taken into account
above all. It is of course clear that the progressive inclusion of
environmental external costs in companies’ accounting has a very
relevant economic and political price, and thus it requires a strong
commitment on behalf of the institutions themselves. Furthermore, in
the moment of suggesting an environmentally responsible regime,
governments are submitted to pressure by powerful lobbies interested
in keeping environmental legislation as loose as possible.
It is for this reason that the process of making companies
responsible is very slow. For example, during the Johannesburg World
Summit in 2002, “voluntary agreements” were given much more space
than discussion about environmental legislation.
Nevertheless, the institution of legislation on environmental
responsibility is a very important step towards greater sustainability
and environmental justice. We can cite one example of national
legislation as a good model: the Superfund.

2.2. The Superfund and the European directive proposal
The USA is the most advanced country in terms of
environmental responsibility, thanks to the CERCLA legislation (also
known as Superfund), a programme that imposes strict responsibility
laws for cases of site pollution and deposits of dangerous residues. If
the company that caused the damage is identifiable and still in activity,
the Superfund obliges it to clean up the area. The onus of proof falls
upon contaminating companies, who, if they do not want to pay, have
to prove that not only is there no significant pollution, but also that no
risk exists.
136

The problem of individualizing responsibility is particularly
difficult when companies go through several owners or when they close
down. In such cases, neither the old or new owners want to take
responsibility for damage caused in the past and the State rarely has the
resources or political will to do so (in this respect, legislation that is
being passed in Chile relating to the closure of mining work is very
interesting1).
The Superfund resolves this question. In the case of dangerous
residue deposits that are closed or abandoned on national territory
(“orphan” sites, for whom nobody accepts responsibility), the
Superfund finances cleaning operations through a surcharge imposed
on oil and chemical industries. In over 20 years activity and with a
budget of $1.6 billion between public and private capital, the
Superfund has cleaned hundreds of contaminated sites2.
In Europe, a proposal for a European Directive on
environmental responsibility was presented in January 20003. This is
an innovative document compared to current legislation, but still with
many limitations, among them the non-retrospective nature of
responsibility (as opposed to that of the Superfund). Moreover (once
again in contrary to the Superfund), it does not cover damages
unanticipated within the context of contemporary scientific and
technical knowledge, that is, the time in which polluting activities are
carried out.
With regard to the evaluation of costs, it is very difficult to
determine the amounts that should be paid in reparation for
environmental damage, as can be seen in the following section. The
Superfund and the European Directive proposal are based on
reparation costs that are relatively easy to quantify through economic
valuation methods based on simulated markets. The Directive proposal
also refers to some (not very specific) “equivalent alternatives”, which
the responsible party would have to provide to those affected by the
damage, if the reparation ends up to be too expensive. Nevertheless, the
problem of irreversible damage remains in place.
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The problem of jurisdiction also remains, in both the Superfund
and the European Directive, as they are only valid within the confines
of the USA and the EU. In other words, the Superfund and the future
European Directive will not be able to be used to validate
environmental liabilities outside the USA and the EU. A notable
deficiency can thus be observed in international laws on the subject.
The ideal scenario would be for countries that have not already
done so, to adopt integral legislation on environmental responsibility,
perhaps using the Superfund and the proposed European Directive as
possible models, especially if they were capable of imposing this
legislation on foreign companies operating in their territory. Such
legislation would have to be as homogenous as possible, in order to
avoid the phenomenon known as “ecological dumping” – that is, the
sale of a product at a very low price that does not include
environmental costs, in order to ruin competition4. Perhaps in an ever
more globalised economy a kind of “International Superfund” should
be established, that is to say, an international legal system of
environmental responsibility.

2.3. Environmental damage
The judicial process is a necessary complement to the legislative
process for two reasons: in the first place, it can be the only way of
partly compensating victims for environmental damage; in the second
place a lawsuit for environmental damage can set a precedent that
provides an incentive for companies to take measures that reduce their
risk of ending up in a similar process.
Environmental damage can be pursued under criminal and civil
legislation and in some countries through the legal definition of
environmental damage5. Criminal legislation also typifies “ecological
offences” in some countries. In all such regimes the contaminating
party must be individualised and a cause/effect relationship must be
established; cases of pollution of an imprecise nature, coming from
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multiple sources are not considered. Normally responsibility is not
applied retrospectively: only activities prohibited at the time of the
mission are pursued under law, despite the fact that the perception of
pollution changes with time and progresses with scientific
investigation, information and awareness about risks.
Some cases exist of local communities starting to bring cases
under civil legislation against companies for damage caused. One very
recent example is that of Neuquén, an Argentinean province where the
Mapuche people have sued Repsol-YPF for $445 million for the
damage they suffered in their territory as a consequence of
hydrocarbon exploitation. Out of this figure, $138 million correspond
to compensation for the impact on psychophysical health, vegetation,
fauna and the sociocultural environment and $307 million to the cost
of recovering the affected surface area6.
The problem is that often the national juridical systems of
Southern states are not sufficient to protect their inhabitants; due to a
lack of political and economical willpower and strength, businesses
enjoy impunity. This means that in many cases it is more convenient
for Western companies to transfer their most contaminating or
dangerous activities to Southern countries, where environmental and
labour legislation is less strict, salaries are lower and in the case of
accidents, compensation to victims is lower. Often Southern States do
not have the political strength with which to impose severe
environmental norms due to the threats of poverty, external debt and
the ease with which companies can transfer their production abroad.
The globalisation of production and commercialisation
processes causes a political vacuum as transnational companies, who
increasingly control the flow of resources between countries, have an
enormous economic and political power; it is thus very difficult to
impose respect for environmental laws upon them.
For this reason, in an ever more globalised economy,
international law mechanisms that are the same for all countries (in
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spite of their unequal political power and wealth) should complement
national legislation; in this way multinationals would be legally
recognized and penalised as responsible for environmental damage.
Unfortunately, international jurisdiction is still very scarce and
wields little power. For example, the International Criminal Court,
instituted in 1998, could be an adequate base to which appeals for
environmental damages could be made, but its statute only allows it to
judge individuals.
Today there is no existing international forum that can offer
protection in a case of environmental damage. However, there have
been cases in which victims of environmental damage have sued those
responsible through the US legislation known as ATCA. It is a partially
unexplored field, but one that could be a way of bringing to trial
companies responsible for environmental abuse7.

2.4. The “Alien Tort Claims Act”
The ATCA (Alien Tort Claims Act)8, was introduced in 1789, but
was hardly used before 1980. It hands to federal courts the right to
concern themselves with cases of civil responsibility in cases of injury,
which can be perpetrated by foreigners in harm to other foreigners,
committing a violation of international common law (law of nations).9
The ATCA is a potentially useful mechanism for suing
transnational companies, as often conditions in the damaged area are
not right for impartial justice. There are cases of environmental abuse
judged under the ATCA jurisdiction, although unfortunately up to now
with little success.10.
One of these cases is that of Freeport-McMoRan, a mining
company that works in Irian, in Jaya or Western Papua, part of
Indonesia’s sovereignty. This mine is the world’s main gold producer
and third copper producer. The company has razed over 120 metres of
the highest part of a mountain sacred to the local Amungme
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population, destroying thousands of hectares of tropical jungle,
devastating lakes and polluting water. The mine currently discharges
around 120,000 tons of untreated toxic waste per day into the
watercourse and plans to increase its discharges to 200,000 tons per
day11. The health and livelihood of the local population is seriously
threatened. This case was presented to the Louisiana District Court
under the ATCA legislation, but was rejected.
Another relatively recent case is that of Bhopal in India, where a
second attempt under the ATCA was made in 1999. This is the case of
Union Carbide, which in 1984 suffered a serious accident in one of its
pesticides factories, directly killing 5,000 people and more than 20,000
through exposure to toxic emissions. Apart from this it caused chronic
illnesses in approximately 120,000 – 150,000 people12. Union Carbide
rejected all responsibility for the accident and only accepted to
compensate victims after five years of legal battles, granting $350 to
each affected party, an unquestionably derisory sum. The New York
District Court rejected the judicial claim presented under the ATCA in
March 2003 and today the sentence is awaiting appeal.
The most interesting case is against Texaco, the transnational
company that extracted oil from the Amazonian jungle in Ecuador over
20 years (until 1992), digging 300 wells and creating almost 300,000 km
of roads through the tropical jungle. Texaco has discharged massive
quantities of highly toxic products into the water used by the local
population to drink, fish and wash. It has filled storage tanks of
extraction water with highly toxic residue. These deposits have often
ruptured or overflowed, seriously polluting the environment and
causing health damage in the local population13. The US court rejected
the case, arguing that the Ecuadorian court would be a more suitable
forum in which to decide on the case due to the greater ease with which
it could access evidence and communicate with witnesses and victims.
There are two reasons for the frequent rejection of such cases
under the forum non conveniens (inadequate forum) doctrine. The first
is that the evidence and witnesses to the damage are not in the official
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home country of the company, but in the country in which the damage
occurred, thus the trial should be carried out there. The second is that
the environmental offences are not immediate violations of
international law and thus cannot be judged under the ATCA.
The ATCA is a very advanced piece of legislation, but is
characterised by extreme arbitrariness. Whether the cases reach a judge
or not depends upon many circumstances. For example, it is often the
lawyer (who in a successful case wins a percentage of the
compensation) who contacts the complainant and looks for evidence.
Judges have a very strong decision-making power, and at the moment
of deciding if they will concede jurisdiction to US courts, or send the
case back, they refer to past cases (up to now unfavourable).
Unfortunately in the USA (and less so in Europe) there is still no
homogeneous legislation that regulates the whole area of
environmental damage produced abroad by transnational companies.

3. The valuation problem: how much should be paid?
3.1. Limitations of financial valuation
There are many difficulties to be encountered in the financial
evaluation of environmental damage. In the first place, ecosystems and
the interaction of ecosystems with human society are characterised by
their complexity and strong uncertainty, which must be taken into
account. The effects of certain types of pollution on nature and
humanity are very difficult to predict. Naturally the interaction
between different parts of the said systems can exacerbate any
disturbance in the balance and lead to irreversible changes.
Contamination is transmitted and accumulated along a food
chain, and factors that increase the risk of illness are multiply and act
cumulatively, often in the long-term28. It is therefore very difficult to
isolate the effect of every contaminating element and to establish a
linear correlation between cause and effect. Our knowledge of the
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working of ecosystems and the human body is too scarce for our
estimates about the effect of polluting substances to be accurate,
especially in the long term. For this reason, many warnings about
contamination endangering the natural environment or human health
that were not listened to within time, and thus the “precautionary
principle” was not applied. Famous examples are DDT and asbetos29.
Secondly, the expression of environmental damage in financial
terms has inevitable structural limitations if we accept the idea of the
immeasurability of values, or rather the “absence of a common unit for
measurement” applicable to plural values30.
What is the financial value of human life? Economists use a
diversity of methods to express loss in financial terms, related for
example with the price of life insurance, or the cost/opportunity of lost
work. Obviously these measurements only reflect one part of the losses
associated with death, and many other important aspects are not
included. Furthermore, these estimates are all questionable as they
clearly depend on income (thus the loss of life of a professional is much
higher than a wageless worker). In this way we could pose the question,
what is the financial value of the degradation of a landscape, reduction
of biodiversity, loss of cultural roots, forced emigration, or illnesses
suffered?
For these reasons it is clear that the financial evaluation of
environmental damage is highly arbitrary. The figures that come out of
such evaluation depend highly on suppositions and the methodology
employed, and most likely do not reflect many other values of losses
suffered.
Immeasurability destroys the very root of the concept of
compensation. Can financial compensation be adequate in response to
health damage and death, to the destruction of a cultural context, and
irreversible environmental degradation? There are many cases of local
populations refusing to discuss the amounts of money that would be
offered to them in return for leaving their land to companies or to
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mines. For example, the U’Wa of Colombia, as many indigenous
populations, refused financial compensation offered by the Occidental
Petroleum Company for the oil drilling and extraction, which they
conceptualise as the “rape of the sacred body of our Mother Earth””14.
It is evident that the issue is about two different value systems that
happen to be incompatible32. The U’Wa have managed to get
Occidental Petroleum to leave not by threatening to make
compensation demands for environmental damage in the future, but
by arguing for the value of what to them is sacred, and also for their
indigenous territorial rights.

3.2. When and why can financial Evaluation be useful?
The choice and evaluation of an instrument must of course
depend upon the objective for its use. If its purpose is the vindication
of rights and making demands, it could be more effective to show the
public a web of impacts, with both qualitative and quantitative
indicators, each one in its own unit of measurement.
On the other hand, on a business and institutional level it could
be effective to talk a quantitative and financial language. To present
values in money could help to represent environmental damage in a
way that would mean their true magnitude would be perceived in
contexts in which financial language is normally used.
In the same way, financial evaluation of environmental liabilities
is useful in a judicial context. In order to ask companies for
compensation for their environmental liability it is essential to have
carried out a valuation of environmental impact expressed in financial
terms. Of course, in the civil and administrative law of any country,
reparations for damages are conceived in monetary terms (while in
criminal law there are sentences involving imprisonment, not
redeemable in money).
Monetary compensation can be the only way of ensuring that
victims of damages receive something, and that the crime does not
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remain unpunished. It can be used as a way of redistributing earnings
produced through the contaminating activity, as a partial
internalisation of the external costs.
Another reason worth mentioning is that financial evaluation of
environmental damage works as an incentive to business people not to
start polluting, or at least to take precautions and introduce
technological innovations that reduce environmental impact.
Furthermore, financial compensation and the process or
negotiation that makes it possible, has a very strong symbolic value. It
reaffirms the rights of local populations over their territory.
Nevertheless, there are some caveat. Financial compensation
must be carefully managed so as not to create strong imbalances within
the community receiving it, such as unexpected inequalities in income,
corruption and conflicts. For example, it can often be more effective if
the compensation money received is put towards trying to repair
damages or offering services to the community than to if it is granted
directly to individuals.
It is also worth ensuring that financial compensation is
sufficiently high for it not to be seen as a pigouvian tax15, or as a
pollution permit, but rather as a fine for damage caused. In other
words, it must work to dissuade companies and seriously affect their
balance sheets. Thus, the large fine imposed upon Exxon for the Exxon
Valdez spill in Alaska in 1989 meant a considerable economic effect on
the company, as well as providing a boost to the environmental
movement16.

4. Conclusions
Financial valuation uses a very arbitrary calculation and the
result depends, among other things, on the existing power structure.
Normally the poor are compensated very cheaply. If an accident such
as the one in Bhopal had happened in Western Europe, the
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compensation provided to victims would have been much higher than
$350 per person, and this not just due to differences in acquisition
power.
Furthermore, much environmental damage is irreversible and
cannot be repaired. Damage to health, forced migration, the
destruction of cultural contexts cannot be compensated. To a person
that has been diagnosed with cancer, the amount of compensation
offered by the company responsible is not the most important issue at
stake.
Nevertheless, to ask for financial compensation for damages
produced could be a way of making environmental liabilities ever more
expensive and problematic, and at the same time, of recognising the
right of individuals to live in a clean environment and have full use of
their own territory.
The expression of environmental liability in financial terms,
although it involves a significant loss of information (as well as being
questionable from many points of view) could possibly become very
effective politically and socially in that it is more immediate and
simple. In this way the vindication of injustice could be accepted in
governmental and business sectors, where the use of financial language
is the norm. Above all, financial calculation is indispensable in a
forensic context.
Nowadays, courts in Southern countries often do not have
enough power to ensure justice to victims in the case of environmental
damage; on the other hand an international forum in which companies
could be sued for their environmental liabilities still does not exist.
There is a long way to go to be able to force companies to take
responsibility for their own environmental liabilities. A collective
reflection between local populations, NGOs, and Northern and
Southern institutions is necessary to be able to identify the most
suitable legal mechanism to make the rights of the weakest be afforded
greater value.
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Mining Debt: A Victim’s Point of View
Rowil Aguillon
Asia/Pacific Movement on Debt and Development
“No awanen dagiti baker ken maatianan dagiti karayan, ania serbi ti
balitok?
Nga kasla aramiden ti ingin iti tapok, Maisubli kadi balitok ti ili?”
– A Cordillera Elder
(When the forests are gone and the rivers are dry,Of what good is gold?
The people are scattered as the wind do to dust, Can gold restore life?

The Asia/Pacific Movement on Debt and Development
(APMDD) has defined ecological debt as the debt incurred by the
industrialized countries and transnational corporations of the North
towards the people of the South in the continuing plunder and
exploitation of the ecology and resources of the South, and in the
destruction of the planet due to their production and consumption
patterns that dominate the global economy. Ecological Debt is the
ultimate debt, not by one people against another, but by a definite class
who works from one country to another, and has institutionalized a
system of production driven by greed for profit. It is the sum total of
exploitation and plunder of resources on the one hand, and the
deprivation of the vast majority of peoples on the other hand. The net
effect of ecological debt is the destruction of the material base of
human survival-the earth.
Ecological Debt is hard to translate in terms of concrete
monetary terms.
Existing laws provide for penalties and other forms of assurances
for rehabilitation in cases where the environment is damaged and
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destroyed. But as far as those who have been victimized are concerned,
these assurances are not enough. In fact, funds are never enough
because ecological destruction can never be paid.
How can one compute the dollar equivalent of destruction and
despair? Can one come up with monetary value for scattered
communities and denuded resources that affect present and future
generations?

Economics of Destruction
Over the last four decades, the Philippine government has
facilitated and presided over the fastest deforestation process one could
ever imagine. By virtue of the partnership between local and foreign
companies both in logging concessions and mining operations, the
Philippine forest cover has been reduced significantly: from 9 million
hectares in 1968, to 1.6 million hectares in 1996. On top of this
deforestation process, the Philippine government has also invited
global mining companies to engage in large-scale open pit mining
operations all throughout the country.
The cases that will be described later will show how much
suffering and misery has been inflicted on the peoples of the
Philippines, all in the name of development and modernization.
It is important to note that many of the projects that will be cited
are so-called priority development projects of the government. The
objective of which is to boost the national economy, earn dollars, and
pay the country’s foreign debt. Moreover, these projects are meant to
eventually eradicate poverty.
The logic is simple: destroy the earth to reduce the number of
impoverished peoples. The result: many impoverished peoples and
communities are now in their graveyards.
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This process could not have been made possible without the
support of the country’s loyal patrons and mentors: the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank.
With programs such as Structural Adjustment and other
conditionalities, the Philippine ruling elite is able to pursue a
development and modernization process that has led to the
transformation of rivers into dry lands, of forests into muddy grounds,
and of self-subsistent communities into beggars and slum dwellers.
Indeed, the development process in the Philippines has gone a
long way.

The Case of Mining
Traditionally, the mining sector has been a significant
contributor to the country’s economy. This sector of the economy must
have also been important to the American colonial government
because a mining law was enacted as early as 1905. Since early 1900s,
large scale mining operations have proliferated all throughout the
country for gold, copper, silver, coal, and other minerals.
However, due to the alleged major flaws in the country’s policy
environment, the mining sector began suffering a serious decline
starting in the 70s. In the 90s, President Fidel Ramos wanted to fasttrack the so-called industrialization process and he made sure that the
mining industry would contribute significantly to his vision of a
Newly-Industrialized Country. With that, the government in
partnership with the Asian Development Bank, commissioned the
East-West Center of Hawaii to evaluate the factors leading to the
downturn of the industry. Upon the recommendations of the EastWest Center and the Asian Development Bank, the Philippine
Chamber of Mines came up with a set of recommendations which were
later adopted by congress and incorporated into a new mining law, now
known as the Philippine Mining Law of 1995 or Republic Act 7942.
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The new law, and the package of financial aid that came with its
passage, are clearly not meant to encourage small miners to go into the
industry but for global mining corporations to extract the country’s
resources. Some of the benefits it promised to foreign companies were
100% ownership, tax holidays, 100% repatriation, exemption from
environmental impact assessments, direct sale of gold to the
international market, and other offers.
So effective and attractive was the new mining law that in one
region alone (Western Mindanao), a flood of mining applications
poured in from the world’s biggest mining company Rio Tinto, with a
total applied area of 500,000 hectares. In 1997, a total of about
9,299,121.78 million hectares were applied for large scale mining
operations all throughout the country. About 99.9% of these are
applications of foreign companies, mostly Australian, Canadian and
British.
While the applications have triggered the sprouting of many
protest actions and mobilizations throughout the country, the
government and the global companies continued to campaign
aggressively for support both from local residents and local
government units. This explains why despite the protests, some
applications were able to push through with exploration, and
eventually operations.
Yet, many lessons have to be learned from the history of mining
operations in the country-lessons that are too bitter to be remembered
especially by those whose lives have been shattered and whose sources
of livelihood have forever been destroyed. Unfortunately, the
government’s drive for dollars and foreign investments prevented it
from learning the lessons of the past. In the name of development and
modernization, the government, again, pursues a program that will
only lead to more destruction and devastation, where multinational
corporations and their local patrons reap gargantuan profit all at the
expense of the people.
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The End-result of Plunder
From Luzon down to Mindanao, various people’s organizations
and communities have documented different incidents of
environmental destruction brought about by mining-incidents that are
seldom reported, much less, investigated by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). This is why the people
have renamed the department as Destruction of the Environment
Never Reported.
In all the so-called mineral development projects, the people
have only seen devastation and destruction. The impacts have been
disastrous and far-reaching. Below are specific cases that have occurred
over the last 15 years.
•

Mindoro, Luzon - The Japanese-owned Kanto International
Marble Corporation caused serious damage to the environment
resulting to soil erosion, heavy siltation of rivers and heavy
flooding.

•

Cordillera - Philex Mining Operations in Itogon spilled 11,000
liters of oil; the Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation
drained acidic effluents into the Mancayan River (one of the four
rivers of the Cordillera either dead or choked by mining wastes);
and, Benguet Mining operations has transformed the
municipality of Itogon into a virtual graveyard.

•

Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya and Zambales - Due to heavy
siltation, major river areas are now considered Class C or D
(dying or biologically dead).

•

Negros Occidental -Marikalum Mining Corporation was found
to be dumping used oil into the Bulata Bay and tailing ponds are
leaking mine wastes into agricultural lands in Sipalay, Negros
Occidental. Philex Mining has also deliberately released tailings
into the Sipalay River, causing fish kill and siltation. Both
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operations have negatively affected the environment due to
inundation by heavily silted rivers. Skin diseases among children
and adults and cases of heavy metal poisoning have also been
reported.
•

Eastern Samar - Operations of the Heritage Mining Company
have caused flooding and siltation of areas in the vicinity.

•

Palawan - An old mercury mine threatens entire city of Puerto
Princesa; affected areas were even declared to be under a state of
emergency.

•

Zamboanga Peninsula (Mindanao) - Philex Gold Philippines
Inc. in their Sibutad operations has threatened the lives of
residents in eight coastal villages with the siltation of the coastal
areas; caused also serious damage to livelihoods; depletion of
water supply; buried five hectares of ricelands in mud coming
from the tailings pond.

•

Surigao - A tailings pond of Manila Mining Corporation
collapsed in 1995 and caused the death of five people.

•

South Cotabato - Maughan crater of Mt. Parker collapsed due to
mining operations, leaving 79 people dead.

The Case of Placer Dome
In March 1996, 3-4 million tons of metal-enriched and acidgenerating tailings filled the 26-km Boac River in the island province of
Marinduque. This was caused by a badly sealed drainage tunnel in an
old mine pit that burst. The mined-out pit which is located in the high
central mountains of Marinduque had been used as storage pit for the
tailings from a new adjacent mine since 1992. The culprit was the firm
Marcopper Mining Corporation.
Greatly affected by the Marcopper incident were the
municipalities of Sta. Cruz (center of mining operations), Mogpog,
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and Boac, all in the island province of Marinduque, 170 kilometers
north of Manila.
Marcopper is the third largest mining company in the
Philippines with a reported production of 30,000 tons of copper daily
for the last 27 years. It began mining the Tapian ore body in
Marinduque in 1969, and proceeded with San Antonio project in 1991
using the old Tapian pit for waste disposal.
The company is 40% owned by the Canadian firm Placer Dome
Inc. (PDI) and 50% by a front corporation of former dictator
Ferdinand Marcos called Performance Investment Corporation; since
it was sequestered during the Aquino government, it is also partly
owned by the Philippine government
Placer Dome is one of the top gold mining corporations in the
world, second only as a mining corporation in its home country,
Canada. In 1998, the company posted profits of US$105 billion.
Placer Dome employs some 8,400 people in its 14 mines
scattered in five countries in five continents. It has a reputation of
coming into conflict with local populations in areas of operation. Like
the Western Shoshone tribe in Nevada for polluting land; people of
Strickland, New Guinea for dumping wastes in the river, and the people
of Costa Rica. The company’s Golden Sunlight Mine in Montana, USA
is accused of cyanide leaching.
Marcopper has a 30-year history of mining disasters and
environmental abuse in the Philippines. The 1996 tragedy got the
national and global attention on Marcopper’s culpability in destroying
entire river systems, communities and livelihoods but actually, the trail
of destruction can be traced as far back as 1969.
•

In Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, Marcopper dumped 200 million tons
of tailings in Kalankan Bay from 1975-91, creating 80 square km
of tailings along the bay. This had the following effects:
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– reduction of fish catch of at least 2,000 fishers; other uses of the
bay adversely affected
– threatened the food security of 200 fishing villages for 25 years
now
– covered houses and rice fields with dust storms
– metal contamination and chronic lead poisoning of victims that
remain untreated until today
Marcopper responded, albeit inadequately, with the following
actions:
– launching of a livelihood projects in the area;
– setting up funds for artificial corals and rehabilitating seagrass
projects;
– ignoring any liability on reported health concerns;
– and, rationalizing health complaints as arising from
Marinduque’s naturally mineralized environment.
•

In the municipality of Mogpog, Marcopper dumped another
kind of waste called overburden, creating practically mountains
of waste here in the higher areas of Marinduque. It also built a
dam in 1991 and made use of a watershed area as a dumping
ground. In 1993, the dam collapsed causing heavy floods,
siltation and contamination of the Mogpog River; eruption of
skin diseases, plastic anemia, and metal poisoning of
townspeople.
Marcopper’s response:

-

gave a one-time assistance of $11 - $22 per household (1993)

-

dredged some parts of the river but left the sludge on the banks
of the river
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-

built a one-meter increase in an already existing dike in one of
the villages

•

In Boac, the capital of Marinduque province

In 1996, the worst environmental mining tragedy in Philippine
history occurred when 3-4 million tons of waste equivalent to 1.6
million liters of waste or 300,000 dump trucks of sludge spilled into the
river because of an old badly sealed tunnel being used by the company.
Because of this, the whole island of Marinduque was declared a
calamity area.
– The Boac river died instantly
– Health problems:
•

The PDI admitted in 1997 that exposed sulfur in the tailings has
started to oxidize, causing the formation of toxic sulfuric acid
and potential release of heavy metal such as cadmium, lead,
mercury, zinc and arsenic.

•

A Department of Health study made between 1996 and 1997
confirmed heavy metal contamination due to the use of the river
as disposal site for run-off from Marcopper since 1970.

•

UN investigation identified unacceptable levels of heavy metals
in some parts of the river and they also pointed to toxic wastes
leaching into the river through the faulty waste rock siltation
dam.

•

Costs calculated by a consultant of the Resources Environment
Economic Center for Studies Inc.

•

US$6 million dollars damage in agriculture alone in 1996

•

After three years, US$19.5 million

•

Other key economic losses such as tourism, US$14.4 million
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In 20 years of its operations in the Philippines, PDI accumulated
earnings estimated at US$1 billion. Their contribution to the national
reserves stands at US$370 million. Taxes paid to the government
amounted to a mere US$100,000 in 20 years. Social projects have been
estimated at only US$40,000. Is these enough vis-à-vis the irreparable
damage done to the people and environment of Marinduque?

Benefits or Misery
Despite the many tragedies associated with mining, the
government decided to liberalize the sector in order to encourage more
foreign investors to go into exploration and mining operations in the
country. With that, the 90s saw a revival in mining interest in the
Philippines.

But what is so tempting about mining?
There is actually great wealth in mining. In a document prepared
by the Philippine Chamber of Mines (PCM) that was circulated among
similar chambers in other first world countries, it was shown that in an
average mining operation in the Philippines, a ton of ore can be
extracted from three tons of earth. From this one ton of ore, one can
extract 3.77 grams of gold, 105 grams of silver and sometimes copper
at an average of 2.79% and zinc at 2.03%. Especially now that open pit
mining has become the preferred method, a mining site covering 3,500
hectares can be completely mined in seven years, with an average
production rate of 1,850 tons of ore per day.
A major interest in the Philippines is gold, where the economics
is more attractive. In a 4,500-hectare, with a production rate of 1,850
tons of ore per day, a company can expect to extract in seven years
some 179,600 ounces of gold. Multiply this by $300 per ounce and the
amounts are staggering. However, according to the PCM, 70-75% of
the world’s gold production goes to jewelry. Only a small amount goes
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to industrial uses and gold reserves in central banks. So much of the
earth’s natural resources are destroyed to please the elite.
Reading the many papers and reports of mining companies and
the Philippine Chamber of Mines, one would expect to see paradise in
the mine site. Yet, for the people, whose lives have been severely
devastated by the many tragedies, and whose future has been made
bleak, mineral development simply means destruction and despair.
The billions of dollars extracted by multi-national corporations,
and the few thousand dollars given to the national government in the
form of taxes, as well as bribe, are never sufficient to justify the degree
of destruction that mining has wrought on the environment and on the
lives of the people. Yet, despite all these, the plunder continues.

The Cost of Destruction
There are at least four areas that should be considered in
examining the ecological debt incurred from mining activities: the
local mining sector, the global mining industry; the national
government; and the affected people and communities. The whole
history of mining in the country has only shown how disproportionate
the proceeds are, with the bulk of the profit going to the multinational
corporations and the pockets of accommodating government officials,
while the bulk of the environmental damage and suffering are passed
on to the people.
The existence of ecological debt is all too real and has caused
untold suffering for peoples and communities. And the reasons why
these things continue are:
1. continuing subservience of nation states to the dictates of global
corporations and multinational corporations (MNCs)
2. balance of power favorable to the MNCs, highly industrialized
countries and local ruling elites
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3. persistence of a purely economic view as regards development
4. a playing field shaped and determined by those who seek to
destroy the earth and risk its future, all in the name of profit
5. tendencies among civil society players to confine the engagement
in debate and argumentation and reduce the arena of the
struggle to lobbying and negotiation
6. polarized and fragmented people’s movement, which provides
for an opportunity for the neo-liberals to gain the upper hand in
the political positioning.

Terms of Payment
Global mining giants, multi-national corporations, and the local
ruling elite have to pay the price of destruction and devastation. But
such payment can only be made in terms of actual liberation from a
social order that is inherently destructive; hence the following
premises:
1. The whole issue of ecological debt boils down to the question of
control over resources by the people. Thus, ecological debt is
largely a political issue; it is a question of power, both at the level
of nation states and at the global level.
2. Ecological debt is difficult to monetize; there is no monetary
value to erosion, poisoning, siltation, mudflows and flash floods;
to shattered homes, broken communities, cultures eradicated.
3. Current production systems and the rush to generate profits
entail a conspiracy against the earth and its future. No reason or
theory or legal mandate is plausible enough to justify destruction
and plunder.
4. Ecological debt is perpetrated not by a simple club of
unenlightened persons. It is perpetrated by a certain class
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through the institutions and structures that are deeply
embedded in societies whose interests are irreconcilable and
inherently contradictory to the interests of the majority of the
dispossessed peoples of the world.
Given these, ecological debt can only be paid when the peoples
shall have gained control over resources and over means of production,
and when utilization of resources shall no longer be geared towards
profit but towards the satisfaction of the needs of society.
For those who have caused the devastation and destruction, we
shall give them this statement of account:
Exploited and Oppressed Peoples of the World, Inc.
100+ Southern Countries, 80% of the World Population
webpage: www.destroyedhomes.shattered future.com
STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT
TO: G8, MNCs and MFIs
Re: Notice of collection of Payment
Date
Particulars
Amount
Since the Colonial Era
Mining
a. Erosion access to and control over
b. Siltation resources, economic dislocation,
c. Forest Denudation and continuing powerlessness
d. Poisoning and pollution
e. Flashflood and mudflows
f. Destruction of watershed
g. Loss of livelihood
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All these amount to loss of access to and control over resources,
economic dislocation, and continuing powerlessness
Total
Destruction and Death
Note to the Statement:
Since you owe us so much and these debts cannot be translated
in monetary terms, we demand that your payment be made in terms of
outright departure from our lands and in terms of various restitution
and reparation. We demand further that you pay in terms of breaking
up your companies and giving them up in favor of your workers who
have labored so much and who have been exposed to inhuman working
conditions so that you may earn gargantuan profits.
We demand further that Foreign Debt should be cancelled
automatically.
Our liberation from your control is the ultimate payment. We
can seek no less and we shall continue to collect this payment until that
day when no one among us shall be poor and powerless.
Article published with the authorisation of Jubilee South.
http://jubileesouth.org/journal/mining.htm
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Biodiversity,
biotechnology
and ecological debt

Biopiracy: privatisation
of the community sphere*
Silvia Ribeiro
ETC Group1

The term “biopiracy” is interpreted in a different way according
to the person whom you ask. For some, it is the simple act of collecting
biological materials without the “prior informed consent” of the
communities of the area and/or country from where they are extracted,
without respect for existing legislation or an agreement on “benefit
sharing”, such as is indicated in the United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity. From this legalistic perspective, the signing of a
“bioprospection” contract within the limits of the law, whether existing
or to be created, would solve biopiracy. Moreover, so-called intellectual
property “rights” (in their many permutations) would become a useful
instrument that over the time in which they generate earnings for
companies, would bring some economic income to the local
communities that provided resources and knowledge about them.
For the large transnational companies that work with
biotechnology in the pharmaceutical and agricultural field, who are
also the main interested party and commercial destination for such
biological resources, biopiracy is the unauthorized use or reproduction
of their patented innovations. For example, if a farmer uses their
patented seeds without paying royalties to the company. This can be
done consciously or not, as in the case of the farmer whose field is

*

This article was presented during the SEMINAR ECOLOGICAL DEBT AND
BIOPIRACY held in March 2002 in Quito, Ecuador, organised by Acción
Ecológica.
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contaminated by pollen swept by the wind from other fields sown with
patented seeds.
To prevent this, apart from drawing up laws and contracts with
farmers, companies have developed detective corps that go around
agricultural areas in the USA and Canada taking samples. Monsanto
has already started over 460 court cases against farmers in these
countries, and in March 2001 a Canadian farmer was ordered to pay
more than $75,000 for “biopiracy” after his land was contaminated
with transgenic seeds patented by Monsanto, although the farmer was
neither aware nor wanted such seeds, in fact he considered his land to
have been damaged by such contamination.2. In case the juries
sentence against them, or intellectual property laws are insufficient, the
very same companies that dominate these sectors have developed and
now hold 70 technology patents so that their seeds become sterile in
the second generation; thus biological patents with no expiration date
(“Terminator” technologies) are established to prevent “biopiracy”.
For the ETC Group (previously known as RAFI) and many civil
society organizations, biopiracy is the appropriation and privatisation
of genetic resources and the knowledge of indigenous and local
communities, especially in third world countries, by private
companies, usually transnationals, and/or public institutions from the
North. Biopirates use different intellectual property mechanisms to
claim the use of tangible and intangible resources of communities
located primarily in the South for them. Thus biopiracy is far from
being a merely legal issue; rather it is a subject of social, economic and
political justice, in its essence a question of ethics. It is basically about
the privatisation of resources that have always been public, collective
and for the good of humanity, for the benefit and profit of a handful of
companies and institutions. Although a company or institution may
have signed a contract that claims to follow national or international
legislation, and although it includes a certain degree of consultation or
participation of communities and/or states and “benefit-sharing” in
some shape or form, it is still biopiracy. The protection and primacy of
the rights of the principle actors in the biodiversity process and its
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components – the indigenous and local communities - is not only
completely insufficient, but also in many cases denies these
fundamental rights, legitimates plundering and undermines the very
bases on which the heritage of biological and cultural diversity were
historically built.

To whom do the resources belong?
Over thousands of years and across the world, the base for the
sustenance of humanity has rested on knowledge process around the
means, adaptation, availability and creation of resources for food,
medicinal use, clothing, shelter, aesthetical use and others. The
processes that the members of diverse local cultures – indigenous,
peasant, shepherding, fishing etc – have practised for their survival, are
thus bequeathed to all humanity. It has always been an open, collective
and free exchange process, except for certain restrictions relating to
“sacred” or ritual knowledge, although these processes can also be
considered as collective and public in that the function of such
specialized experts (shamans, healers etc) are also roles with a social
function. This free flow of knowledge and resources has allowed
collective accumulation and permanent enrichment.
Cultural diversity interacts in a dynamic way with biological
diversity, in the same way that agricultural and cultivated diversity
interacts with wild diversity, in a reciprocal continuum in which all
factors feed and nourish each other. This explains why the areas of
greatest biodiversity on the planet coincide with areas of great cultural
diversity. This process is not a fact of the past, although it is being
seriously threatened by genetic and cultural erosion. It is calculated
that the rural population of the Third World depends upon biological
resources to fulfil 90% of its needs, 60% of the world population
depends essentially on self-sufficiency for its food, and 80% of this
population uses medicinal plants for its health care.3
Apart from such direct use, these resources and knowledge are
also the base upon which scientific investigation and development are
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supported, both historically and in the present; contributing to public,
commercial and industrial research, or as part of agricultural,
pharmaceutical or veterinary work, as well as many other areas.

Historical benefit-sharing from South to North
and the recolonization of the South
Traditional medicines and indigenous and local knowledge have
acquired a high commercial value on top of their intrinsic value.
Approximately three quarters of prescribed medicines deriving from
plants from around the world were first used by indigenous peoples,
which permitted their subsequent “discovery” by laboratories and
companies from industrialized countries. It was calculated in 1996 that
the global pharmaceutical industry has annual profits of over $32
billion thanks to the use of traditional remedies incorporated into
prescribed medicines. Between 1950 and 1980, plant-derived
medicines used in the pharmaceutical industry amounted to 25% of
the pharmacy drugs sold in the USA. Currently, approximately 40% of
clinical tests for medicines in the USA are based in some way on natural
products. It is estimated that the total annual economic value of plantderived drugs is over $68 billion in the USA alone4.
For this reason it is not surprising that the hunters of biological
riches are feverishly engaged in the “green gold” rush in the south,
especially in zones of megadiversity5.
There is currently a renewed interest in the evaluation of natural
products, especially for medicinal compounds. In 1980 the research
budget of the US pharmaceutical industry destined no funds to the
evaluation of superior plants. Nowadays it is estimated that more than
200 research companies around the world are evaluating compounds
of animal and vegetable origin in the search for medicinal properties.
This increased interest is due in part to new technologies that have
revolutionised the possibilities for analysis and later application to
pharmaceutical and other commercial products, and for the expansion
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of intellectual property systems to areas they had never before reached,
in particular to living beings and biological processes.
In the agricultural sector, the estimated value of the contribution
of agricultural germplasm from the South to the North for four species
(corn, wheat, rice, beans) and taking into account only the flows
coming from the CGIAR system (Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research), the largest international network for public
agricultural research, it is calculated to be $5 billion annually. This
estimate is surely modest, since in 1994 the then Secretary of State in
the USA, Warren Christopher, argued in a letter to Senate that foreign
germplasm meant an annual contribution of $10.2 billion only in US
corn and soy crops. The letter was meant to present arguments for the
US signing of the CBD6.
Of course such looting did not start with what we now call
biopiracy. The powerful groups of the North have looted biological and
other resources and have benefited from indigenous and local
knowledge from the South for centuries, particularly since European
expansion. The “collateral damage” of this has caused considerable
human, cultural and environmental devastation. Nevertheless,
approximately two decades ago, a process started that could be
characterized as a new technological, agricultural and industrial
revolution, which is interfering even more profoundly in the creation
process of natural and cultural diversity. In this revolution we can see
three specific factors converge and interact; together they provide the
conditions that are a sine qua non for biopiracy:
- patenting and other forms of intellectual property applied to
living beings, and in general the system of monopolistic patents.
- the development of new biotechnologies and other related
technologies.
- the increased vertical and horizontal economic and corporative
concentration of power.
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The conjugation of these factors is forming a true process of
Southern re-colonization, as we see that the resources that the
conquerors needed to take in material form can now be appropriated
from a distance, without these new biopirates even needing to step foot
in the place of origin of such resources.

Types of biopiracy: pirates and corsairs
It is not possible to give a precise date for the start of biopiracy
(understood as the looting of genetic resources) in the world, as for
many years it has been an underhand and illegal activity, or simply not
recognised for what it is. Such is the case of the use of germplasm from
the South in the agriculture of many Northern countries, which has an
enormous unrecognised and uncompensated economic importance.
However, it is possible to point out a key moment in the 1980s,
in part due to the qualitative jump taken by new biotechnology
(genetic engineering, cloning, tissue culture, etc), and also the approval
in the USA of the first patents on living beings. Both conditions –
technology and monopolistic intellectual property laws – exacerbated
the bioprospection activities of pharmaceutical companies and
agricultural businesses in process of developing new products.
Information and resources obtained as well as the common base
of biotechnological and biochemical research systems allow
developments to come about in the agricultural and pharmaceutical
fields. This contributed to a merger process between companies from
he agrochemical and seed sector (which was already happening since
the Green Revolution), and the pharmaceutical sector; lately the
veterinary and genetic sectors have become involved, to form what ETC
has denominated “genetic giants”.
Although bioprospection and biopiracy activities increased
significantly in the 1980s, at the outset companies were more dedicated
to a kind of casual exploration, without any pretensions to legalise what
they were doing. They collected samples from areas of great
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biodiversity, and searched for active components that had not
previously been detected. Monsanto, one of the five biggest genetic
giants, recruited among its own personnel for “those who were going to
travel to some place exotic and who didn’t mind extracting a few soil
samples for the love of science”. Their aim was to collect specimens for
Monsanto’s agricultural prospection programmes. “You never know
what you will find, or where you will find it... Everything is possible”,
said Margann Miller-Wideman, Monsanto spokesperson.7
Other companies started to set up direct contacts with
indigenous people and traditional experts in areas of great diversity
and, shunning any kind of contract, paid them individual derisory
sums for collecting and even sending plants that they considered useful
or rare, with descriptions of their known uses.
More systematic, though by no means legal, was the biopiracy
exercised historically and in the present day by botanical gardens in the
North, who under the cover of scientific searches for their collections,
that would supposedly benefit all of humanity, collected thousands of
samples from Latin America and the rest of the South. These samples
were repeatedly passed on to form part of the laboratories of
multinational companies, for commercial use, patenting the
compounds that were obtained from them. Some botanical gardens
such as the Missouri Botanical Garden, the New York Botanical Garden
and Royal Botanical Garden of Kew in the UK, are notorious for their
collaboration, and even drew up contracts with large companies such
as Pfizer, Merck, Phytera, Searle (later part of Monsanto and then of
Pharmacia), Shaman Pharma (now Bristol Myers Squibb), DowElanco
agriculture sciences and others, to provide them with samples from
their collections for bioprospection purposes.8

Intellectual property mechanisms
The renewed interest of companies in genetic resources and
indigenous knowledge from the South, the expansion of their
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biological prospecting activities and the jungle in which they act (in all
senses of the word), led to them also searching for ways to guarantee
greater monopolistic rights for their activities and results. This was not
only to protect their searching and investigative activities from other
companies, but also from possible protests from affected groups or
lawsuits brought by other institutions and even States.
One of the fundamental measures in this regard was the forceful
and systematic lobbying of the multinational pharmaceutical industry,
led by US companies, for the imposition of intellectual property
regimes on living beings across the world.
It is a widely known fact that this group drew up the first draft
of the chapter on intellectual property for the then GATT (now WTO)
and managed to introduce the topic in the Uruguay Round. The result
was the inclusion of TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights), whose Article 27.3(b) obliges all members of the
WTO to adopt patenting systems for micro-organisms and microbiological processes, as well as providing intellectual property systems
for plant variety, through patents or sui generis systems. This last clause
was interpreted by the majority of governments as adhesion to the
certification system of developers of new varieties of plants under the
UPOV Convention (International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants), which are not formally patents, but do have a very
similar effect, especially since the laws of 1991. The TRIPS were
approved in 1994 and a four to ten year term was allowed for Southern
countries to implement them.
Governments of Southern countries tend to believe that if they
enter into intellectual property and patenting systems, as the WTO and
corporations demand, their countries will receive greater foreign
investment, technology transfer will increase and technological
innovation will be favoured and thus national research.
In actual fact, none of these expectations are fulfilled. According
to recent studies, the application of intellectual property systems does
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not have any effect, in fact promotes an adverse effect9. Globalisation
and harmonization of patenting systems does benefit the corporations
that can extend their market monopolies to more countries, and more
effectively exclude potential local competitors. But foreign investment
can also diminish, as corporations are equipped to protect their own
technology and products in new markets, without necessarily making
any transfer to the country involved, nor generating any new jobs. In
some cases, in Argentina and Brazil for example, research and national
development projects were discontinued in the 1990s as well as efforts
to adapt imported processes to local conditions, as the acquisition of
national businesses by multinational corporations (entered into the
accounts as foreign investment, of course) meant that more
sophisticated research was transferred to their head offices, leaving less
specialized functions in these countries: national investment and
technology transfer was thus affected negatively10.
A particularly illustrative case is that of agro-biotechnological
research. An overwhelmingly majority percentage of this kind of
research is carried out by subsidiaries of these same businesses, without
any kind of technological transfer to the local country. When carried
out by public institutions in our continent, it is generally financed by
one of the giant corporations, the very same that benefit from the
results. Likewise, there is no significant technological transferral, rather
the minimum needed technology is transferred to be able to carry out
fieldwork, adapting prior genetic constructions to agricultural varieties
already adapted to the country, for example.
Intellectual property acts complementarily, as it is these very
same multinational companies who make up the majority of those
requesting and obtaining the new varieties developers rights in our
own countries.
In short, despite the fact that the introduction of intellection
property regimes is a very powerful instrument, and one that the
majority of countries is in the process of implementing, they also lead
to many problems: the wide majority of Southern countries accept
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them as part of a negotiation package (believing to have negotiated to
yield this in return for other aspects that benefit them, which in any
case have not been fulfilled) but with a relative degree of awareness that
they will not benefit from them. There are even UNCTAD11 reports
warning of the disadvantages of patent systems for the South. At the
same time, the opposition and condemnation of many civil society
organizations against such agreements has been and continues to be
extensive. Nevertheless it continues to be the most powerful
international “legal” instrument to impose intellectual property
systems, but one that lacks legitimacy at many levels.
For this reason, other international agreements negotiated in the
same periods, though seen to be less negative, went on to play an
important role in legalizing and above all legitimising biopiracy. In this
sense of legalization, and disguising reality, the UN Convention of
Biological Diversity (CBD) plays a noteworthy role, despite the fact that
the US considers it sufficiently “dangerous” never to have ratified it.

The Convention on Biological Diversity, sovereignty
and the benefit sharing discourse
The CBD, in effect since 1993 after being ratified by 168
countries, has among its objectives the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustained use of its components, and the fair and equal
participation of the benefits obtained through its use. As part of this it
includes the transferral of relevant technologies “taking into account all
rights on these resources and technologies”.
Among the most significant clauses relevant to the subject of this
article, it is established that States have sovereignty over their genetic
resources, but that they must establish “adequate access” to them
(Article 15). Article 8 (j) establishes that “subject to its national
legislation”, the same State will “respect, preserve and maintain
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their
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wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of
such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge,
innovations and practices”.
The fact of establishing that countries have “sovereignty” over
the genetic resources that exist within their territory is presented as a
success for third world countries, as if it were a fair revindication.
Paradoxically, it can also work the other way round, for two basic
reasons.
The first is that through the journeys of the first conquerors, and
more recently of other travellers, scientists and botanical gardens, the
largest part of “ex-situ” genetic resources (ie collections outside their
place of origin), are found within institutions from Northern
countries, in germplasm banks of agricultural varieties as well as in
botanical gardens, aquariums, zoos and microbial collections. When
the CBD declares that countries have sovereignty over the genetic
resources in their territory, it automatically passes the control of
resources originating from the South collected before its signature in
1993, to the Northern countries that hold them within their territory,
allowing them to be sold, patented etc. Territory even continues to be
“sovereign” until the moment in which each country ratifies the CBD.
This fact is significant as although 83% of “in-situ” biodiversity and
associated knowledge is found in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 75%
of “ex-situ” resources and technology is found in countries in the
North. This is not the result of the Northern countries having
catalogued and collected their own resources, as in fact the large
majority of the resources they hold come from the South and were
collected before the CBD12.
A second but equally relevant subject, is that the sovereignty of
resources historically conserved, guarded and developed by indigenous
peoples, peasant and fishing and other communities, is transferred to
States. These same States have been instrumental in the legal and even
warlike plundering of the cultural, economic, social, land and territory
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rights of these same peoples and communities. Moreover, States’
boundaries do not always coincide with the geographical location of
indigenous peoples (which can be several within one State and/or
extend to other States) and this means that the State is attributed with
the right to trade resources and knowledge that form part of the
heritage of an ethnic group that could at the same time be found in
several other countries.
In the same way, although Article 8 (j) apparently recognizes the
fundamental contribution and the right of these actors to resources
and knowledge, they are conditioned to national legislation (once again
within these same States), and establish the term “community” instead
of “people”, the collective term recognized by the indigenous people
themselves. This is important, as one (or several) communities can
thus act as partners in bioprospection contracts, or grant any other
kind of access, to resources that do not belong solely to their
community or communities, but in fact form part of the collective
heritage of indigenous peoples, which as already mentioned, can be
found in many other zones or countries.
In this current context, and in the face of ever more public
debates on biopiracy, access laws become the panacea or miracle cure
to avoid “robbery”. However they only join forces with the ensemble of
regulations that companies need to continue carrying out (now
“legally”) their work of looting and privatising collective and public
resources. Suffice it to say that no country in the North is discussing
access laws to its own genetic resources, and that in fact the proposals
for this kind of law are fundamentally based in countries with greater
biological and cultural diversity – in the South.
In the 1990s, the so-called bioprospection contracts started,
which claimed to be fulfilling the terms of the CBD. Some
multinational companies incorporated concepts of consultation, legal
access and “benefit-sharing”. Among the best-known early agreements
(prior to the CBD, but while it was being discussed) is that of Merck
with the National Institute for Biodiversity (INBio), a private entity in
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Costa Rica. INBio promised to hand over 10,000 plant samples from
the country, in exchange for $1,135,000, some instruments, training
and the payment of a percentage of royalties (the amount is
confidential) in the case that some pharmaceutical were to be found
from the samples given. The contract drawn up between Shaman
Pharmaceuticals and an indigenous settlement from the Amazonian
jungle in Ecuador was also “innovative”; the company agreed to
provide some infrastructure improvements and a percentage of future
royalties in exchange for obtaining samples and the knowledge about
the uses of plants from the region. In both cases the blessing of
authorities in the countries involved was given.
Other multinationals took up the example, with some
variations, and started to apply similar schemes for involving
indigenous communities and/or research centres or local universities,
in exchange for some kind of “benefit-sharing”. In this way they
managed to obtain knowledge as well as plant, micro-organism, insect
and other samples more easily and with a greater information yield
than any other way, which not only would have cost them more, but
could never even have been achieved. In addition, they got legal
coverage in countries where they were drawing up this kind of
contract.
In any case, the scheme of plundering resources is the same, and
for this reason we could suggest calling this kind of bioprospector
“corsairs” instead of “pirates”.
In the era of piracy on the high seas, the English crown gave out
looting permits to other vessels that plundered in favour of the crown.
These were known as corsairs; they did the same as other pirates, but
with the permission of authorities, to whom they were then required to
account for all their earnings. In this way the famous pirate known
across the world as Drake became called Sir Francis Drake in England,
and became a “respectable” person.
One of the more refined ways of facilitating this kind of
“legalized” agreement was constituted by the International Cooperative
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Biodiversity Group (ICBG). The ICBG’s programmes are managed by
a consortium of federal US government agencies, including the
National Health Institutes, the National Science Foundation and the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). It grants donations
to public and private research institutions that have
bioprospection/biopiracy programmes in Southern countries.
According the ICBG itself, its goals are the promotion of the discovery
of pharmaceuticals derived from natural resources, the conservation of
biodiversity and sustained economic growth in developing countries.
They have drawn up a series of guidelines on the need to obtain
consent from communities and local authorities and to establish ways
of “fair share” of benefits13.
The typical structure of the ICBG is that host groups that receive
donations are made up of a) US universities and/or botanical gardens
(who are always the project coordinators and those who receive all the
information and project materials); b) universities or research centres
in the country where the bioprospection is to be carried out; c) in some
cases international NGOs (WWF and Conservation International,
denounced for their biopiracy activities in many countries); and d) a
commercial partner, generally pharmaceutical or agro business
multinationals. Glaxo-Wellcome, Bristol Myers Squibb, Shaman
Pharmaceuticals, Dow Elanco Agrosciences, Wyeth-Ayerst, American
Cyanamid, Monsanto have all participated in ICBG projects.
The operating structure of several of these projects has
incorporated indigenous groups locally, through a national research
institute of international conservationist NGO. Such groups provide
their knowledge and facilitate the collection of samples, are promised
future compensation as a modest form of reward, and in some cases are
given the chance to be owners of the patents, which they then license
out to third-parties. This is one of the most negative impacts, as it
introduces elements that are completely external and harmful to their
own cultures.
In this way the ICBG use public money to subsidize
multinational companies, adopting altruistic language about the search
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for medicines for all humanity and the cultural rescue of indigenous
peoples. The results obtained cost them far less than what the National
Health or Cancer Institutes and others spent previously in carrying out
these “bioprospection” activities for themselves. Results are left with the
US university partners and the enormous majority of the economic
benefits stay with those companies that participate in the projects14.

The business context
As the genetic resources and knowledge associated to them make
up the fundamental raw material of the industry applied to the health
and food sectors, among others, it is important to be able to recognise
those that manages and dominates these markets.
According to ETC Group research15, information available for
2001 shows that:
•

The 10 biggest pharmaceutical companies control approximately
48% of the value of the world market, calculated to be $317
billion.

•

The 10 biggest veterinary pharmaceutical companies control
60% of the value of this market, which amounts to $13.6 billion.

•

The 10 biggest seed companies control 30% of the commercial
seed market, amounting to $24 billion.

•

The transgenic seed of one single company (Monsanto, now
property of Pharmacia) was used in 94% of the total area sown
with transgenic crops in 2000.

•

The 10 biggest agrochemical corporations control 84% of the
market value of agrochemicals, calculated at $30 billion.

•

The 32 main supermarket chains control 34% of the global
market of foodstuff distribution, with an estimated value of $2.8
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trillion. Of these 32, only 10 control 54% of the sales total, with
a value of $513.7 billion.
One of the most relevant pieces of information is that the main
companies of each heading simultaneously participate in several of the
others, in this way constituting true genetic giants (see the following
table). The number indicates the positioning of main companies in the
sector on an international scale.
Classification by sector based on sales for the year 2000, in US dollars
Genetic Giant

Agrochemicals
LS

Seeds

Pharmaceutica

SYNGENTA
(Novartis +AstraZeneca)

#1

#3

#4 Astra Zeneca
#7 Novartis

PHARMACIA
(inc MONSANTO)

#2

#2

#8

AVENTIS

#3
for sale

#10

#5

BASF

#4

Not classified

Sold its
pharmaceutical
division for
$6.9 billion

DUPONT

#5

#1

Sold its
pharmaceutical
division for $7.8
billion 8/01

BAYER

#6

Not classified

#18 for sale

DOW

#7

#7

Not classified

Source: ETC Group, 2001

Moreover this exists in a world in which during the last 10 years
we have witnessed an astonishing concentration of corporate power
that stretched across practically all sectors of the global economy. The
world value of corporate mergers and acquisitions increased from $462
million in 1990 to over $3,5 billion in the year 2000.16 Last year,
business carried out outside national frontiers amounted to 35% of
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mergers and acquisitions. The global value of mergers and acquisitions
in the year 2000 was equivalent to 12% of the total of world economic
growth.
It is estimated that countries of the OECD are owners of 97% of
patents, and that global corporations possess 90% of all technology and
patented products17.
A study carried out by Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh, of
the Institute for Political Studies, finds that of the 100 biggest
economies of the world, 51 are corporations and 49 are countries18. A
comparison between the corporate sales and the GDP of countries
reveals that General Motors is bigger than Denmark, Wal-Mart is
bigger than Norway and General Electric greater than Portugal.
Corporations are using their economic power to win enormous
political power. While governments turn into the servants of
corporations, rather than serving citizens, democracy and the meaning
of national and international legislation is rendered hollow.

Some conclusions
Biopiracy, through its diverse mechanisms, is not just stealing
of previously public and collective resources in order to privatise
them through intellectual property systems, but is also a way of
creating competition and conflict among the local communities and
third world countries that have these resources. Furthermore, it
suffocates the basic cultural elements of indigenous peoples and rural
communities, introducing commercial and privatisation systems in
the place of systems of generosity and free exchange that have been
the historical base of cultural and biological diversity. The experience
also shows that “benefit-sharing” agreements, whether or not the
system in itself is incorrect, do not even fulfil the terms in which they
are set out. Neither are there effective ways to control the final use
that companies and institutions that sign contracts make of the
resources they obtain.
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Nor is it about these companies carrying out “research” for the
benefit of humanity, as intellectual property systems inhibit rather than
stimulate research; investigation is fundamentally subjected to
commercial objectives, searching for profitable products for
companies: for those who can pay for them rather than those who need
them.
In the current context of corporate power and the privatisation
of research and gene banks, public research also ends up handing over
its results to the private sector, whether directly or through market
domination.
Intellectual property systems as such are inherently unjust and
contravene, for example, principles set out in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, such as Article 27, which states: “Everyone has the
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the
arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits”.
The true system of conserving and sustainable using biodiversity
and “sharing benefits in a just and equal way” resides in, among other
things, not permitting any kind of intellectual property on living
beings or technologies, and in the effective and integral affirmation
(that is to say economically, socially, politically and culturally) of the
rights of indigenous, peasant, fishing, forest communities, including
the right to land and territory.
As far as this is not the case, all bioprospection will continue to
be biopiracy.
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Paradigmatic Bioprospection Contracts:
Between Promises and Reality*
Silvia Rodríguez
National University, Heredia, Costa Rica

The objective of this document is to contribute to the critical
discussion of bioprospection agreements that began to proliferate in
this continent a little over ten years ago, promising new development
and welfare for all through the conservation and use of tropical
ecosystems. For this purpose, I have divided the work into four parts:
the first provides a brief historical context of the term “bioprospection”
and the way its principles took shape through the INBio-Merck
contract in Costa Rica. The second part analyzes different types of
bioprospection, according to the ways in which they are carried
out/executed and their aims. These characteristics take us to the third
part, which is about establishing a typology of the contracts of the last
ten years. Finally, I will evaluate the extent to which the promises of
different bioprospection models are complied with or not and present
some conclusions.

1. The Historical contex of Bioprospection
and the Inbio-Merck Model
At the beginning of the 1970s, it was argued that one of the most
powerful reasons for conserving tropical forests was the countless

*

This article was presented during the SEMINAR ECOLOGICAL DEBT AND
BIOPIRACY held in March 2002 in Quito, Ecuador, organised by Acción
Ecológica.
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number of potential medicines to treat as yet incurable illnesses to be
found within them. However, almost two decades later, towards the end
of the 1980s, Thomas Eisner, an entomologist from Cornell University
in the USA, thought a basic support was missing for this argument to
be able to pass from being a plain declaration to a practice.
In early 1989, Eisner believed he had arrived at the solution to
this problem, when he imagined the case of a tropical country being
associated to one of the large pharmaceutical companies in order to
systematically shift through its native species in search for potential
medicines. The guest company would enjoy immediate access to the
wealth of the tropical forest1 and the country of origin would receive a
part of the earnings for allowing such access, providing the raw
material and adding value to it. This economic incentive would in itself
help conservation of the forest, concluded Eisner. What would also
contribute to conservation would be the “non-invasive” techniques
used, given that it would only be necessary to extract tiny quantities of
biological, plant, animal or micro-organism material, thus no harm
would be caused to the forest.
Eisner called this searching for new resources for industry
“chemical prospection”, which derived from the existing concept of
mining or oil prospection (Lyons 1991). Later the term changed to
“bioprospection”2 as the systematic search for new sources of sealable
products deriving from elements of biodiversity opened up to consider
not just chemical extracts from wild and domesticated plants, animals
and micro-organisms, but also their genetic properties.
Some people suggest that the practice of bioprospection has
existed since prehistoric times, but we must understand clearly that
Eisner’s concept went further than that of the hunt for natural products
for use by mankind, and incorporated the idea of sophisticated and
modern work3 carried out jointly by a highly industrialized company
and a tropical country. This association would justify sharing earnings
and incentives with the country of origin in order to support in situ
efforts towards the conservation of tropical ecosystems.
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Chemical prospection, as Eisner conceived it, was first put into
practice through the agreement signed in September 1991 by the
powerful US pharmaceutical company Merck and the National
Biodiversity Institute (INBio) in Costa Rica, in which Eisner played the
role of intermediary (Lyons 1991:27). This agreement was set up before
the signing of the Convention on Biological Diversity during the World
Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This Convention did not even
mention the word “bioprospection” and became a model to be
followed.
The INBio-Merck agreement and later agreements are presented
as models of joint efforts between countries in which each side wins in
both economic and ecological terms. Behind this model is a clear
ideology, whose time for discussion is not the present, but which is
shown in the ideas presented below:
•

In order to save the forest it must be sold, as it is the market that
offers the best incentive to maintain biodiversity.

•

It is necessary to transfer resources in the public domain to
private hands to avoid the so-called “tragedy of common goods”
which suggests, in short, that when common goods belong to
everyone and no-one there is a tendency not to care for them,
and thus for them to be eroded or made extinct.

•

The model appears to continue supporting the old recipe of the
sixties and seventies that indicates that, for under-developed
countries to get out of their situation, they need to follow the
example of industrialized countries. In this concrete case,
sustainable development will be achieved with, among other
things, the proliferation of contracts such as the one between
INBio and Merck. This will mean the transferral of technology
from industrialized countries as well as the financial income
granted by the provider country for the sale of forest resources.
In this way, the whole industrial process, given time, will be able
to be carried out in under-developed countries, which ironically
are the richest in biodiversity.
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2. Types and aims of Bioprospection
In the ten years following the signing of the INBio-Merck
agreement many trial agreements have been written, some closer to the
Costa Rican model and others with new proposals. In order to be able
to evaluate the fulfilment of all that bioprospection promised and
promises, or whether in fact it has proved to be a new kind of economic
and cultural domination, we believe it important to analyse these
agreements in detail, establishing a typology based on similarities and
differences to then determine the points in which peoples and
countries rich in biodiversity lose control of their resources, in spite of
the promises made.
Practices have shown us that the social actors involved in the
agreements as well as the conditions for handing over materials, access
frequency, costs and the need for re-supplying, among others, differ
depending upon the type of bioprospection and the aim to which it
pretends. Let us look more thoroughly at the relationship between the
types and aims of bioprospection from which different arrangements
of social actors derive.

2.1. According to the type of bioprospection, which
can be random or intentional4.
a) Random bioprospection is the act of collecting plants and
animals to “see what can be found”. There is no higher degree of
deliberation in planning what will be collected. This method has
a low percentage of success but all the same through this method
the National Cancer Institute in the USA discovered Taxol,
which is used to treat breast and ovarian cancer.
b) Intentional bioprospection can be one of three types: the
phylogenetic, through which the line of close relatives of plants
that have been detected as having pharmaceutical interest is
sought. The ecological type searches for plants or animals that
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live in particular habitats and present characteristics such as
immunity to certain predators, or observes the behaviour of
micro-organisms in extreme conditions, such as in thermal
waters. Lastly, the ethnobotanical type is oriented by traditional
knowledge. (Cfr. Balick y Cox 1997:37-38);
Some think that the most effective bioprospection model is the
ethnobotanical (see table), while others defend the idea that at present
the development of new pharmaceutical products depends more on
phylogenetic information (Reid 1994:53). It can also be the case that
the techniques are combine: they can be guided first by traditional
knowledge and then pass through a phylogenetic search. Whether it
takes one or another form, what is sure is that the possibilities of a
compound turning into an effective pharmaceutical product are very
limited – oscillating between 1 in 80,000 and 1 in 250,000 (Feinsilver
1996:126) – for which reasons companies are currently directing their
efforts towards botanical medicine, dietary and nutraceutical
supplements5, which require less control and thus are easier to
introduce on the market.

2.2. According to the aims, bioprospection is carried out to find new
medications and agricultural, chemical or industrial products
3. Classic Examples of Bioprospection and Social Actors
In this section, under the previous classification, I will typify
classic examples of bioprospection and the social actors that take part
in them. I will start with models that are said to be “exclusively
scientific”, which theoretically and automatically eliminate the
participation of local communities, claiming that traditional
knowledge is not needed in exploration work based on phylogenetic or
ecological techniques. Among these models we have also those whose
aim is to find pharmaceutical or industrial products (examples: INBioMerck, UNAM-Diversa), and those who are looking for new or better
agricultural products (US Department of Agriculture).
189

A second type of bioprospection is one that uses ethnobotanical
guides; these can be divided up into those related to individuals in a
community or indigenous peoples in an “institutional” way (for
example, the so-called ICBGs), and those directly related to
communities (eg. Shaman Pharmaceuticals). These projects seek
pharmaceutical products but also natural and nutraceutic medicine,
now known as “dietary supplements” or “dietetic”.
At the end of this section I will briefly analyse the differences and
similarities in these models.

3.1. Main Actors in
“Scientific-Pharmaceutical-Industrial” Models
All contracts of this type are governed by the Convention on
Biological Diversity. In the absence of national legislation on access in
Mesoamerican countries6, the contracts drafted up to the present have
basically been achieved thanks to political influences of national
signatories and with agreements guided by their own initiative.
PARTICIPANTS:

INBio-MERCK
AGREEMENT

UNAM-DIVERSA
AGREEMENT

Southern research centre

National Biodiversity
Institute (INBio)

National University of
Mexico (UNAM)

Northern biotecnology
company

Merck Pharmaceuticals

Diverse licences to:

Transnational company

Merck Pharmaceuticals

Dow Chemical, Roche
Bioscience, SigmaAldrich, etc.

In the case of the INBio-Merck agreement, there is no
intermediary biotechnology company because Merck is in charge of
the last two stages of chemical prospection and the eventual sale of any
successful product once INBio has carried out the initial stages. Using
this model, samples were taken from public conservation areas, an
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advance payment was set up of which 10% was given to the
Environment and Energy Ministry and the rest was administered by
INBio, a private association. Merck also transferred some technology to
INBio so that it could carry out the task efficiently. In exchange, the US
company received a determined quantity of samples of interest, and
retained the intellectual property rights of future products.
As far as the UNAM-Diversa agreement is concerned, the latter
is a relatively small biotechnology company, with patented technology
for the extraction of microbes in so-called “extreme ecosystems”, such
as jungles, deserts, volcanoes and geothermic sites. Its method employs
the cloning, sequencing and expression of compounds purified directly
from environmental samples, in a way that means they only need a
small sample taken from a single collection. Neither do they need to
establish microbe cultures.
The contract states that Diversa would give UNAM equipment
worth $5,000 and would pay $50 per sample, also promising them a 0.5
payment of royalties on net sales of a future pharmaceutical-type
product on the market, and 0.3% if it was a chemical product. The
contract also alludes generally to intellectual property and technology
transfer. (Text of the Popular Condemnation for the UNAM-Diversa
Bioprospection Contract).
A previous similar contract was made between the same
company, Diversa, and the Yellowstone National Park in the USA,
under which the conditions for the Park were much more favourable:
the promised payment was of $100,000 over five years, and the promise
of royalties fluctuated between 0.5 and 10% (The Edmonds Institute
1999; Pollack Andrew 1999). In Costa Rica, Diversa also signed an
agreement with INBio in 1995, renewed in 1998, in which it is stated
that INBio will use its own techniques and the technology patented by
Diversa to look for structural enzymes and proteins of interest to
biotechnology, crop protection and pharmaceutical products. INBio
guarantees that it will not use this technology to collect and process
samples for other companies. All DNA sequences that INBio isolates
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for Diversa will become property of Diversa, and in a magnanimous
gesture, the agreement states that all the micro-organisms collected
from sites will continue to be property of Costa Rica (!) (See:
www.biodiv.org /doc/meetings/COP-6).
As Diversa only starts the search process and does not bring to
completion the subsequent industrial or pharmacuetical products,
once it can count on the control of the resources, which is to say the
intellectual property of the microbian genomes of interest, they licence
them out to the highest bidder. In 1998, it was reported that Diversa
had entered into strategic alliances with DowChemical Co., Finnfeeds,
Roche BioScience and with Sigma-Aldrich Co. (BusinessWire:
HealthWire 1998). The enzyme of a microbe from Yellowstone is
producing yearly sales of more than $100 million to the Swiss company
that owns the patent (Milstein 1999). In 1999, Diversa had discovered
and obtained more than 500 enzyme patents.
A point in common to the two bioprospection models analysed
here is the absence of public entities from the USA, from where Merck
and Diversa are from, and the complacent laissez-faire style of southern
governments towards this type of agreement. As far as civil society is
concerned, the position of Costa Rica has hardly been effective in
questioning the bioprospection that continues to be tolerated in the
absence of approved Access Laws. In the case of the UNAM-Diversa
agreement, one group of non-governmental organizations have started
to take a very active role denouncing and requesting its annulment
from the Federal Environmental Protection Prosecutor (PROFEPA),
on the grounds that neither UNAM nor its biotechnology institute
“have the power or the right to rule on Mexico’s genetic resources as it
does not have control over the, nor are they agents of those who having
such control, could have conceded it to them” (www.ceccam.org.mx).
Outside the Mesoamerican area, in the USA, civil society also
successfully opposed the agreement between Diversa and Yellowstone
Park. In 1999, a federal judge suspended it based on its environmental
impact, but also because “The introduction of commercial
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bioprospection in national parks represents a dramatic change in the
policy of the Parks Service, in Yellowstone and more generally”
(Milstein 1999:2).

3.2. Main Actors in “Scientific-Agricultural” Models
Agreements of this type will soon be governed by the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, known as the Seed Treaty, now signed by 52 countries and
awaiting ratification by the respective Congresses. For the moment,
access has continued to be granted widely in the area without the
defined participation of the provider State under whose sovereignty
they are found, but instead through arrangements between parties. In
the case of ex situ resources (collections, botanical gardens,
herbariums), a type of contract known as an Agreement of Material
Transfer is used; in the case of the hunt for in situ resources for
agriculture, the procedure is similar to that of pharmaceutical
bioprospection, that is, under agreements or contracts between private
individuals, whether they be institutes or individual collectors.
We will now analyse an access request to search for wild potato
material with the objective of improving domesticated varieties. The
location is a bi-national area in the frontier between Panama and Costa
Rica and the relationship is established using the following outline:
In the previous access request, ignoring the fact that it is the
provider country that should establish the rules, the interested parties
get a head start by laying down the following conditions:
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NORTHERN PARTICIPANTS
• United States Agricultural Department
• Academy of Science which finances
• Collaboration of 2-3 european research
institutes
• International Center for the Potatoe

CONTRACT INTERMEDIARIES
FROM THE NORTH
• University from USA or private
researchers, for guiding the expedition
• field guide: company from the North
mix of eco-touristic operator and
researchers guide, settled in the
Southern provider country’s access zone

THESE WOULD SUBCONTRACT
IN THE SOUTH TO
• Research institute from Costa Rica
• Research institute from Panama, or
• Local researchers (individuals)

1. Duplicates will go to each country participating in the
exploration; in this case the USA, two European countries, the
International Potato Agriculture Centre, Costa Rica and
Panama.
2. The national system of phytogermplasm in the USA will
multiply and administer the collected material
3. The management of intellectual property rights will be
influenced by the multilateral system of the Seed Treaty, namely:
that resources will be free and intellectual property rights will
not be conceded on the parts and components of material “in
the format received”; later they will become property of whoever
modifies them.
This case shows us that certain concrete problems start to take
shape, for example:
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•

Will the search for a theoretically “wild” relative to the potato to
improve a plant that has been domesticated for hundreds of
years and that is of great commercial interest be governed by the
multilateral system of the FAO or through the bilateral
guidelines of the CBD?

•

How is it to be decided whether the material found is “wild” or
product of the care and knowledge of the surrounding
communities.

•

Why are the interested parties those who will decide where the
duplicates are to go and who is to multiply and administer them?

•

Why are these same interested parties those who will lay down
the rules of the granting of intellectual property, not the country
that provides the resource together with the communities in
which access is materialised?

Answers to these questions are urgently needed as permits such
as the last one continue to be requested owing to the fact that phytoimprovers and genetic engineers continue to use original material from
many of the crops of highest demand in the world, despite the advances
of science.

3.3. Main Actors in Institutional ScientificCommunitarian Models
In this model we will analyse the case of the International
Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBGs), characterised by their use of
popular or indigenous knowledge mediated by a scientific effort with
participants from the North as well as the South. Their work began to
be developed in 1991 in the form of “research consortiums” for
development financed by the US government. They had several
interdependent aims: conservation of biodiversity, economic growth
and human health. All of this was carried out through the hunt for
plant- and local knowledge-based pharmaceuticals, with the exception
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of the Costa Rican consortium in which, they insisted, the process
followed no paths guided by ethnobotany (Feinsilver 1996:120).
Three consortiums worked bilaterally in Costa Rica, Peru and
Surinam; two others worked multilaterally: in Latin America
Argentina, Chile and Mexico took part; in Africa, Cameroon and
Nigeria. Years later, in 1998, another agreement, known as the ICBMaya, was signed in Mexico. Its typical organization was as follows:
PARTICIPANTS FROM THE NORTH

PARTICIPANTS FROM THE SOUTH

• USA National Health Institute
• USA National Science Foundation
• International Agency for Development
(IAD), separated later

• Local research institutes
• Local communities or indigenous
peoples (except in Costa Rica)

THEY CONTRACT TO
• USA universities or Botanical Gardens

THESE SUBCONTRACT TO

As shown above, in the first instance, public institutions from
the US contract universities or botanical gardens from the same
country as collectors in charge. These subcontract research institutes
from the source country who in turn will make contact with local
communities in the search for plants or animals of interest. Each
consortium received between $400,000 and $475,000 annually over five
years, training was given to students and technicians and compensation
was promised in the case of a successful drug being registered. Through
this process they aimed to register traditional medicine practices, and
they would prepare inventories and methods to extract material of
interest in a sustainable fashion for specific projects. (Grifo 1996-a,
quoted by Feinsilver 1996:120).
As far as intellectual property rights go, the panorama was not
clear from the beginning. Francesca Grifo, Manager of the ICBG
programme, stated in a presentation made in 1994 that depending
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upon the country in which the agreement was being carried out and
the stage at which the process was found, there could be commercial
secrets, minor patents (if they existed), registered trademarks etc. She
also recognised the problem of this kind of “protection” in the case of
using indigenous knowledge. Also indicated, superficially, was the
point that:
These agreements would mitigate the tensions between traditional
scientific ethics, which defends the public right to access information,
and the understandable right of commercial partners to keep all
information that could have a commercial value as confidential while
the protection given by the patent is pending. (Grifo 1996-b:17-19).

Subsequently, the directors of the ICBGs recognized that
intellectual property rights are of no use in recompensing traditional
knowledge, for which reason they agreed to grant fair and reasonable
incentives to the communities in which the bioprospection is carried
out, through contracts that guaranteed the flow of benefits as a crucial
incentive to stimulate the conservation of resources in danger of
extinction. (Grifo and Rosenthal 1996)
In bioprospection projects separate from those of the ICBGs, the
National Health Institutes and especially the National Cancer Institute,
have been changing the terms of agreements with provider countries.
Very recently, in August 2002, as a result of pressure received, the
National Cancer Institute modified its Memorandum of
Understanding with the Provider Country and now recognises that
protection through patents for all of its inventions will be developed
together (NCI 2002). As can be seen, and in spite of the change in tack
observed, it is the Institute that lays down the rules of the agreement,
simply imposing on the provider country the obligation to seek
patents, without finding out if this is the protection medium that they
were looking for or not.
It is important to note here that the National Health Institutes
have taken a leadership role in plant collecting across time, with around
50,000 samples collected between 1986 and 1999 in Africa, Madagascar,
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Central and Southern America and South-East Asia. Contracts have
been drawn up with the botanical gardens of Missouri, New York and
the University of Illinois, who then, following the ICBG model that I
comment upon here, subcontract to local institutions in the South.
During this same period, 1986-1999, they also collected over 10,000
marine invertebrates and algae in the Indo-Pacific region, helped by the
Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institute, the Australian Institute of
Marine Science, the Universities of Canterbury and New Zealand, and
the Coral Reef Research Foundation. (DTP/NPB-NCI)
Once they place all these samples in their deposits, research
institutes or companies interested in accessing this enormous
collection, must sign a Materials Transfer Agreement with the Institute,
for the following reasons:
The National Cancer Institute considers the Deposit of Natural
Products to be a national resource (…). Access to these programs
(Open Repository Program/Active Repository Program) is subject to
signature of the Materials Transfer Agreement in which the rights of all
parties are protected (DTP/NPB). (Emphasis added)

In this model we can see that the presence of public institutions
from the north, in this case from the USA, fulfils a double function: on
the one hand they certainly fulfil a social function through promoting
research into illnesses such as cancer and AIDS; but on the other hand
they are subsidising corporate research of medicines with public
money (Feinsilver 1996:121). These institutions only carry out the
search, the preliminary studies and the depositing of materials for them
to be subsequently transferred to companies for industrialization and
sale. The principal objective of these companies is profit, which has to
reach such levels that although a medicine may have demonstrated its
efficiency, if it does not reach a minimum level it is taken off the
market. On the other hand, and under the same premise of profit, they
fix prices of medicines whether or not they remain outside the
possibilities of those that need them.
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3.4. Main Actors in the Ethnobotanical Model
of Direct Relationships With Communities (Shaman Model)
At the end of the last decade, a group of researchers in the US
formed a small company called Shaman Pharmaceutical,s with the
intention of doing things differently from the large pharmaceutical
corporations. Steven King, Vice-President of Ethnobotany and
Conservation in Shaman Botanicals stated that: “Large companies do
not want to share their earnings with countries and cultures, and do
not want to negotiate these contracts with countries. They want to have
complete control over the processes” (O´Connor 2000).
Shaman started its work soon after signing the Convention on
Biological Diversity, under the philosophy of carrying out
bioprospection activities on a direct understanding with indigenous
communities in a way that would mean that the contributions made by
this company for taking advantage of their resources and knowledge
would get to them effectively. The model they employed is as follows:
PRIVATE COMPANY FROM THE NORTH

ORGANIZATIONS FROM THE SOUTH

Local Communities or Indigenous Peoples

Biotechnology company

Eventual License to an Interested
aCompany or Industry

As can be seen, it is a simple model that does not eliminate the
condition that the biotechnology company, in this case Shaman
Pharmaceuticals, will control the patent of potential products and will
licence the future sale of derived products to a third company of greater
size
Despite its good will, the agreements between Shaman and
indigenous peoples in Ecuador were strongly criticized for their
unilateral terms and the scarce benefit they provided to the indigenous
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peoples. On the other hand, although they invoke the Convention on
Biological Diversity, in actual fact they were lacking on one of their
fundamental principles which is to initiate access with the approval of
the nation state under whose sovereignty all the resources of a country
fall. Finally, the medicines obtained through these efforts— for
respiratory and viral diseases, herpes and chronic diarrhoea produced
by AIDS – did not pass the last tests of the US Food and Drug Agency
(FDA) and Shaman Pharmaceuticals went into liquidation on
declaring itself incapable of continuing to face its economic
commitments.

What has Happened After ten Years of Bioprospection
Following the CBD
The following are some aspects seen from the side of the
executors of the models under analysis, especially of the ICBGs, which
were subject to evaluation in 19977.
•

The ICBG Programmes report to have contributed to the
training of professionals from the south, among this through
short courses in which more than 425 people have taken part.
(NHI 1997)

•

Some programmes have contributed to the development of
infrastructure, buying of vehicles, computers, laboratory
equipment among others.

•

They have published documents, chapters of books, summaries,
databases, computer programmes on biodiversity, the chemistry
of natural products and on policy around this subject.

•

The ICBG evaluators recommended in 1997 that they start
another cycle of funding of at least five years as some of the
programmes found themselves making inroads to the discovery
of new medicines. Moreover, in all cases critical biological
information had been developed.
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•

The ICBG evaluators also pointed out that the process had
allowed the integration of modern discovery of medicines with
traditional methods.

•

Nevertheless, they also point out that in order to ensure the
continuous participation of ICBG partners in the revision of
mechanisms and processes, they must with no exception,
preserve the confidentiality of all information under private
property, such as chemical structures and biological
information, and should not endanger the patentability of the
discoveries (NHI 1997).

It is now important to contrast the previous perceptions with
others seen from a different perspective:
•

Almost 11 years have passed since the signing of the INBioMerck agreement and as yet no successful product derived from
the bioprospection contracts analysed here has been reported.

•

The prolonged nature of the search process for medicines is
making the objectives of bioprospection change towards the
hunt for fragrances, cosmetics, agricultural products (pesticides
and natural herbicides), veterinary medicines, dyes, natural
medicine products, dietary and nutritional supplements.

•

Pharmaceutical companies can be found looking for other
options such as combination chemistry and gene therapy, while
strong voices are heard about the destruction of myths around
bioprospection as a development and conservation process.

•

In spite of the courses given to southern researchers, the
technology transferred from the North is not the latest
technology, and if it is shared, such as in the case of Diversa, it
comes under the premise of payment of technological interest
and under intellectual property laws.
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•

The least benefited are indigenous peoples and local
communities who, in a best-case scenario, have generally only
received a payment for samples and the work of looking for
them.

•

Disputes and differences between communities and generations
within the same community have arisen.

•

No matter how positive the ICBG evaluators consider the
integration of modern work with traditional methods, it is
certain that an irreconcilable conflict exists between traditional
knowledge, cultural and survival aims, and the knowledge
promoted to obtain products orientated to world commerce.

•

Medicines, such as those for AIDS, are sold at prohibitive prices
for those that need them and, with the exception of the ICBGs,
all the other projects do not propose the search for medicines
that will solve third world diseases.

Conclusions
In all the bioprospection models revised in this work there are
differences in approach, use of techniques and participation of
different social actors. Nevertheless we also find a series of similarities
that allow us to outline and establish some conclusions on
bioprospection as it is used today:
•

The lack of trust towards southern research institutes of
northern organizations starting the bioprospection process is
noteworthy, as they establish responsibilities and operate with
northern intermediaries who in turn subcontract to southern
research institutes or universities at inferior prices, with the
exception of Diversa and Merck who contract directly to INBio
or UNAM, and Shaman which operated directly with
communities.
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•

Models are thought out from north to south, from above to
below; market logic and the rules, mechanisms and limitations
that it imposes shows that what counts most is earning rather
than social wellbeing or nature conservation. So much so that
people continue to think, as in the times of Christopher
Columbus, that we, the inhabitants of tropical lands, are white
sheets upon which any essay written from the perspective of
others can be dictated.

•

In all cases, northern organizations demand control of
intellectual property and on doing so, turn themselves into the
real owners of the resources with complete authority to keep
them at their disposal.

•

The Convention on Biological Diversity clearly asks countries
that are rich in biodiversity to facilitate access to their resources,
and industrialized countries to share their technology. Ten years
of experience show us that the pressure to comply with these
requests is only received by tropical countries, to whom the
explicit demand is made not to hinder access to resources and to
accept the imposition of intellectual property upon products
derived from them. On the other hand, industrialized countries
are not questioned for the barriers they place on access to the
patented technology that they transfer with great limitations and
under the terms of intellectual property rights and technological
interest which is applied at cost price.

•

The sovereignty of states over their natural resources is
questionable in the way the Convention on Biological Diversity
is being implemented tacitly and explicitly, subordinating States
to the whims and fancies of the market and impositions of the
World Trade Organisation.

•

Evidence from several fronts shows that the contracts are in no
way fair and reasonable. One of the most visible fronts can be
found in the prices that northern countries and their companies
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put on the samples, the salaries they pay to local scientists, and
the percentage of royalities when they exist. Less tangible is the
one observed when these same countries or companies add to
the control they already have on scientific and technological
advances, the control of products deriving from the resources of
biodiverse countries once they are extracted from them to be
synthesised, domesticated or deposited in germplasm banks,
collections and botanical gardens. The other control mechanism
exercised is through control of intellectual property which is
generally demanded by them in their own favour and under their
rules. With this they enjoy a closed circle on raw material,
science, technology and derived products.
•

Bioprospection, as a hunt or exploration for new medicines,
veterinary, agricultural and nutritional products is not bad in
itself. The problem is the current mode of production in which
is immersed the distortion of its aims and the conditioning of
the methods used to achieve them. In this way, however much
goodwill the designers of the models seen here had, or the
apparent achievements reached, bioprospection loses its way on
the path to sustainable development and degenerates the
objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity.

•

Thus if I consider that bioprospection is not bad in itself, but
rather it is the models currently underway that are, what
corresponds is to make a 100 degree turn in its design and
conception. This means opening the field for bioprospection
managed according to the needs and perspectives of the very
caretakers and multipliers of biotic resources and not from the
perspective of those who make profits from them. There is no
doubt that I am talking of a long, difficult and painful path, but
with this basic principle in mind it is worth starting to walk it.
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Notas
1

2

3

4

5
6
7

The elements and components of tropical forests are interesting for
bioprospectors as they are particularly well endowed with chemical defences
against the innumerable predators that they have to repel. It is not out of chance
that a quarter of all prescribed medications in the USA are based on plant- and
microbe-derived substances or are synthetically derived from such sources (Joyce
1991:38).
A preliminary combing shows that Monsanto was the first to use the word
“bioprospection” when in 1991 it signed a multi-million dollar three-year
agreement with botanical gardens in Missouri for the collection of microorganisms from the soil as well as plants (Joyce 1991).
The first collection and initial sifting phases would be carried out in the country
of origin, and the following phases, technically more sophisticated such as
purification and characterization, would be carried out in the industry’s home
country (Eisner, Thomas 1989-90:32).
The type of bioprospection to which I refer is basically of plants; the investigation
of the working methodology in the case of animals and especially marine
resources is still to be done.
Nutraceuticals are nutritive plants (antioxidants) used in preventative medicine
(Feinsilver 1996, quoting The Lancet 1994)
Mesoamerica is made up of Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama.
An evaluation of the INBio-Merck agreement after six years of its signing can be
consulted in: Rodríguez S. and Camacho, A. 2002.
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Agreement between
Awa Federation-Ecuador
with the U.S. National Cancer Institute:
Ecological debt for Bioprospection*
Elizabeth Bravo
Acción Ecológica

The home of the Awá nationality is found in northwest Ecuador
and southwest Colombia, on either side of the frontier. The Awá
territory is made up of wooded ecosystems, found in the last fragment
of western tropical forests, in the Chocó biogeography.
The region covers 5,000 Km2 and is spread over the Carchi,
Imbabura and Esmeraldas provinces, but recognised Awá territory
amounts to only 1,010 Km2.
The Awá reserve contains extremely high biodiversity, in which
are included two or three endemic centres. Out of the 25 life zones
classified by Cañadas in Ecuador, 11 are found in the Awá region, which
is made up of areas in the steep slopes of the foothills of the Western
Andes going down towards the coastal area.
It is estimated that the region has some 6,300 vascular plant
species, of which 1,500 (20%) are possibly endemic. The adjacent
region in Colombia could have an additional 6% of endemism.

*

This article was presented during the SEMINAR ECOLOGICAL DEBT AND
BIOPIRACY held in March 2002 in Quito, Ecuador, organised by Acción Ecológica.
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The Chocó Biogeography stretches along the length of the
Pacific coast of tropical America, from the south of Panama to the
North-east of Ecuador. The region is characterised by having the
highest precipitation of Tropical America (8.000 mm per year), and is
one of the planet’s most biodiverse regions.
The Awá population numbers 3,000 people across 8
communities; they have grouped together to form the Federation of
Awá Centres.
The formation of the Awá territory started in 1984 and was
finished in 1988, and the Awá Confederation was put under the
protection of UTEPA, a unit of the Exterior Relations Ministry. Some
difficulties in recognising the territory included:
•

The Awá people were not recognised by national society.
Officially, their existence was only known about since the 1950s.

•

The territory is surrounded by poor settlers, and conflicts have
occurred between the two groups.

•

The State considers Awá territory as wasteland, and thus an
object of colonization. They proposed the building of the
Chical-San Marcos - Tobar Donoso road as a priority for the
area’s development. The State was interested in the area’s
minerals, particularly gold, and later showed its interest in its
biodiversity

•

No law in existence recognised the special rights of indigenous
peoples.

•

Few members of the Awá people spoke Spanish

Owing to the proximity to Colombia, and to the fact that the
Awá people were divided between the two countries, the Colombian
and Ecuadorian governments signed a bilateral agreement for the Awá
region, with three objectives: territorial demarcation, bilingual
education and natural resource management.
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The Awá use a wide variety of medicinal plants; there are a large
number of Shamans capable of curing ills ranging from snakebites to
mental illnesses. They divide illnesses in three categories: the first are
minor illnesses produced by natural causes, cured with home remedies.
The second type is caused by wood spirits and is cured through a threeday ceremony. Finally, there are illnesses caused by witchcraft; these are
cured by the shamans.
The area is affected by serious deforestation. The forests have
been described as one of the most threatened on the planet in terms of
biological extinction. It is estimated that in 1945, the area was made up
of 60.000 Km2 of wood; current estimates indicate that only 6.000
Km2 remain, a mere 9% of the initial area. This is a direct result of the
fact that the forests are home to many species valuable to the wood
industry.

The National Cancer Institute (NCI)
The National Cancer Institute was created in 1937 to carry out
research into cancer. Research on new agents was started in 1955 when
its chemotherapy programme was set up; today it is under the charge
of the Developmental Therapeutics Program (DTP). During its first 35
years, 400,000 synthetic and natural chemicals were evaluated. Since
1960 they have started a programme to discover anti-carcinogenic
agents in plants. At the outset the programme was limited to the USA
and Mexico, but it was later extended to almost 60 countries.
In 1993, the NCI invested $39 million, of which the National
Cooperative Drug Discovery Groups Program used $2.91 million for
laboratory research, $15.9 million in contracts, $16.25 in scholarships
and $4.68.
At the start, the NCI randomly adopted bioprospection
methodology. To achieve this it paid botanists around the world to send
in a quota of plants every year. From this period there was one
successful discovery, TAXOL, which is used in breast and ovarian
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cancer and is an active principle isolated in the Pacific tejo tree. There
are also 15 more active principles being evaluated in clinical trials.
In 1986 the NCI launched a more systematic and extensive
programme of plant and marine organism collection in tropical and
sub-tropical regions.
These bioprospection programmes were carried out in
association with Botanical Gardens and other research centres. The
programmes include:
•

Missouri Botanical Garden - in Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Madagascar and Tanzania.

•

New York Botanical Garden - in Belize, Bolivia, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Martinique, Paraguay, Peru and Puerto Rico.

•

University of Illinois at Chicago - in Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua
New Guinea, Nepal, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand.

•

Coral Reef Research Foundation - collects marine life in
Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Thailand, Antarctica and the Caribbean.

Under each contract 1,500 samples of between 0.3 and 1.0 kg dry
weight must be collected every year. In the case of plant collection,
different parts of the plant must be included.
Up to now, some active principles with anti-carcinogenic or
anti-HIV potential have been found. For example, halichondrin B, a
sponge from New Zealand was isolated and an anti-HIV from a liana
from Cameroon. Other anti-HIV principles were isolated from a shrub
found in the west of Australia and a group of compounds called
calanolides from plants in Sarawak-Malaysia.
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Another area that interested the NCI was ethno botany, as they
realised that they achieved a higher percentage of discoveries of new
active principles when accompanied by traditional knowledge.
In September 1999, the NCI had more than 50,000 plants and
10,000 marine invertebrates and algae, the majority of them collected
from the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
To screen the material collected, the NCI is able to establish
contracts with third parties, for which purpose it has set up a Materials
Transfer Protocol, establishing among other things that the property of
the material belongs to NCI. It also establishes a confidentiality clause.

Intellectual Property Rights
The NCI has its own policy on intellectual property. They are
willing to negotiate royalties for the patents that arise directly from
agreements with the country from which the resource has come. The
NCI is prohibited from establishing a specific percentage of
“compensation”. It also establishes that the main source of raw material
will be the country of origin; this ensures an economic income for the
country, for example through crops cultivated.

Agreement with the National Cancer Institute
In April 1993, the Therapeutic Development Program of the
Treatment Division in the National Cancer Institute (TDP/NCI), the
New York Botanical Garden, the Federation of Awá Centres and
UTEPA signed a research agreement for two years.
The purpose of this agreement was to collect and research plants
within the territory of the Awá people in the search for new cures for
cancer and AIDS. The collection would be carried out by scientists
from the New York Botanical Garden.
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Under the agreement, the TDP/NCI declared its interest in
researching plants in Awá territory, and added euphemistically that it
had decided to “collaborate” with the Awá Federation in its research.
Years later, the botanical director of this project, Hans Beck, said that it
had helped the Awá people “in the management of its resources and
conservation strategies “.
The Agreement established that in its laboratories the TDP/INC
would investigate anti-cancer and anti-AIDS activity in extracts of
plants given by the Awá Federation (through the JBNY). If there was
space in the TDP/INC laboratory, they agreed to invite a technician
from the Awá Federation, for no more than one year, to work there or
in another laboratory, under agreement of the parties involved. Salaries
and other conditions would be negotiated in good faith.
In this respect, according to a WWF anthropologist, JBNY staff
also brought over two Shamans to help them classify samples. He
pointed out that on taking these Shamans out of their communities,
they left the communities without protection as Shaman are the people
who care for their well-being.
Under this agreement the TDP/INC is to seek protection for all
inventions developed. The results of the research are to be kept
confidential by all parties, and the results will not be able to be
published, until the PDT does obtain a patent in the USA on any of
these isolated agents. The patent will be referenced to this agreement.
If production and marketing licences for pharmaceutical
companies were to come out of the research, the TDP/INC will “make
the greatest effort possible to ensure that royalties and other forms of
compensation will be provided to the Awá Federation or to individuals,
with the quantity to be negotiated between the TDP/INC and the Awá
Federation. This process can last from 10-15 years.
The royalties will depend upon the relationship between the
marketed drug and the natural product that has been isolated. The
Agreement says that: “if the invention” is the natural product (we ask
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how it is possible to invent a natural product?) the percentage of
royalties will be higher than if the natural product only provides a
guide for developing the drug.
A fund is also considered to carry out infrastructure works, such
as the building of health centres, but this point is not stated on the
signed contract.

Acquisition of Raw Material
If a possibility to market any product were to arise, the raw
material used must originate primarily from Awá territory. If the
Federation cannot provide the required material in sufficient quantity,
it will be paid to set up a medicinal plantation and other conservation
programmes for endangered species at a cost to be negotiated. Will a
social and environmental impact analysis for this plantation be done, we
wonder? To cite some examples, will they stop sowing traditional
products on which the food sovereignty of the communities depend in
order to plant these medicines? Will the plantations be set up in primary
forests? What will the impact on the zone’s rich biodiversity be?
All aspects of this agreement will be applied only to the endemic
species of the Awá territory.
If the TDP /INC were to require more raw material during the
screening phase, the Awá Federation and the JBNY is under a duty to
provide it.
If large quantities of raw material are required, the Awá
Federation and the JBNY will investigate the massive propagation of
the material within its territory.
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The Federation’s Obligations
Members of the Awá Federation will work together with the
JBNY in plant collection activities, will sort out export paperwork and
share knowledge on the medicinal use of plants to guide plant
collection. Healers will provide information on how medicine is
administered and the best season for collection.
The Awá Federation’s scientists and its collaborators (the JBNY?)
will be able to investigate active principles for uses other than cancer
and AIDS.
Finally, the Agreement stipulates that if any conflict were to
occur between the English and Spanish versions, the English version
will prevail.

The Development of the Agreement
As part of the agreement, 17 members of the Awá people
attended a course on traditional and Western medicine in Pasto,
Colombia. They also learnt plant-drying techniques for their later
export. Subsequently, they themselves were put in charge of carrying
out the project.
In 1993, the Awá Federation and the JBNY signed an agreement:
Regulations for Scientific Studies Carried out in the Federation’s
Territory. Some of the points included were:
•

Written permission must be requested to carry out studies,
including the objective, impact area, and the benefits to the Awá
people.

•

The request must be made two months in advance

•

No more than five people will be allowed. (Berk and Ortiz, 1997,
report that groups were made up of seven people)
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•

One group at a time

•

Scientists must be accompanied by local guides

•

Collection of animals, insects and plants for commercial
purposes is forbidden (According to a WWF anthropologist,
New York Botanical Garden researchers took insect samples).

•

Only three specimens of each species can be collected: one for
the Awá Federation, one for the researchers and one for the
Tobar Donoso Project. Later the number was increased as the
NCI asked its collectors to hand in at least five duplicates, one of
which would be left with the Smithsonian Institute Natural
History Museum and the other with the NCI Natural Products
Repository (NPR) in Frederick, Maryland (NCI web site)

•

They were forbidden from taking cultural objects

•

Scientists should take their rubbish away with them

•

Prices for services1:
- Entrance - 1.000 sucres
- Guides and information-givers (shamans) - 700 sucres per day
- Cooks, laundry and other workers – 500 sucres per day
- Ecuadorian members of staff only need pay 500 sucres

•

Giving of presents prohibited

•

Anybody who does not respect the rules will be immediately
thrown out

•

The Awá Federation must be credited in publications
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Results
Scientists from the New York Botanical Garden carried out six
ethno-botanical inventories in three communities found at 200, 500
and 1100 metres above sea level. In each inventory they investigated
medicinal plants, the knowledge of healers and collected botanical
samples for plant collections and photochemical analysis.
All journeys made were accompanied by local healers.
1,500 plants were collected, 85% with ethno botanical
information, including use, preparation, and contra-indications for
each plant, as well as ecological information.
I have not been able to find information on the fate of these
samples once they arrived at the NCI.
It is important to point out that the Colombian Government,
when it learnt about this project, protested against the Ecuadorian
Government, as this biodiversity and knowledge are shared between
the two countries.
This Agreement is not found in the framework of the Andean
Decision 391.

Nota
1

At that time, the local currency of Ecuador was the SUCRE. 5.000 sucres = 1 US
dollar.
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Inbio and Ecological debt:
A Successful Model of Biopiracy*
Isaac Rojas
COECOCeiba-FoE Costa Rica

The Inbio: what is it and what does it do?
The National Biodiversity Institute (Inbio) in Costa Rica is “a
private institute with staff appointed outside the Costa Rican State, but
with sufficient representation to be able to influence ministers,
legislators, university authorities and other high-ranking officials from
the governing class”1. The name it uses makes most people think it is a
public institution, but in fact it is not so, in actual fact it is a private
entity that has benefited from national patrimony.
In February 1989, representatives from 16 public institutions
and NGOs met in San José to formalize plans under discussion to
create an institute for biodiversity. They suggested collecting and
building up a biodiversity inventory, bringing together a collection
within one entity, centralizing information on biodiversity and putting
this information at the service of the country. At this meeting a
planning commission that would draw up a proposal was formed; the
commission was legalized through a decree issued by the then
president Oscar Arias. In October 1989 the Inbio was created as a not-
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This article was presented during the SEMINAR ECOLOGICAL DEBT AND
BIOPIRACY held in March 2002 in Quito, Ecuador, organised by Acción Ecológica.
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for-profit private association, with strong links to the governing class,
and declared to be of public service.
At the time, international consultants made the following
comments:
“The Inbio cannot be adapted and assimilated to a governmental
organizational structure as it would hamper the achievement of the
very purposes for which it was set up. (…) The aims of the Inbio are
“to protect, understand and use our biological diversity” and its
strategy must be aimed at achieving this efficiently. The wishes
expressed by donors, who support the institution economically, and
the urgent time period for natural factors, oblige the Inbio to look for
flexibility and achievement in its strategies.”2

In this way, Inbio was born with the blessing of scientific and
political sectors. It acquired significance with the transfer of the
Neotropic Foundation’s database, and the same happened with the
hundred-year old collection of the National Museum, due to it being
engaged in construction works. They also obtained funds from the
cancellation of debt for nature, tax exemption, land for its premises
(this was returned) and vehicles. Moreover they started the biodiversity
inventory and sold samples to the pharmaceutical company Merck.
Later they were to win prizes and international recognition, for which
their reputation grew. The training of informal taxonomists and its
socio-environmental discourse also carry weight.
The contract with the pharmaceutical company Merck in 1991
positioned the Inbio as an international business player, receiving
prizes, funding and a strong publicity campaign. It is important to
point out that, despite being the main actor according to his functions
and considering the sale of natural resources belonging to the State that
was agreed, the Environment Minister was never present in this
negotiation.
A million dollars were paid in advance to Inbio through their
contract with Merck: $100,000 was granted to the Ministry for
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Environment and Energy which it would dedicate to the consolidation
of the system for protected areas and possible new contracts and
subcontracts. Important subjects for the country like “number of
contracted samples, percentage of possible royalties, patent ownership,
consequences of patenting on local communities, possibility of erosion
of sovereignty”3 were never mentioned.
The mission of Inbio is “to promote greater awareness around
the value of biodiversity, to achieve its conservation and improve the
quality of life of the human being. The Inbio has organized five
programmes or interrelated processes: inventory, bioprospection,
conservation for development, information management and social
management”4. Among the products emphasized by the Inbio are the
“identification of new species for science, the most complete database
on Costa Rican biodiversity available to the public, support to the
National System of Conservation Areas, a boost to the country’s
ecotourism sector, infrastructure development (Inbio-Park), products
(books, games, educational material etc.) for knowledge transfer (“bioliteracy”), and the development of experiences in the search for
sustainable use of biodiversity, are just some of what Inbio will
contribute to the country.”5
Since the contract with Merck, the Inbio conceives itself as a
partner rather than a supplier, as it adds a value of information and
processing of samples collected. It defined as prerequisites “the
commitment of the partner in covering all in-country research costs, to
provide support equivalent to 10% of the budget destined to the state’s
protected wild areas, to make monetary compensation in the form of
royalties for products that reach the market, and in this way contribute
to technology transfer, training of Costa Rican scientists, and in many
cases, donate the necessary equipment and infrastructure needed to
develop research”6. Up to the present day, the Inbio has signed almost
30 commercial agreements. Some of these prerequisites, which are also
presented as benefits for the country, are logical in the framework of a
commercial negotiation. For example, that the partner finances the
research budget is logical, taking into account its financial capacity and
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interest in the business. Monetary compensation is not certain due to
the fact that a commercial product is not always obtained, and finally,
the remaining prerequisites would have to be studied to understand
their compliance, for example in the light of scientific equipment used
by the partner in its premises and that transferred to the country.
As regards economic benefits, Nagod and Tverteraas7 offer
information (in US dollars, for the period 1991-1999) of $420,245 as
contributions to the Ministry for Environment; $856,248 to
Conservation Areas; $699,336 to public universities; and $740.882 to
others. Guevara8 maintains that the Inbio has provided “support to the
conservation of protected wild areas, through direct payments to the
Minae for an amount that in the year 2000 topped $512.148, product
of 10% of the research budgets. (…) economic backup to specific
projects in conservation areas, universities and other groups for a total
sum of $2’256.259 between 1991 and 2000”. These figures show us that
in 2000, public universities, conservation areas and others received a
total of $40,207, as the total until 1999 was $2296,466. The MINAE
obtained $91,903. That is, they obtained $132,110 in 2000, a figure that
beats figures for 1998 and 1999, and is at least three times less than that
of 1996 and 1997.
We can assert that the Inbio has consolidated itself as a model in
the field of contracting and sale of biodiversity with various companies
on a national and international level - this is in fact its greatest profit.
It has benefited from its connections within governmental spheres,
whatever the government to be found in office; it is in fact part of the
elite that has controlled the Costa Rican state for the last ten years. It
has made economic profit synonymous with benefits to the country,
though its contribution in monetary terms has not been what was
expected according to what was expressed in the agreement with Merck
and for this reason we can say that it has sold off Costa Rica’s
biodiversity on the cheap.
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Bioprospection and biopiracy
The issue of access to genetic and biochemical resources, and the
fair and equal distribution of their derived benefits, goes in hand with
the subject of bioprospection or biopiracy. The first is one of the
objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which takes it on
as an obligation aiming to allow every country to facilitate access to its
resources, according to each country’s sovereignty, acquiring in return
diverse benefits as a product of access to and the transfer of technology.
Up to now the world has not seen any greater distribution of benefits.9
The concept of bioprospection arose in response to two
situations: the conservation and the commercialisation of biodiversity.
In this way Eisner10, along with the ideas of Janzen, suggest a system by
which genetically rich countries with little development in scientific
investigation can carry out biological sample taking and take the first
steps in the chemical monitoring of the properties of these beings.
Countries with strong scientific development would be in charge of the
last stages of identification of the properties of these sampled beings. It
was claimed that these activities were of low environmental impact,
and thus very compatible with conservation. This fact is not true, as we
have news of the destruction of ecosystems through such activities, as
well as the creation of monocultures of determined plants to be able to
build up a reserve of them to carry out biological prospection11.
Furthermore, benefits related to technology and economic transfer
would exist.
We could define bioprospection as “the systematic search,
classification and research for commercial ends of new sources of
chemical components, genes, proteins, micro-organisms and other
products of current or potential economic value that are found in
biodiversity”12. We can confirm that it is indeed a commercial activity.
In the same vein we maintain that bioprospection is the legalized
action of accessing genetic and biochemical resources, as well as
facilitating fair and equal distribution of benefits; a situation which up
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until now has not happened. Furthermore, due to its legality,
bioprospection cannot generate inequalities.
We can define biopiracy as the bioprospection that has been
carried out up to now on our planet, that which has generated greater
inequality, failed to respect the rights of communities and indigenous
peoples, not benefited in any way the denominated suppliers (the
economic side has not been significant) and failed to promote citizen
participation at least in the determination of the terms of negotiations,
among other aspects.

The ecological debt the Inbio
The Inbio carries out biopiracy in accordance to what is written
above. The economic benefits that it has provided cannot hide this fact
and in any case have not come in the quantity that the country was
expecting, thanks to the hopes created by Inbio itself. Even so, this is
not an issue of money. In this way, the Inbio has been running up an
ecological debt, that is to say a responsibility with the rest of Costa
Rican society (and not just in Costa Rica, but with other societies that
possess the same biodiversity) reflected in the following:
•

By carrying out its work through bilateral contracts, it has
legitimated what in fact works like weapon on an international
level, one that helps only deepen differences between contractual
parties (usually the transnational company and the local
community), bind existing inequalities to eternity, and promote
social and environmental injustice;

•

The Inbio has in this same way legitimated a package associated
to accessing genetic and biochemical resources, made up in
general of intellectual property rights and the production of
genetically modified organisms. This new package benefits only
those who already hold power;

•

Has promoted the privatisation of what is collective;
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•

Biopiracy carried out by Inbio has not promoted national
discussion on the use of natural resources as it has merely
appropriated them through various legal instruments. It has not
benefited anyone other than the Inbio and the Costa Rican elite
that is alternated in government every four years, and for this
reason it is not a sustainable activity;

•

The Inbio was created by the same dominant class that has
governed the country for the last 50 years, as a form of
legitimating the commodification of nature;

•

Biopiracy goes against communal control of natural resources;

•

It is based on commercial and technocratic determinism13. It
maintains that unless biodiversity shows that it can be valued, it
is not worth anything: the “sell to save” principle. But to sell to
whom, why, and with what cost? This leaves to one side other
values, those that have sustained biological diversity on the
planet: culture, religion, all of which go further than such
mercantile simplicity.

The successful model of biopiracy that has been legitimated by
the Inbio is full of unfulfilled promises that legitimate a development
model distant from social needs.
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Impacts of Transgenic Commerce:
a Case of Ecological Debt*
Elizabeth Bravo
Acción Ecológica-Ecuador

In May 2001 a peasant uprising of corn and rice producers took
place, due to their low cost in the national market. Among other things
the low cost was due to an import of 60.000 metric tons from the U.S.
and with subsidising prices, that is, lower than those existing in the
national market.
There exists two forms of corn production: small and average
producers with farms to about 5 ha and traditional which cultivates for
auto-subsistence these last are those that keep the greater corn biology
diversity. 11% of the economically active population is related with
corn cultivation (SICA, 2001). To this we must add the population,
which cultivates corn for its subsistence.
In Ecuador, at a commercial level, the greater production of corn
is developed on the coast (99.4 of the total), which has a cultivated
surface of 186.400 ha, with a performance by ha in average of 2,69
TM/ha (SICA, 2001).
The insertion of cheap corn coming from the U.S. would be
harming all the population, producing serious social impacts. Apart
from harming national production, this corn import from the US
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This article was presented during the SEMINAR ECOLOGICAL DEBT AND
BIOPIRACY held in March 2002 in Quito, Ecuador, organised by Acción
Ecológica.
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could mean the entrance of genetically modified corn or transgenic
corn.
Corn is the most domesticated and evolved plant in the vegetable
kingdom. Its origin and evolution has always been a mystery because it
has arrived to us highly evolved, without us knowing about any
intermediate forms.
Since last century there have existed diverse theories to explain
the origin and evolution of corn. The most popular one accepts
teocintle of Chelco (Zea mays mexicana) as the direct ancestors of corn.
In Ecuador, more than 5,900 years ago, the people of Valdivia,
who settled on the Pacific Coast, was already a totally agrarian society.
These people traded with the North of Peru, Meso America, up to
Western Mexico, where it originated from.
Around 3,000 b.c. an expansion of corn’s cultivation (Alvarez,
1999) of the Valdivia’s culture to Las Vegas, Chorrera, Chaullabamba,,
Monjashuaico and Cotocollao.
At present, Ecuador is one of the countries with the greatest
diversity of corn kept in CIMMYT- the greatest collection of corn in
the world comes from Ecuador (RAFI, 1992).
At present corn plays a very important cultural role in rural
communities in Ecuador, with very important social and cultural
implications.
The food complex of corn haricot bean, squash from a very old
origin has kept itself almost untouched up until today. Corn gives to
the haricot bean the necessary mechanical support it needs, and the
beans fix Nitrogen on the ground improving its quality. Moreover, the
three cultivations constitute complementary food for the peasants diet.
Corn is not the only basis of their nourishment but also a ritual
and celebration food. Corn is used for everything: to celebrate a birth
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or burial to elaborate the “chicha” for great parties, to share toasted
corn to visitors, etc..
Corn is always present on the peasant’s table. When corn is not
available, some women go and look for it where cultivation is later, to
trade other products for corn.
Ecuadorian corn has contributed to the development of
improved modern varieties of corn. According to the director of the
germplasm CIMMYT bank, “the CIMMYT as well as national corn
improvement programs in all the world, has incorporated elite sources
of germplasm originating in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well
as the improved varieties and hybrid development” (Nadal, 2000). In
relation to this, the United States former Secretary of State calculated
in 1993 that the “contribution” done by foreign germplasm to his
country’s economy was of 7 million dollars per year. This gives us an
idea of the “contribution” that Ecuadorian corn has given to their
economy.

Corn Sales in the United Sates
There exists 140 million ha of cultivated corn in the U.S. from
which the 20% of the total cultivated area (about 28 million ha) is
transgenic corn.
One of these transgenic corns is called SarLink. This is a Bt
(toxin Cry9C), which confers resistance to insects. This was approved
by the Environment Protection Agency -EPA- of the United States, only
for animal consumption, because it can present allergy problems in
humans. The regulation also asked the company which produced it,
that this seed, Aventis, that the corn could not go directly to human
consumers of the meat that had been fed with this corn. The company
appealed the EPA decision, at the same time that they placed the corn
on the market.
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The farmers that bought the StarLink seeds were noticed about
these restrictions, but there is no system in the U.S. that separates
conventional from transgenic corn, even less the StarLink one.
Halfway of the year 2000, the organization “Friends of the
World” discovered the StarLink was present in many products made
with corn, not only in the U.S. but also in other countries. The first
evidence of the StarLink presence was in taco tortillas in Kraft’s Taco
Bell (Eichenwald, 2000).
It is possible that now the corn Bt pollen has disseminated
towards conventional corn while conventional grains develop.
Although in some parts the StarLink meant 1% of cultivated corn, it
was capable of contaminating 50% of the total crop. In some cases
farmers had not sowed StarLink seeds, but were contaminated by their
neighbours.
The Aventis company has had to face various law suits due to
StarLink, including a class action in Chicago, where the company is
accused of negligence and fraud with consumers by selling and
producing products that have suffered allergic reactions, some of which
have informed the FDA about this.
On the other hand, many farmers and corn merchants are
waiting for Aventis to assume financial responsibility for their losses.
Since then, more than 300 products made out of corn have been
removed from supermarkets, restaurants and grocery shops in many
countries in the world, while proven they contain the StarLink toxin
Cry9C and in other countries this import has been prohibited.
This has provoked a fall of corn’s exportation produced in the
U.S. This export has decreased in 3,8 million metric tons in the year
2.000, compared to 1999 export. The main corn markets in the world
have dramatically decreased their corn import from the U.S., among
them Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, South Africa.
Japan only cut its import in 2,1 million metric tons of U.S. corn.
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What is Happenning with the Transgenic-Corn
In spite of the mandatory provisions which the OMC forces
countries to eliminate subsidies in the farming grounds, in such a way
that all countries can compete under the same conditions, -avoiding
unequal competition by means of placing in the market cheaper
subsidized products-, the Northern countries continue to subsidize an
agricultural system.
Table # 1
Corn Export from the United States
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
DESTINY

2000/01

1999/00

DIFFERENCE

Japan
Mexico
Taiwan
Egypt
South Korea
Colombia
Algeria
Canada
Saudi Arabia
Venezuela
Israel
Turkey
Morocco
Iran
Indonesia
Peru
The Philippines
Chile
Malaysia
South Africa
Unknown Origin

11.869
4.521
3.870
2.806
2.244
1.055
965
956
657
632
577
322
281
167
157
118
117
33
0
0
313

13.985
3.777
4.362
2.664
2.777
1.233
566
128
757
656
420
615
400
604
55
412
263
517
179
309
388

-2.116
744
-492
142
-533
-179
400
-293
-100
-24
157
-293
-119
-437
102
-294
-146
-485
-179
-309
-75

Subtotal

31.657

35.066

-3.409

4.021

4.435

-314

35.678

39.501

- 3.823

Others
Total
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There has been an increase in the levels of farming subsidies in
the U.S. Thus, for each dollar of export wheat, farmers receive US $ 1,4
from their government.
But, what happens with the corn? Apart from the fall of corn’s
sales, there has also been a fall on its price. The department of
Agriculture projected that the prices would be $1.85 for each bushel,
which is an inferior price to the one existing during the eighties
economic recession. Analysts agree that StarLink was a fundamental
cause although not the only one (McAuliffe, 2001).
To balance this fall on the prices, farmers have called on their
country’s Congress in order to ask for a 9 thousand million dollar loan
to pay for “losses in the market”. They have received US$28 billions in
subsidies since 1998.
The United States support two other subsidy programs through
credits, when there has been a fall of price and are directed to oil,
wheat, corn and other grains. These are a post-harvest and represent
less than 85% of the average price, which a determined product has had
in the market these last five years. If the product lowers these averages,
the farmer doesn’t pay the total loan, but pay on the basis of a
calculation of the Department of Agriculture. The loan program due to
payment deficiencies, compensates farmers, even though they haven’s
asked for a loan. Farmers who are eligible for a loan, and didn’t ask for
one, receive the subsidy anyway. In order to calculate the subsidy, the
present price of the product is taken on account, and a specific method
is developed by the Department of Agriculture. The annual payments
are up US$ 150.000 per person.
The National Association of Corn Farmers, propose that this
plan be replaced by a program which take in account as a starting point
the income, and the payments for farming transactions may continue,
which was established in 1995 in order to help farmers in commercial
transaction in high dependency markets.
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Besides, the credit guarantee programs for commercial export
(GSM-102 and GSM-103) who count with the amount of US$ 5,5
million per year.
The GSM-102 guarantees the credit payments in a short term
(90 days to 3 years) extended by financial institutions of the United
States to banks chosen in countries who buy agrarian products in the
U.S. It has been applied in countries of the Andean region, Central
America and the Caribbean. The guarantees given, in the GSM-103
program, finance periods of more than three years.
Besides this, there is a supplementary program designed to
support farmers who wish to expand, keep and develop markets for
agrarian products in areas in the world where there is no financing
without a payment guarantee. This program supports exporters in The
United States who want to give short-term credits (180 days or less)
directly to foreign buyers. This has been applied on sales in the Andean
and Central American region. The assistance program to export (EEP)
is a bond in order for the agrarian products to be more competitive in
the international market. The bond was of US$ 579 million in the year
2000.
The Markets Access Program (MAP) is a yearly US $90 million
fund, designed to encourage development, maintenance and expansion
of agrarian products and similar ones in foreign markets. It supports
market studies, promotion of agrarian products through fairs and
others.
The consequence of this subsidy scheme is that the Southern
countries will enter a totally unequal competition with a highly
subsidized and industrialized Northern countries system. This causes
social, economic and environmental impacts because it leads these
countries into a gradual loss of food’s self-sufficiency and a
dependency on foreign food.
Even when all subsidies are removed from the agrarian system of
these countries, they compete in the world market with 50 years of
subsidized agriculture.
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Another way of subsidy, which the government of the U.S.
supports, is to buy the surplus agrarian products that haven’t been able
to be sold in the global market and sell them cheaply or donates them
to Third World countries.

Food Aid
A Foreign Agricultural Service document (FAS) from the U.S.,
recognizes that it is a political move from this country to use food aid
to increase the development of markets for their agrarian products.
This is done through the PL 4806 Program, of agrarian products
acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporations.
The aid, is the last non regulated export market which is
available to U.S. farmers, because for poor countries, who face constant
economic crisis or are victims of environmental disasters it would be
very difficult to refuse this aid, for example, eve if it is transgenic
products.
In 1999, the government of the U.S. donated 500.000 tons of
corn and corn related products. It is believed that 30% of this help was
part of genetically modified food. For this, very profitable contracts
were given to some grain trades such as Archer Daniels Midland and
Cargill, which profited from a third of the contracts (a total of 140
million dollars in 1999).
The World Food Aid Program doesn’t know how much of this
aid is transgenic, nor does it have a specific policy on this issue. It
receives almost half of its annual income from the U.S. Its executive
director is an ex- official of the department of Agriculture of the U.S.
and is originally from the corn area of that country.
Analysing critically these aids given by The “Alianza Para el
Progreso”, what remains is a change in our cultural standards, but also
a market of typically U.S. products.
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Through Alianza para el Progreso, Ecuador is not self-sufficient
in wheat any more and today we depend almost totally on imported
wheat from the U.S. (Salgado, 2001). North American technicians
would accompany these aid programs, in order to show how to
consume products from that country. In this way great part of the aid
money would return there, and we would assume a debt with them.
Food Aid has always been used in order to reach U.S. foreign
policy goals. Thus for example: In the seventies during the Indochina
war, 70% of the help would go to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos: during
the eighties it was directed toward El Salvador-during the civil war- and
Egypt-which was its way of entering the Middle East- in the nineties
towards Eastern Europe, to support the transition towards a market
economy. Since the eighties, the help to other countries who
implement structural reforms towards free markets was privileged
(Salgado, 2001).
The European Community for a few years is worried about the
tendencies that the United States of using food aid to dispose of food
surplus in this country. This issue has been raised by the EC in
negotiations on agrarian problems at OMC.
Almost half of the wheat export of the 1999/2000 harvests was
food aid. In this communication, the EU proves that international
prices are in direct correlation (91%) with donations made by the U.S.
Food Aid increases when the prices lower, and this one decreases when
the prices increase (EU Ambassador to the US State department, 2001).
In the case of transgenics, donations they are used to diminish
the risks which agrarian U.S. politics could generate-in this case
promote the massive use of transgenic seed- and pass it on to a group
of consumers who by ignorance or necessity are “helped” through these
programs. For these reason transgenic subsidized products are
donated, who rejected from other countries and are sent to Third
World countries as “cheap products” or “food aid”.
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In studies made by the Net for a Free of Transgenics Latin
America, corn donated by the U.S. to Bolivia was found (Ramos, 2001).
Later, with the support of Friends of the Earth, donated transgenic corn
was found in Nicaragua.

World Commerce and and Genetic Erosion
World commerce of corn produces genetic erosion, because it is
based on only 4 varieties. 73% of corn’s world production comes from
one single variety, Dent, which is used as food for cattle and the
manufacture of industrial products (starch, oil, alcohol, corn syrup,
etc…) A second type is the Flint (hard), cultivated in places which
require tolerance to cold weather, where germination conditions and
storage are poor. The third Type is the Flour<(soft) used for human
consumption, and the Pop, (popping).
In Mexico, which shelters 41 racial complex of corn and
thousands of varieties, the genetic erosion in the bio diversity of corn
has already been found, with the NAFTA negotiations (Nadal, 2000).
The main hypothesis in which this negotiation was founded was
that Mexican corn producers are inefficient. The average performance
of this harvest at a national level has traditionally remained under the
2 tons by ha, although many local Mexican varieties have a better
performance than the best hybrid seeds from The US in the majority of
environments where corn in cultivated in Mexico (Nadal, 2000).
Besides, the Mexican germplasm owns exceptional resistance
characteristics towards abiotic “stress” conditions such as freezing
weather, hail, draught, plague resistance, disease and great adaptability
(Nadal, 2000).
With the fall of corn’s prices, the capacity to use, keep and
improve these genetic resources could irrevocably get lost.
Additionally, the introduction the U.S. corn has already
produced a genetic contamination in Oaxaca, one of the original corn
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centres, where the presence of transgenic corn was identified
(UNOSJO, 2001). There are three types of hypothesis related to the
origin of transgenic seeds found in Oaxaca.
-

That they were introduced because indigenous peasants planted
imported corn.

-

Migrants brought seed from the U.S. and planted them in their
communities.

-

Some research centre introduced to experiment with them.

In Ecuador after 5000 years of use, conservation and creation of
corn biodiversity and with a world commerce of corn with prices under
the real production cost, the genetic erosion problem could be similar
to the one in Mexico.

International Corn Commerce and Ecological Debt
The import of agrarian product (example Corn) subsidized or
donated to a producer country, generates an ecological debt for the
following reasons:
-

Destruction of peasant’s economy, because they cannot compete
with prices which are lower than the real production cost.

-

Cultural erosion and vanishing of productive systems in which
these economies are sustained

-

Peasants and small producers who are moved from this market
can: migrate to the cities, broadening the misery belts,
broadening the agrarian frontier at the price of natural systems
or leave the country.

-

Genetic erosion, due to the gradual disappearing of traditional
varieties.
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-

Dependence. By depending of imports from a single country, the
receptor country becomes more vulnerable (in political and
economic terms)

-

The receptive country has to over-export its natural resources
because it needs foreign currency in order to buy food, which
could mean the destruction of forests and biodiversity.

-

The country loses food sovereignty, because it cannot decide
independently over food policies.

-

In the case of transgenic corn, its import can produce genetic
contamination (as has been found in Mexico) negative impacts
on health (resistance to antibiotics, allergies and other
unpredictable impacts) and other environmental and social
impacts.

-

There exist moreover, an ecological debt which the U.S. has with
all countries which are corn diversification centres, due to the
non recognized use of germplasm, which has allowed to create all
the varieties of hybrid and “improved” varieties, and lift up one
of the most important economic sectors of that country.
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